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ESSAY

"NO ARMED BODIES OF MEN" - MONTANANS'
FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
(With Some Passing Notes on Recent
Environmental Rights Cases)
Robert G. Natelson*

I. INTRODUCTION

In July, 2000, the Police Department of the City of
Missoula, Montana, imported approximately seventy-six outside
police officers, many from other states, to assist with law
enforcement during an anticipated visit by the Hell's Angels
Motorcycle Club. Trouble did arise when the Hell's Angels were
* Professor of Law, University of Montana; J.D. 1973, Cornell Law School: A.B.
1970 (History), Lafayette College; PhD.-Level Equivalency Certificate in Latin, 1984,
University of Colorado; Senior Fellow in Western Studies, the Independence Institute,
Golden, Colorado; Senior Research Fellow, Initiative and Referendum Institute,
Washington, D.C.; Founding Chairman, Montanans for Better Government (1993-97);
Member, Colorado bar.
I would like to thank Varya Petrosyan, Class of 2003, University of Montana
School of Law, for her research assistance; Professor Jeff Renz, University of Montana
School of Law, for his comments on an earlier memorandum that served as the starting
point for this essay; Professor Andy Morriss, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, for his research guidance; and the staff at the University of Montana and Montana
State Law Libraries for assistance in tracking down primary source materials.
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in town. But it did not involve the Hell's Angels. To the
surprise of many, clashes and confrontations, both verbal and
violent, flared up between the police, including the out-of-state
officers, and the local citizenry.'
The mayor of Missoula appointed a review committee to
investigate the incident.
During the investigation, several
citizens testifying before the committee questioned whether the
importation of armed men from other states for peacekeeping
purposes violated Article II, Section 33 of the Montana
Constitution. That section reads as follows:
Importation of armed persons. No armed person or persons or
armed body of men shall be brought into this state for the
preservation of the peace, or the suppression of domestic violence,
except upon the application of the legislature,
or of the governor
2

when the legislature cannot be convened.

In its report, the review committee found no constitutional
violation. The committee report asserted Article II, Section 33
applied only to importations by private parties - specifically
mining companies' importation of strikebreakers - and not to
"governmental law enforcement agencies dealing with legitimate
emergencies." The report also averred that a state law, the
3
Montana Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Act of 1983,
4
provided the necessary legal authority for the importation.
1. See generally City of Missoula, Citizens Review Committee Report (Dec. 1,
2000) (unpublished Report, on file with MONTANA LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter "Report"].
2. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 33.
3. MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 44-11-301 to -312 (2001).
4. The Citizens Review Committee stated its constitutional conclusions in rather
strong terms:
In the course of its review, the Committee heard several assertions that are
demonstrably false and should be put to rest.
Misconception No. 1: Importing police officers from out of state violated
the Montana Constitution.
Some in the community have stated that bringing in armed officers from other
states violates Article II, section 33 of the Montana Constitution, which
prohibits bringing "armed" persons into the state to preserve the peace without
the approval of the legislature or governor. Although this Committee is not a
judicial body charged with interpreting the Constitution, the three lawyers on
the Committee firmly believe the Police Department's reliance on out-of-state
officers was not unconstitutional. The history of the provision in question,
which was taken from Montana's 1889 Constitution by the members of the
1972 Constitutional Convention, shows it was intended to keep mining
companies from importing private guards as strikebreakers. The law was not
intended to apply to governmental law enforcement agencies dealing with
legitimate emergencies.
More importantly, the Legislature expressly
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In this essay, I discuss the issue of whether Article II,
Section 33 is targeted at importations of "armed bodies of men"
by government, by private parties, or by both. I conclude:
" that the section certainly bans governmental importations not
specifically approved by the legislature or governor, and that
this is evident from facial analysis (the placement and text of
the section) and from its history;
* that facial analysis suggests that private importation is not
banned, although there is sufficient uncertainty to justify a
court considering the underlying history of the section;
" that although the historical case is not compelling either Way,
the balance of the evidence is that private importations are
banned; and
" that compliance with the Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual
Aid Act without following the specific waiver procedures in
Article II, Section 33 does not render such an importation
constitutional.

Additionally, in Part II. C, I resort to the Montana Supreme
Court's recent "environmental rights" cases to illustrate some
problems in judicial review of a constitutional right against
private parties.
II. THE IDENTITY OF IMPORTERS
A. Facialanalysis
1. Reasons for facial analysis

No Montana case law specifically interprets Article II,
Section 33. In the absence of controlling case law, the normal
first step for interpreting a constitutional provision, as other
written documents, is to determine whether the provision is
authorized mutual aid agreements with out-of-state law enforcement agencies
when it passed the Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Act in 1983.
Report, supra note 2, at 14.
In preparing the memorandum that served as a starting point for this essay, I
interviewed all three of the lawyer-members of the committee, but it remains unclear to
me what could be the basis for the level of certainty expressed in the foregoing extract.
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facially clear when read in its context in the document and in
the language of the time of drafting. 5 If the provision is facially
clear, it is enforced as written. To the extent that Article II,
Section 33 is clear, a court should not look behind it by utilizing
historical analysis or other outside evidence.
Thus, clear language is not qualified or narrowed by the
historical contingency that led to its adoption. By way of
illustration, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States was
adopted primarily for the protection of African-Americans. But
its clear language protects "any person."6 A court would not
admit historical evidence as "proof' that the Clause denies
protection to Asian-Americans. The words "any person" are too
clear to deny that Asian-Americans enjoy the coverage of the
Equal Protection Clause.7 On the other hand, if a constitutional
provision is ambiguous or otherwise unclear, then a court may
turn to historical and other interpretive methods. 8
Part of this essay is devoted to an examination of the
history of the Section as a whole. However, the reader should be
cautioned that to the extent the Section is clear on its face, that
history may have no legal force.

5. Cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-106 (2001) (construction of words and phrases is
according to the context and the approved usage of the language).
The language of the time may have to be consulted because words change their
'meaning over long periods of time. For example, the phrase "more perfect union" in the
Preamble of the Constitution of the United States means "more nearly complete union."
No changes of meaning, however, are relevant to the issue discussed in this paper.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("nor shall any state... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
7. For the broad reach of the Equal Protection Clause, see JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITuTIONAL LAW 632-38 (West Publishing Co. 2000) (1981).
On the other hand, evidence that the Amendment was triggered in part by southern
states' Black Codes could be introduced to show the scope of the less clear term "equal
protection of the laws." Moreover on other points, the term "any person" might require
historical analysis: Is, for example, an unborn child a "person" within the meaning of the
Clause?
8. Among these methods are the much-abused terms "strict construction" and
"liberal construction." These are properly understood as merely different ways of
resolving textual ambiguities. Courts applying strict construction resolve ambiguities
against coverage, while courts applying liberal construction resolve ambiguities in
accordance with the general intent of the legislator. See, e.g. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
386 (4 t ' ed. 1968) (discussing strict and liberal construction).
Outside of criminal law, liberal construction generally is preferred in Montana.
E.g. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2-102 to -103 (2001). The historical analysis in this essay
sheds light on intent, and thus should further liberal construction of unclear matters.
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2. Placement and context
Facial analysis must take into account both the placement
and context of Article II, Section 33 and its wording. We first
turn to placement and context.
The Section is found in the Montana Declaration of Rights.
This suggests, of course, that it partakes of characteristics
similar to other sections in the Declaration of Rights. Two of
these characteristics are relevant to our inquiry. First, with one
partial exception, 9 all of the sections in the Declaration of Rights
are citizen protections against governmental authority. In other
words, they are not claims upon government nor proscriptions
against private action. This is, indeed, rather typical of bills of
rights in American constitutions. 10 Although the Montana
Constitution does contain some positive guarantees and
protections against private parties, those provisions are not
located in the Declaration of Rights."
The second relevant characteristic of provisions within the
Declaration of Rights is that the state supreme court ascribes
special attributes to them. They are "fundamental" rights that
individuals may enforce in court and that government may
infringe legitimately only if the government convinces the court
9. A portion of the right to individual dignity. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
10. Traditionally, constitutions of government are limited to defining the
organization of government agencies and scope of government powers, not the rights of
private citizens inter se. Etymologically, the word constitution comes from the Latin
verb, constituere, which in this context means "to arrange" or "to organize." CHARLES T.
LEWIS, A LATIN DICTIONARY (reprint 1980) (1879). A constitution of government is an
arrangement, organization, or, to use a common 18th century term, a "frame" of
government. Cf. John Dickinson, Letters of Fabius No. 4, in PAUL LEICESTER FORD
(Ed.), PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 181 (1888) (". . . a
constitution is the organization of the contributed rights in society. Government is the
exercise of them.") (emphasis in original).
This is why, in the American constitutional tradition, individual rights usually
are phrased as limitations on government powers. See, e.g., State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65,
70-71, 700 P.2d 153, 156-57 (1985):
Historically, constitutions have been means for people to address their
government. . . . Certainly, there is nothing in the constitutional debate that
clearly indicates we should depart from traditional constitutional notions.
Therefore, in accordance with well-established constitutional principles, we
hold that the privacy section of the Montana Constitution contemplates privacy
invasion by state action only.
216 Mont. at 70, 700 P.2d at 157.
11. Thus, the environmental right within the Declaration of Rights, Article II,
Section 3, protects against state action. The protection against private action is located
in Article IX, Section 1. Similarly, the state educational guarantee is not found in
Article II, but in Article X. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1. See also id.; MONT. CONST. art. IX,
§ 4 (government provision of cultural resources).
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that the infringing action is "narrowly tailored" to serve a
"compelling state interest."1 2 This standard of review of
government action is called "strict scrutiny."1 3 Strict scrutiny
has the practical effect of reversing the presumption of
constitutionality usually afforded governmental actions.
Thus, the placement of Article II, Section 33 implies that it
is (1) a right against government, (2) a citizen right, analogous
to the requirement of trial by jury, 14 and (3) a fundamental
right, so that government infringement is valid only if it serves a
compelling state interest.
3. Text
The next step in our facial analysis is to examine the
wording of Article II, Section 33. Once again, the text reads:
Importation of armed persons. No armed person or persons or
armed body of men shall be brought into this state for the
preservation of the peace, or the suppression of domestic violence,
except upon the application of the legislature,
or of the governor
15
when the legislature cannot be convened.
The drafters phrased the text in the passive voice, without
identification of particular importers or classes of importers.
The natural reading, therefore, is that all importations of armed
persons for peacekeeping purposes are banned, public or private,
irrespective of who does the importing. Unfortunately for this
natural reading, the interpretative convention is that rights in
bills of rights, even if cast in the passive without a subject, apply
only against government.
The Montana supreme court's
interpretation of the state right to privacy is an example.' 6 The
argument is strengthened in that certain other rights in the
state constitution do specify that they are effective against

12. Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 911 P.2d 1165 (1996); Mont. Envtl. Info.
Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, 61, 296 Mont. 207, 61, 988 P.2d 1236,
61. See also Cape-France Enter. v. Estate of Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d
1011.
13. Id.
14. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24.
15. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 33.
16. See State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 70, 700 P.2d 153, 156 (1985) (interpreting
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10, which reads, "The right of individual privacy.., shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest," as a right only against
state, not private, action.) See also U.S. CONST. amends. II, III, IV & IX.
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private action. 17
Moreover, this text is materially different from laws and
constitutional provisions targeted against private arms and
private armies. The latter category includes (1) sections in other
state constitutions that carve exceptions from the right to keep
and bear arms so the legislature may regulate or prohibit
private armies,' 8 and (2) statutes that prohibit importations of
armed personnel for criminal purposes. 19 The goal of such
provisions is to prevent disturbancesof the peace, and the means
is to suppress private armies. But the goal of Article II, Section
33 does not seem to be, or at least is not limited to, preventing
disturbances of the peace. It prohibits importations "for the
preservation of the peace." Different goals often imply different
means - especially here, since public, not private, actors are the
usual preservers of the peace.
4. Conclusionsfrom facial analysis
Facial analysis shows clearly that Article II, Section 33 bans
government importations of armed men. To reach a definitive
legal interpretation on that point, therefore, there is no need to
examine the legislative history behind the section.
Facial analysis is less successful in determining whether
17. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (part of the right of individual dignity), art. IX, § 3
(environmental right against private parties).
18. E.g., ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 26 (adopted 1912): "The right of the individual
citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the State shall not be impaired, but nothing
in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize,
maintain, or employ an armed body of men." See also WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (adopted
1889): "The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state,
shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing
individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men."
Some interpretative cases include Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); State v. Gohl,
90 P. 259 (Wash. 1907); and Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E. 138 (Mass. 1896).
19. An example of the latter sort of enactment is MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-106(1)
(2001):
A person commits the offense of bringing armed men into the state when he
knowingly brings or aids in bringing into this state an armed person or armed
body of men for the purpose of engaging in criminal or socially disruptive
activities or to usurp the powers of law enforcement authorities. (emphasis
added).
This section superseded former MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-3524 (Smith 1947), which
covered only importation for preserving the peace, as does Article II, Section 33:
Every person who brings into this state an armed person or armed body of men
for the preservation of the peace or the suppression of domestic violence, except
at the solicitation and by the permission of the legislative assembly or of the
governor, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding ten
years and by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars.
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Article II, Section 33 interdicts purely private importations. The
natural reading of the section in isolation suggests that it does.
The legal context and various interpretative conventions suggest
that it does not.
We turn, therefore, to the history of Article II, Section 33.
B. The history of Article II, Section 33
1. History before 1971
This section was first adopted as Article III, Section 31 of
the 1889 Montana Constitution. 20 It is one of four fraternal
quadruplets: Similar sections were inserted almost immediately
thereafter into the constitutions of Wyoming, Idaho, and
Kentucky. The Wyoming and Idaho conventions also met in
1889, the Kentucky convention in 1890. Following is the
Wyoming section:
No armed police force, or detective agency, or armed body, or
unarmed body of men, shall ever be brought into this state, for the
suppression of domestic violence, except upon the application of
the legislature,
or executive, when the legislature cannot be
21
convened.

Similarly, Idaho's constitution provides:
No armed police force, or detective agency, or armed body of men,
shall ever be brought into this state for the suppression of
domestic violence except upon the application of the legislature,
or
22
the executive, when the legislature can not be convened.

And Kentucky's:
No armed person or bodies of men shall be brought into this State
for the preservation of the peace or the suppression of domestic
violence, except upon the application of the General Assembly, or
of the Governor when the General Assembly may not be in

20. The 1889 section provided:
No armed person or persons or armed body of men shall be brought into this
state for the preservation of the peace or the suppression of domestic violence,
except upon application of the legislative assembly or of the governor when the
legislature cannot be convened.
21. WYO. CONST. art. XIX, § 6 (effective 1890).
22. IDAHO CONST. art. XIV, § 6 (effective 1890).
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23

All four quadruplets are formed in the passive voice, are
targeted against importations for peacekeeping purposes, and
provide for waiver by the legislature or, as a backup, by the
24
governor.
Although background information on the Kentucky
provision is not available, 25 the transcripts of the convention
debates that led to the adoption of these provisions in the three
neighboring states of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming enable us
to reconstruct the community of understanding existing at the
time.
First, the history amply supports the findings of facial
analysis as to government importations. Although there was
talk of the practice of mining companies and other kinds of
businesses 26 bringing in armed men, there also was specific
concern about public authorities such as local law enforcement
29
agencies,2 7 state authorities, 28 and the federal government.
Moreover, the convention discussions reflect the fact that many
- perhaps most - of the abusive cases had arisen when local
sheriffs and marshals deputized out-of-staters. 30 One Wyoming

23.
KY. CONST. § 225 (effective 1891).
24. The first three provisions state that the governor may authorize the
importation only if the legislature cannot be convened. The Kentucky provision is
marginally looser, allowing the governor to act if the legislature is not actually in
session.
25. E-mail from Carol J. Parris, Reference and Research Services Librarian at the
University of Kentucky, to Varya Petrosyan, University of Montana School of Law, Class
of 2003 (July 10, 2001) (on file with the author).
26. MONT. CONST. CONVENTION 129-130 (1889) [hereinafter Montana 1889
Convention] (statements of Delegate Fields and Delegate Breen).
27. Id. at 129-130 (on the concern with deputization by local law enforcement
agencies).
28. Thus, Montana Delegate Knowles doubted whether the governor should have
the right to call for armed forces from other states. See Montana 1889 Convention at 131
(statement of Delegate Knowles). An earlier draft of the Wyoming provision stated that
even with consent of the authorities the only outside agency permitted in the state
should be the U.S. Army. WYO. CONST. CONVENTION 192 (1889) [hereinafter "Wyoming
Convention"].
29. See John Welling Smurr, A Critical Study of the Montana Constitutional
Convention of 1889, 87-88 (1951) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Montana State University)
(on file with the Mansfield Library, University of Montana).
30. For a Montana example of deputizing company employees, see McCarthy v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 70 Mont. 309, 225 P. 391 (1924) (although in that case
they appear to have local residents). While deputization is not mentioned specifically in
the Montana transcripts, deputization was a widespread practice that occurred in
Montana, and some delegates' remarks seem to assume it.
See Montana 1889
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delegate explained the thrust of the proposal in this way:
That is what this section is intended to prevent; that is that armed
men shall be brought in from the slums of Chicago, and that they
shall be clothed with authority of law.31 (emphasis added).

Another Wyoming delegate said his goal was a provision
that would
keep out a foreign body of armed men, and not give them the
pleasure of sticking on a badge, laying around the saloons at my
little voting place, spoiling for a fight,
made deputy marshals to
32
guard Dale creek bridge as a dodge.
Not surprisingly, however, the delegates were not all of one
mind on such issues; some, for example, defended the police who
33
had deputized out-of-staters.
The more difficult question is history's verdict on whether
these provisions were designed to forbid purely private
importations, without deputization. There is good evidence that
they were. The delegates' comments reflect concerns about
corporations importing armed men to break strikes 34and for
other kinds of violence and intimidation. 35 Delegate Martin
Maginnis' sentiments, thundered out at the Montana 1889
convention to general applause, were unambiguous:
...for anyone or anybody to bring an armed body of men into this
Territory for any purpose whatever, either to foment trouble or to
put it down, is an invasion of the Territory of Montana, and its

Convention, supra note 27, at 130 (Delegate Breen, on arresting powers).
31. Wyoming Convention, supra note 29, at 402.
32. Id. at 404; another Wyoming delegate complained of the heavy focus on public
deputization, urging that importations by "corporations and individuals be put on
exactly the same basis."
33. E.g., id. at 403-04 (Delegate Riner).
34. The strikebreaking function is mentioned by one author, see supra note 30, at
88; but the transcripts and other sources show broader functions. See also K ROSS
TOOLE, TWENTIETH- CENTURY MONTANA: A STATE OF EXTREMES 148 (1972).

35.
Professor Jeff Renz notes two cases that did not involve either mining
companies or strikebreakers: (1) the Union Pacific's hiring of armed men to track down
and kill the Hole-in-the-Wall Gang and (2) a Wyoming cattlemen's hiring of Tom Horn,
on whom see T.A. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING 372-74 (1978) (although Horn did not
come to Wyoming until 1892 at the earliest). See also Joan Bishop, Vigorous Attempts to
Prosecute:Pinkerton Men on Montana's Range: 1914, MONTANA: THE MAG. OF W. HIST.,
Spring 1980, at 2 (use of imported detectives to stop rustling, beginning in 1885)
[hereinafter Bishop].
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sacred rights and privileges. 36

But other delegates were not so sure. Many of the delegates
seemed to understood that some imported men, including
employees of the widely disliked Pinkerton's National Detective
Agency of Chicago, were serving the wholly legitimate public
purposes: solving crime, protecting private property, and
assisting the police - and that they were doing this not just for
mining companies, but for cattlemen.3 7 Thus, at all three
conventions, there were strenuous defenses of citizens'
legitimate rights to protect their property and demands for
assurance that the right to self-defense would remain if these
38
provisions were adopted.
Moreover, there is evidence that in Montana the 1889
constitution was not universally understood to forbid purely
private importations (i.e., without deputization). Importations
continued in Montana for many years thereafter, apparently
without any suggestion that they were unconstitutional. One
author, Joan Bishop, has detailed how men from the Pinkerton
agency were used to check Montana cattle rustling from 1885
until at least 1920. 39 Hers is not the only report. 40 One
Pinkerton detective, Frank Lavigne, received enough public and
positive recognition for his work to be appointed as chief

36. Montana 1889 Convention, supra note 27, at 130 (emphasis added).
37. This point was made obliquely at least twice at the Montana convention.
Montana Convention, supra note 27, at 129, 131. It also was made at the Idaho
Convention. 2 I.W. Hart, ed., PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION OF IDAHO OF 1889, at 1413 (1912) [hereinafter Idaho Convention]. See also
Bishop, supra note 36.
38. Montana 1889 Convention, supra note 27, at 129 (Delegate Warren), 131
(Delegate Hogan); Wyoming Convention, supra note 29, at 402 (Delegate Brown). The
following colloquy occurred at the Idaho convention:
Delegate Ainslie: I move the adoption of that amendment, and I believe in it.
We have had enough of Pinkerton's private squads of men ranging through the
west. I see Montana has adopted the same thing, and I think it is a good thing.
But then a quick clarification by the Chairman:
I will call attention to the words, "private detective agency." If the gentleman
from Boise will examine the amendment and see that it cuts off the
employment of private detectives for the detection of individual crime. I don't
think it was the desire of the gentleman from Logan to include that.
With that clarification the measure was passed. Idaho Convention, supra note
38, at 1413.
39. Bishop, supra note 36, at 2.
40. See, e.g., K. ROSS TOOLE, TWENTIETH CENTURY MONTANA: A STATE OF
EXTREMES 148 (Norman ed., University of Oklahoma Press 1972) (mass use of company
detectives in 1914).
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detective of the Montana State Board of Stock Commissioners. 41
2. The policies behind the constitutionalprovisions
The policies that motivated adoption of Article II, Section 33
and the other quadruplets can add insight into their scope. The
Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming convention transcripts reveal
two principal policies.
One of these was, as Delegate Maginnis said, to preserve
the territorial integrity of the state. 42 The other, which is
perhaps of more interest today, was to prevent clashes and
contention between local citizens and unsympathetic out-ofstaters.
Both policies are part of a long American constitutional
tradition. The first policy - protection of the state's territorial
integrity - is desirable because territorial invasion of a state can
disrupt republican government. Accordingly, the United States
Constitution specifies that the federal government will protect
43
the states against it.
The latter policy embodies the value that
the founding generation at the time of ratification of the U.S.
Constitution called sympathy.
The term "sympathy" is omnipresent in the grand
constitutional debate of 1787-89.44 It meant identity of interest,
values, and "fellow-feeling" between governmental decision
makers, including the police, and the citizenry at large.
Although a closer modern word might be "empathy," in this
essay I shall employ "sympathy" as a term of art because of its
strong historical connections.
The value of "sympathy" between governors and governed
underlies such well-known state and constitutional features as
the large numbers and small districts that characterize lower
houses of the legislature, jury trial by local citizens,
41. Bishop, supra note 36, at 12.
42. E.g. Montana 1889 Convention, supra note 27, at 130 (Delegate Maginnis).
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion...").
44. See, e.g., Virginia Ratifying Convention Debates, 3 JONATHAN ELLIOTT (ED.),
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 395 & 536 (James Madison), 576 (Edmund Randolph); 590 (Patrick
Henry). See also, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 35, at 216 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 45,
at 290, 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS Nos. 55 ("A Georgian") & 63 ("The Federal Farmer" [likely Richard
Henry Lee]), available at http://www.constitution.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2001).
This list is merely a small sampling.
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proscriptions on conflicts of interest - including bans on
executive branch officials in the legislature, 4 5 frequent elections,
46
and term limits.
At an early date, Americans became attached to the value of
sympathy in law enforcement. British importation of Hessian
mercenaries to suppress the American Revolution was a topic of
particular abhorrence, and was cited as one of the grievances in
the Declaration of Independence.4 7 As made clear earlier, in the
19th century public opinion reacted strongly against the practice
of local authorities granting law enforcement powers to armed
men brought in from other states. 48 The United States has been
one of the few nations that has declined to establish a national
police force, preferring to rely on community and state law
enforcement. Quartering of troops on homeowners in peacetime
is constitutionally prohibited. 4 9 Use of the military for internal
policing is, in general, forbidden by law. 50 Lest anyone think
that this policy of "sympathy" in law enforcement is
anachronistic, he need only reflect on the serious recent
attention given to training and disciplining local police so as to
maintain an identity of feeling and interest with local
51
citizenry.
45. E.g. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 9.
46. See Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy
and Independence (forthcoming).
47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 28 (U.S. 1776).
48. The lack of "sympathy" between those men and local inhabitants was noted in
the Wyoming Constitutional Convention:
That is what this section is intended to prevent; that is that armed men shall
be brought in from the slums of Chicago, and that they shall be clothed with
authority of law.... Wyoming Convention, supra note 29, at 402 (1893).
Some of these men were convicts who had been pardoned not ten days from the
Lincoln penitentiary in Nebraska; that was the kind of men that were sent
here....
Id. at 403.
See also the cutting reference to Chicago in Montana 1889 Convention, supra note 27, at
130 (Delegate Breen), as well as the general hostility toward out-of-state enforcers in the
discussion.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. III. See also MONT. CONST. art. II, § 32.
50. By the so-called "Posse Comitatus Act." See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 375 (1998).
51. This is called community policing. See, e.g., Community Policing Consortium,
About Community Policing, at http://www.communitypolicing.orglabout2.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2001) (among the elements of the philosophy: "Law enforcement has long
recognized the need for cooperation with the community it serves. Officers speak to
neighborhood groups, participate in business and civic events, consult with social
agencies and take part in education programs for school children. Foot, bike and horse
patrols bring police closer to the community" and "Community policing allows law
enforcement to get back to the principles upon which it was founded, to integrate itself
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Article II, Section 33 promotes the policy of "sympathy" by
making importation administratively inconvenient - that is, by
Before an
requiring two-tiered deliberation in advance.
importation, both local and state authorities must agree on its
necessity. The statewide officials to whom the local officials
must apply are, first, the legislature - the branch most
"sympathetic" to the people - and, if that is impractical, the
governor, who commands the militia and is the statewide official
most visibly responsive to the people. In the course of this
process, the legislature or governor may decide that there are
less risky alternatives, such as using the militia or police from
other communities within Montana.
Sadly, some consequences of disregarding the constitutional
policy were illustrated in the Missoula incident referred to
above: A documented lack of "sympathy" between citizens and
police that was aggravated, justifiably or not, by the presence of
Now that mass invasion of
out-of-state police officers. 52
Montana by purely private forces is unlikely, the promotion of
sympathy between law enforcement and citizens may be this
53
section's primary usefulness.
The policies underlying Article II, Section 33 are best served
by its application to both public and private importers. The
territorial integrity of the state could be threatened by invasion
sponsored either by another government or by private parties.
Either kind of invasion could have local government
collaborators; that is one reason the section provides that the
legislature or governor must approve the importation. The
policy of sympathy is most applicable to public importers,
especially of law enforcement personnel. However, even the
private use of out-of-state security guards, for example, can
cause ill-will, disrespect for the law, or even violence.
3. 1971-72 ConstitutionalConvention
The 1971-72 Montana convention transcripts, although not
copious on this subject, support the conclusion that the Article
once again into the fabric of the community so that the people come to the police for
counsel and help before a serious problem arises, not after the fact.").
52. See, e.g., Report, supra note 2, at 6-13.
53. Unfortunately, this point seems to have been missed in Elison and Snyder's
discussion of the Montana Constitution, which discusses instead isolated instances of
tax-protestors and the like, and concludes that, "In practice, the section is probably
without significant value ....
CONSTITUTION 86 (2001).

" LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE
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II, Section 33 applies to both public and private importations.
Although some have interpreted references to "strikebreakers"
at the convention as a limitation on the Section, 54 examination
of the 1971-72 transcript actually suggests that the provision
has a very broad sweep indeed.
The primary discussion of Article II, Section 33 at the
convention was an oral report from the Bill of Rights
Committee. Based on that oral report, the section was read and
approved. The entire report is as follows:
DELEGATE FOSTER: Mr. Chairman, I move that when this
committee does arise and report, having had under consideration
Section 33 of the Bill of Rights Proposal Number 8, it recommends
that the same be adopted.

Mr. Chairman. Article III, Section 31 [of the 1889 constitution]
remains unchanged.
The protection, initially established to
prevent the importation of strikebreakers, is thought to be an
adequate safeguard against any body of armed men coming into
the state. No delegate proposals were received on this provision.
This particular section was reviewed in somewhat similar light as

to the one previous to it. The thinking of the committee on this
question was the same. It does have some history to it, and there
is a possibility that in the case of an unruly situation that someone

might be inclined to bring armed men into the state. And we felt
that it was a good safeguard, and the committee felt it was
important that this be retained as a safeguard to the people of the
State of Montana. Thank you, Mr. President [Chairman]

.55

It is evident from a reading of this passage, which is echoed
in the Bill of Rights Committee's formal comments, 56 that the
committee's, and by extension the convention's, intent was for
the normal rule of interpretation - a clear, general clause is not
limited to the historical events that produced it. In the words of
Delegate Foster, whatever the reason this section was "initially
established," it was now a "safeguard against any body of men
54. This is likely a basis for the conclusion in Report, supra note 2, at 14.
55. 6 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-1972,
at 1832 (emphasis added).
56. See MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-72, BILL OF RIGHTS
COMMITTEE PROPOSAL:
The committee voted unanimously that the former Article III, section 31
remain unchanged.
The protection, initially established to prevent the
importationof strike-breakers,is thought to be an adequate safeguard against
any body of armed men coming into the state. No delegate proposals were
received on this provision. (emphasis added).
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coming into the state" because of the "possibility that in the case
of an unruly situation [such as a Hell's Angels' visit - ed.] that
someone might be inclined to bring armed men into the state."
There is no suggestion that the section be read in a historically
restrictive way, or that "any body of men" was to be limited to
57
either public or private importations.
In other words, Article II, Section 33 means what it says.
4. Implications of history for the identity of importers
The history of Article II, Section 33 supports the conclusions
from facial analysis that the provision restricts governmental
importations and creates a citizen right to be protected from
them unless the state complies special procedures.
The
transcripts of the various constitutional conventions discuss
publicly-sanctioned importations, and such coverage is
necessary to implement the underlying policies of "sympathy,"
and territorial integrity.
Facial analysis revealed a lack of certainty as to whether
purely private importations were covered.
There is some
historical evidence that they are not: Delegates expressed
reservations against reducing the right of self-defense, and in
Montana, in particular, private importations continued for many
years without constitutional challenge. Although I am not
without reservations on the question, it does seem to me that
the weight of the historical evidence is that Article II, Section 33
also restricts purely private importations. This conclusion is
supported by strong statements, both at the 1889 and 1971-72
conventions, in favor of broad coverage. It also is supported by
the fact that restricting private importations furthers the twin
policies of territorial integrity and "sympathy."
C. An Unresolved (andPerhaps Unresolvable)
Problem: JudicialReview of Private Importation Cases
It is with mixed feelings that I conclude that Article II,
Section 33, unlike most other provisions in the Montana

57.
N.B. the wording in the oral Bill of Rights Committee report: "This particular
section was reviewed in somewhat similar light as the one previous to it." The one
previous to it was the ban on the quartering of soldiers in homes and the superiority of
the civil to the military power. Discussion at the convention reveals that the provision
was retained (1) because of an unwillingness to remove rights already enjoyed by the
people and (2) because future circumstances could once again threaten the right. See 6
VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-1972, at 1829-31.
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Declaration of Rights, creates a right against private parties. In
general, I favor the traditional view that constitutions ought to
limit themselves to protecting "negative rights" against
government rather than rights against private parties or
positive guarantees from government. Construing Article II,
Section 33 creates a knotty interpretative question of the kind
that arises when constitution-makers depart from that principle.
The question is this: By what standard should a court review a
purely private importation?
The Montana Supreme Court opinion in Montana
Environmental Information Center v.
Department of
Environmental Quality5 8 included dicta concerning another state
constitutional right against private parties - the right to a clean
59
and healthy environment vis-a-vis other private citizens.
Because of that provision's close connection with the
environmental right against government in the Article II
Declaration of Rights, 60 the court opined that it was a
fundamental right, and that therefore violations by private
citizens must be justified by showing a compelling state
interest. 61 A fortiori, this reasoning applies to Article II, Section
33, which is itself in the Declaration of Rights: A private
importer of armed personnel can justify an unauthorized
importation only by showing a compelling state interest.
The problem, however, is that this standard is internally
inconsistent, and therefore - quite literally - impossible to
apply.
A private actor accused of violating another's fundamental
right is often, perhaps usually, proceeding in accordance with
one or more of his own fundamental rights. The dicta in
Montana Environmental Information Center, for example, spoke
of one's right to be protected against a private actor whose acts
"implicate" the environment. The court makes it clear that a
plaintiff can defend against a private actor's "implication" even
if that "implication" does not cause injury to the plaintiff in the
traditional sense.6 2 Hence, if A decides to cut timber on his own
58. 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236.
59. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
60. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
61. See supranote 57, at 63.
62. Because the right to property generally includes the right to use it in a way
that does not create a nuisance, the standard in Montana Environmental Information
Center also may entail some federal constitutional difficulties. See Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, U.S. -,
121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001).
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land in a way that does not hurt B in a traditional sense - that
is, A does not create a nuisance - but B nevertheless convinces a
court that A's cut "implicates" the environment, then A cannot
proceed unless he proves that the cut furthers a compelling state
interest. However, A's right to cut timber without harm to
others (in the traditional sense) is part of his right to property.
The right to property also is in the Declaration of Rights, 63 and
therefore fundamental.
It cannot be infringed without a
64
interest.
state
compelling
The upshot of all this is that if both sides can show a
compelling state interest or if neither side can show a
compelling state interest, then the cut must be simultaneously
permitted and prohibited.
I doubt if even the Montana
Environmental Information Center majority could find a way to
do that.
In a private importation case, if the importation is to protect
the importer's life, liberty or property, it cannot be infringed
without a compelling state interest. 65 But if private importing is
barred by Article II, Section 33, then, under the dicta in
Montana Environmental Information Center, it cannot be
permitted without a compelling state interest. If there is no
compelling state interest either way or if there is a compelling
state interest on both sides, the importation must be
simultaneously permitted and prohibited.
The quandary demonstrates more than a problem with the
Montana Environmental Information Center case. It illustrates
the almost insuperable juristic snafus that courts get into when
faced with constitutional guarantees against private parties
rather than against the state. 66 So perhaps, given the uncertain

63. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
64. The inherent conflict here has been suggested by Justice Rice. See CapeFrance Enter. v. Estate of Peel, 2001 MT 139, 61, 305 Mont. 513, 61, 29 P.3d 1011, 9
61 (Rice, J., dissenting).
65.

See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.

66. The relative success of the U.S. Constitution is attributable partly because it
avoids creating rights against private parties or positive guarantees against the state.
Positive guarantees also involve juristic quandaries, and almost inevitably draw the
courts into the legislative sphere, as the history of the Montana school funding litigation
amply shows. See, e.g., Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State of Montana,
236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989). This, in turn, removes policy questions from the
more democratic branches (legislature and executive) and lodges it in the judiciary - an
essentially unrepublican result. See Robert G. Natelson, "A Republic, Not a Democracy?"
Initiative, Referendum and the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 81 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming February 2002). (as determined by the founding generation, one of the
three "core". requirements of republicanism is rule, either directly or through
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nature of the facial and historical evidence, we might breathe
easier if the state supreme court did not read the historical
evidence quite as I do, and declined to apply Article II, Section
33 to private importers.
III. COMPLIANCE WITH THE MUTUAL AID ACT
DOES NOT SATISFY ARTICLE II, SECTION 33

The Montana Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Act

67

purports to authorize the importation of police officers from
outside Montana pursuant to mutual aid agreements approved
by the attorney general. The City of Missoula relied on the Act
for its importation in July, 2000. Although the citizens'
committee investigating citizen-police clashes stated that
compliance with the Act represented the necessary legislative
approval under Article II, Section 33,68 it is difficult to square
that conclusion with the clear wording and underlying policy of
that section.
Article II, Section 33 prescribes the procedures under which
the ban on importation can be waived. 69 Particular procedures
must be followed - specifically:
1.

Application (request for the importation) by the legislature, if the
legislature can be convened.

representatives, by citizen majorities or pluralities).
In the federal constitution, there is one positive guarantee - U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 4, by which the United States guarantees each state a "republican form of
government." The federal courts have avoided entering this legal thicket by declaring
the clause a matter for Congress, and non-justiciable. On the Guarantee Clause, see
generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(1972). For more recent treatments, see Natelson, supra, and sources cited therein.
67. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 44-11-301 to -312 (2001).
68. Report, supra note 2, at 14 ("More importantly, the Legislature expressly
authorized mutual aid agreements with out-of-state law enforcement agencies when it
passed the Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Act in 1983.").
Interestingly enough, at the time of the Missoula importations of July, 2000,
the Act actually had not been complied with because, for unknown reasons the attorney
general had approved the mutual agreements only "as to form" rather than under the
full panoply of standards mandated by the Act. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, REPORT ON
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMPORTATION OF OUT-OF-STATE POLICE OFFICERS TO

MISSOULA, MONTANA IN JULY, 2000 16-18 (2001) (on file with Montana Law Review).
69.
Cf LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION 85
(2001) ("This section prohibits bringing armed men into the state except upon official
government request.") If the quoted words mean any official request, they are mistaken.
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If the legislature cannot be convened, 70 application by the
governor.

The literal wording of Article II, Section 33 contemplates
waiver neither by local law enforcement nor by any official
agency other than those designated. As the various convention
transcripts show, the delegates deemed only the legislature and,
71
in unusual cases the Governor, worthy of the waiver power.
In addition to creating rights in the citizenry, therefore, this
section is in the nature of a "check" amid the larger
constitutional system of checks and balances - analogous to the
right of the senate to approve gubernatorial appointments 72 or of
the governor to veto bills. 73 The reasons for the check are
discussed below.
Because the Act permits the attorney general to determine
whether an importation will take place, it could be argued that
the Act is a valid delegation of legislative power to the attorney
general. There is no question that in the usual case the
legislature has the constitutional authority to delegate power to
executive agencies if certain requirements are met. Among
other requirements, the grant must be "sufficiently clear,
definite and certain to enable the agencies to know their
respective rights and obligations."74 The terms of the Act do
provide significant guidance to the attorney general on approval
of mutual aid agreements. The attorney general has a fair
amount of discretionary authority as well, because he must
approve the content of a mutual aid agreement, including the
level of precision required7 5 and undefined "necessary and

70. The meaning of "when the legislature cannot be convened" is uncertain,
although resolving the uncertainty is not necessary to this discussion. Since MONT.
CONST. art. VI, § 11 states, "Whenever the governor considers it in the public interest, he
may convene the legislature," it cannot be the same as being already in session. Cf.KY.
CONST. § 225 (reproduced at text accompanying note 24, supra). Presumably, therefore,
the language means that the legislature decides the question if either (i) it is then in
session or (ii) the emergency is not so serious and time so short that the legislature
cannot be brought into session.
71. E.g., Montana 1889 Convention, supra note 21, at 129 (Delegate Courtney the governor) & 130 (Delegate Maginnis - legislator and governor).
72. See MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 8,cl. 2.
73. See MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
74. Grossman v. State, 209 Mont. 427, 460, 682 P.2d 1319, 1336 (1984); Bacus v.
Lake County, 138 Mont. 69, 79, 354 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1960). See also Huber v. Groff, 171
Mont. 442, 458, 558 P.2d 1124, 1133 (1976); Mont. Milk Control Rd. v. Rehberg, 141
Mont. 149, 161, 376 P.2d 509, 514 (1962).
75.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-11-305(2), (12) (2001).
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proper matters."76 The discretionary authority in the Act is
certainly within normal limits.
There are, however, certain problems in classifying this
with more typical delegation cases. The typical delegation case
is a bestowal of a limited portion of the general legislative power
granted by Article V, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution.
The power exercised under Article II, Section 33 is not a general
legislative power at all - it is a specific function lodged
alternatively in legislators and the governor. Besides serving as
a protection for the citizenry, it also is, as previously noted, a
"check" amid the constitutional system of checks and balances.
Delegating it to the attorney general is rather as if the state
senate tried to delegate to the attorney general its right to
confirm gubernatorial nominations 77 or if the governor had
78
sought to abdicate to him the right to veto bills.
Moreover,
the underlying
constitutional policy of
"sympathy" is sabotaged if governor and legislature abandon the
Article II, Section 33 power to the attorney general. I previously
noted that the drafters' selection of the legislature and governor
reflects the popular position of those two agencies. The attorney
general, although directly elected, seems a less responsive
figure: He is the state's chief law enforcement officer, required to
be a lawyer, 79 less visible, the "legal officer of the state"8 0 and
tied intimately to law enforcement in a way that may render
him less impartial in weighing the requests of law enforcement
officials. Additionally, there is a possibility of conflict between
8
the approval power and the attorney general's other duties. '
Once again, the approval portion of Article II, Section 33
provides that
No... armed body of men shall be brought into this state...
except upon the application of the legislature, or of the governor
76.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-11-305(13) (2001).

77. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
78. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 10. Cf. State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Fin. Comm.,
168 Mont. 470, 543 P.2d 1317 (1975) (holding that the legislature must act on certain
measures qua legislature, and could not delegate those functions to a particular
committee). The court did authorize delegation to the executive in this particular case,
but the broader principle is that a delegation is unconstitutional if it defeats the purpose
of a constitutional grant of power to the delegating agency.
79. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2.
80. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 4, cl. 4.
81. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, REPORT ON THE STATE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
IMPORTATION OF OUT-OF-STATE POLICE OFFICERS TO MISSOULA, MONTANA IN JULY, 2000
15 (2001) (on file with MONTANA LAW REVIEW).
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when the legislaturecannot be convened.

Delegation to the attorney general directly violates the
wording of this section. We have now seen that it violates the
spirit - the central purpose of promoting "sympathy" - as well.
A more technical issue with the Act's attempted delegation
of power is that not all the Article II, Section 33 approval power
is the legislature's to delegate. In the usual delegation case,
lawmakers bestow legislative authority held either by the
legislature alone (as when a law is passed without the
governor's signature) or with the governor conjointly. As noted
earlier in this Part, the Article II, Section 33 approval power is
discretionary or administrative in nature, and it is divided
differently. Here, the power is alternative rather than conjoint.
One can question whether the legislature can delegate the
governor's authority to approve or disapprove when the
legislature cannot be convened.
Assuming, however, that the governor's signing the Act is
interpreted as a bestowal of his alternative power as well, there
is another issue: Usually, when the legislature delegates power
to an executive branch agency, it does so in express terms. This
was not done here. On the contrary, the record contains no
evidence that the legislature understood it was delegating its
special power under Article II, Section 33.
The Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Act was
introduced into the 1983 legislature by multiple sponsors as
House Bill 857. Significantly, the bill was requested by the
Department of Justice, whose chief officer is the attorney
general. As so often happens in Montana, no testimony was
offered by or heard from members of the general public. Two of
the three proponents were employees of the attorney general's
office, and one was the chief administrator of the Highway
Patrol. There were no opponents. After some amendment, it
passed the senate unanimously and the house with only one
dissenting vote.
The record contains no references to Article II, Section 33.s2
The Act does not mention it.
The witnesses' testimony
contained extensive citations to legal and constitutional
authority, but they overlooked Article II, Section 33. The
specific examples cited by the witnesses as to how the Act would

82. I am indebted to the State Law Library in Helena for providing to me the
legislative materials pertaining to H.B. 857.
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operate in practice involved responding to traffic emergencies in
remote border areas, not the importation of armed men for
peacekeeping purposes.8 3 Under the circumstances, it is difficult
to conclude that the legislature intended to delegate the special
power given it by Article II, Section 33.
Still another factor that removes this from the usual
legislative delegation category is Article II, Section 33's
placement in the Montana Declaration of Rights. Because of
that placement, it arguably creates in each citizen a
fundamental constitutional right not to be subject to law
enforcement officers from other states unless those officers have
been imported with the approval of the citizen's statewide
elected representatives. That means each citizen has standing
to defend that right and that government infringements are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny - they can be justified only by
84
showing a compelling state interest mandating the violation.
Realistically, it is hard to find any compelling state interest
to justify transfer of waiver authority to the attorney general
from the legislature or governor. Administrative convenience is
not, of course, a compelling state interest. On the contrary,
rights are established with full recognition that respecting them
may render matters administratively inconvenient. In the case
of Article II, Section 33, administrative inconveniences are
85
deliberately inserted into the constitution to protect the right.
Although the foregoing is not sufficient, in my view, to
conclude definitively that the Act is unconstitutional, it is
enough to raise a presumption that it is - and to suggest that
state officials need to take remedial action.
IV. CONCLUSION

Whatever the objective merits and demerits of Article II,
Section 33, the section was drafted as it was for definite policy
reasons. It means what it says. Citizens of Montana have a
constitutional right not to be subject to law enforcement from
out-of-staters, unless the specific use has been approved by the
83. See Authorizing Mutual Aid Agreements Among Law Enforcement Agencies,
etc.: Hearing on H.B. 857 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 48th Leg. (Mont.
1983) (Testimony of Steve Johnson, Assistant Attorney Gen.); Id. (Testimony of Colonel
R.W. Landon, Chief Adm'r, Highway Patrol).
84. See supra Part II.A.2.
85. See supra Part II.B.3.
Arguably, moreover, review by the governor
(commander in chief of the militia) is just as convenient as review by the attorney
general.
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legislature or, in rare cases, by the governor. This is certainly
applicable to public authorities, and probably to private
importers as well. Furthermore, this is a fundamental right.
Although it is uncertain what implications "fundamental" status
may have for private importers,8 6 public agencies' importations
are subject to "strict scrutiny" - they may import armed
personnel only if there is a compelling state interest in doing so.
Compliance with the Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual
Aid Act of 1983 is not sufficient to comply with Article II,
Section 33. At the very least, there are sufficient doubts about
the constitutionality of the Act to justify official remediation. To
comply with the state constitution, law enforcement agencies
seeking additional assistance from armed personnel should:
1. Use only in-state officers; or
2.

Ask for prior legislative approval; or

3.

If the legislature cannot be convened, obtain prior approval of the
governor.

86.

See supra Part II.C.

COMMENTARY*

THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH COMMISSION
Justice Albie Sachs**

It was not very long ago, I was in my chambers at the
Constitutional Court in Johannesburg, my telephone rang and
the receptionist said "there's a man called Henry who wants to
see you." I said "show him to the security gate."
I was quite eager to see Henry. He'd phoned me about a
week before to say that he had been the person who'd organized
the placing of the bomb in my car. He was now applying to the
Truth Commission for amnesty. Was I waiting to see him? I
said "yes."
*

Justice Albie Sachs delivered this lecture at the University of Montana School

of Law on October 15, 2001.
**
As a leading member of the African National Congress, Justice Albie Sachs
was targeted as a race traitor by the Apartheid Security Forces, who in 1988 planted a
car bomb in Maputo, Mozambique, in an attempt to assassinate him. Thankfully,
Justice Sachs survived, but his right arm was blown off, and he lost sight in one eye.
This article is essentially a transcript of Justice Sachs' remarks. Justice Sachs
returned to South Africa to take an active role in negotiations for a new constitution and
was passionate in ensuring that the new South Africa would cultivate a culture of
respect for human rights. President Nelson Mandela appointed Justice Sachs to South
Africa's first Constitutional Court, where he continues to serve as a Justice today.
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I went to the security gate, opened it, and there he was, a
little shorter than myself, younger, lean, staring at me as I
stared at him: So this was the man who tried to kill me. And I
could see in his eyes that he was as curious about me: So this is
the man I tried to kill.
He walked down the passage towards my office. I still recall
he had a stiff soldier's gait. I decided to walk with what I call
my ambulatory judicial style. We sat down, and he told me
about his life. He said he came from a very good family; his
mother in particular was a very moral person. He had done well
at the university, been recruited into the army, and with great
pride mentioned that he had risen rapidly through the ranks
and had become integrated into Special Operations.
He was the person who had photographs taken of my car,
and had arranged for the explosives to be put in it. He told me
that, in fact, the operation had initially been postponed. He had
dropped out because he'd fought with the head of the squad.
But when he read in the newspaper afterwards that my car had
been bombed, he knew that the plan he had organized had been
followed. This was one of the matters in respect of which he was
going to apply to the Truth Commission for amnesty.
He told me much more about their work in Mozambique,
some incidents known, other plans not known. And I could have
listened to him and questioned him and probed for hours, but I
felt that wasn't my function; that was for the Truth Commission.
He seemed to be aggrieved, almost seeking sympathy from
me, looking around my chambers seeing lovely artwork. I'm a
judge, holding an honored position in society, and he now was a
discarded, discharged soldier, abandoned by the generals who
had given him medals and praised him, and repudiated by the
politicians on whose behalf he had worked. He'd even told me
that he'd had an injury to his foot as if to seek some kind of
equality in his condition and mine.
Eventually I broke off the conversation, stood up and said,
"Henry, normally when I say good-bye to somebody, I shake his
or her hand." And then a cheap emotion overtook me: I would
have said why I can't, but I didn't. I said "I can't shake your
hand, but if you tell the Truth Commission everything you know
and do something for South Africa, then maybe we'll meet again
one day." I recall that as we went back down that corridor, he
seemed to shuffle along this time without that proud stride that
he'd had before. I opened the gate, and he went out. "Good-bye,
Henry."
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I was a victim of terrorism, together with thousands and
thousands of other South Africans - terrorism from the State,
terrorism from those in power. I can't help just reflecting on
something I heard on National Public Radio yesterday: People
from the Black American community saying that they've
experienced terrorism here in the United States, the lynchings,
the burning crosses. Terrorism in that sense isn't something
new to this country. Native Americans have known terrorism.
They experienced what it meant to be threatened, dispossessed,
and harassed by the powerful. Terrorism is thus not something
new here..
Oppressed people in many parts of the world have known
terrorism in circumstances where their basic fundamental rights
haven't been acknowledged by society. Certainly we in South
Africa knew terrorism. What was unusual about me was that,
unlike most victims of terror, I came from the privileged
community. I was singled-out in a particular way for the kind of
experience that thousands and thousands, and over the ages
millions, of my fellow countrymen and countrywomen had
experienced.
How did we, in our setting, respond to the terrorism of the
State? I can recall the excited debates in the ranks of the ANC
exiles in the 1970s when a Middle East group calling themselves
Black September hijacked planes. Some of the people (ANC
exiles) were saying, yes, that's what we must do. We're faced
with a powerful enemy that tortures us and kills us and denies
us the vote and any chance to express our legitimate claims
through proper channels. They've got guns. We haven't got
guns. They've got superior power. We must hit them where
they are most vulnerable. But the leadership of the ANC firmly
repudiated that approach. As they noted, when you start
hijacking airplanes, it's ordinary people just traveling who
become the victims of terror. You are simply transferring the
victimization from yourselves to another group. You are not
ending victimization, you are perpetuating it.
As leaders of the ANC, we in exile wanted to demonstrate to
the world that one day we would be fit rulers of our country,
that we would respect humanity, that we would be sensitive to
people's fears. We too travel in airplanes, and we too want that
sense of security that we can go about our business without
threat of harm. And so, we firmly squashed the idea that we
employ the kinds of terrorism used by other groups in South
Africa.
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In the 1980s, when terrible massacres were occurring in my
country, where people were being tortured to death, when
commandos from South Africa would invade neighboring African
countries and kill refugees, the idea was revived: We must hit
back because until white mothers and fathers cry for their
children, they will never understand our pain; they will never
give way.
I remember a conference, a very important conference in
1985 in Zambia of the ANC in exile. The conference was
surrounded by Zambian troops in case there were commando
raids. We were discussing the struggle. We were discussing
future democracy in South Africa. At one stage a prominent
traditional leader from South Africa who had been forced to flee
from the country and hadn't been very active in the struggle, got
up and addressed the delegates.
He spoke in the native
language. He told the story of two men fighting fiercely with
sticks while their wives were urging them on. One man was
being severely beaten by the other. His wife said, "My husband,
you are being beaten by the other man. Your cause is just. You
are truly stronger than him. But you are beaten because you're
fighting with only one hand. Your other hand is used to hold up
a blanket to cover your nakedness. Drop the blanket, fight with
both hands and then you'll beat him."
We all knew what he meant: he was criticizing us for
restricting our targets to military personnel and installations,
for imposing all sorts of limits on who it hit. In this way, the
ANC was making its operatives more vulnerable and achieving
what appeared to him to be far more limited consequences.
I would have jumped up then and made a serious
philosophical speech about violence and the cycle of violence.
The much more savvy audience, however, just laughed in a very
friendly, kind way, heard him out, and moved on to the next
item on the agenda. His whole approach was repudiated. As a
result of our approach, we got a country. With his approach, we
could possibly have hastened the downfall of apartheid, but we
would have provoked a racial war. We would have inherited
ruins, not a country. And I don't just mean physical ruins; I
mean a ruined people with rancor and hatred being passed on
from the former victims to the newly victimized. The whole
thrust and point of the struggle would have been lost. Our
struggle would not have been seen as a war of democraticallyminded people who happened to be overwhelmingly black
against an unjust system of oppression, but rather a war of
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blacks against whites. Our leadership, although consistently
under provocation, resisted provocation, resisted any possible
temptations, and ultimately repudiated and denied that whole
philosophy of violence.
The Truth Commission is an example of how a people deal
with past injustice and injury in a way that helps to break the
cycle of violence. We had to reflect on matters like this when
our Constitutional Court was established. Nelson Mandela said
"the last time I stood up in court was to see if I was going to be
hanged.
Today, I rise to inaugurate South Africa's first
Constitutional Court." The next day we opened the Court with
our first hearing which focused on the constitutionality of capital
punishment. President Mandela, on behalf of the government,
asked the Court to strike down the inherited laws which
permitted - even required - capital punishment in certain
circumstances for a whole range of offenses.
Crime is serious in our country. Law enforcement needs to
be improved and strengthened. People have a right to feel that
their personal safety is taken seriously by the State. But we
unanimously decided capital punishment was not the way. As
one of my colleagues said, "capital punishment doesn't punish
the crime, it repeats the crime." As I wrote in my concurring
judgment, the killer, on being executed, secures a perverse
moral victory in establishing the calculated extinction of human
life that's done by the State is something legitimate and
justifiable.
We wanted to break the cycle of one killing being responded
to by further killing. Our rejection of capital punishment didn't
mean that killing and murder would go unpunished. We didn't
mean those responsible would not be apprehended and
prevented from doing it again. Our decision meant that the
killers could spend the rest of their lives in jail, but it also meant
that the State did not become a killer. When I refer to killing by
the State, I am not referring to killing in self-defense where
there's imminent threat of serious bodily injury. I'm referring to
the State killing somebody who is strapped, trussed, and not
offering any violence, simply as an example to society of the
power of the State, a form of vengeance.
The Truth Commission was established in that broad kind
of setting with an overwhelming feeling coming from the ranks
of the firmly oppressed, those who had been the victims of
massacre and torture and kidnaping. Archbishop Desmond
Tutu was appointed as its head. It had three main functions.
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The first was to listen to what Archbishop Tutu called "the small
people," the little people, whose voices had never been heard,
who had suffered extraordinary pain and repression, the Albie
Sachses, who had been on television, had written books, had
been interviewed. The Commission did that. Our pain was
recorded, established, spoken about, acknowledged.
Thousands and thousands of people, many in the black
townships, sometimes in distant rural areas, had their
opportunity to stand up, to speak, to be heard. Sometimes
hymns would be sung. There would be comforters. Water would
be available. People cried. And so the stories came out.
The Commission also investigated the press. They asked
different questions: where were you? Why did you carry so
much disinformation, creating a climate in which these
violations of human rights could be furthered? Business, where
were you? Did you not provide repressive material? Did you not
benefit from the laws that prevented black workers from
organizing, and having effective unions?
We smiled when we saw these former elite and immune
sections of society being interrogated by the Truth Commission.
Then the Commission questioned the judges: where were you?
We stopped smiling. We had very intense debates in our ranks
and eventually sent a memo on behalf of senior judges saying
that the judiciary had failed. The judiciary had enforced the
apartheid laws.
When it came to the security laws, the
judiciary, with some very honorable exceptions, had just gone
along supporting, interpreting the laws in a way which
supported the police, despite the evidence of people being
tortured, of being placed in confinement for weeks, months,
sometimes even years, as though that was normal. It was a very
powerful "mea culpa" from the judiciary, maybe unique in the
world. And yet many people feel that wasn't enough. The
judges should have gone there and acknowledged directly that
the judiciary, with some very, very honorable exceptions, had
not done what it could.
The second part of the Commission was the granting of
amnesty. Here it was necessary for individuals to come forward
to accept personal responsibility for what they had done. There
was no blanket amnesty. To the extent that they revealed the
truth and established that they were acting in the context of the
political conflict, they would be entitled to amnesty. This is
what made our Truth Commission possibly unique.
And so "the perpetrators" came forward and acknowledged:
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I executed, I tortured, I threw the body into the river to be eaten
by crocodiles, I burnt the body not far from where we were
having a barbecue.
The Commissioners had to hear the
evidence, decide if the criteria were being fulfilled, and then
decide whether to grant amnesty. In some of the major cases,
for example, the killing of Steve Biko, a very prominent and
brilliant African leader, amnesty was refused.
The police
claimed that Biko had suddenly jumped up, lunged at them and
that they'd pushed him back. According to the police, Biko had
fallen and banged his head on a radiator, and died as a result.
The Commissioners asked, "Well, where is the offense in respect
to which you're claiming amnesty? We don't believe you're
telling the whole truth, but in any event, on your story, you
acted in self-defense; there is nothing to give you amnesty for, so
you don't get amnesty."
Another case involved the murder of the General Secretary
of the Communist Party, one of the leaders of the ANC who was
a very popular, charismatic, brilliant figure who had escaped
three previous assassination attempts. Now, in peaceful South
Africa, he went out jogging one day. He came home. There was
somebody waiting for him with a pistol, who shot him down.
The person was found, the gun was found. The perpetrator was
an immigrant from Poland, a member of an extreme right-wing
group who had linked up with another white South African from
that extreme right-wing group. They were brought to trial,
convicted, and sentenced to death. Ironically, it was the ANC's
opposition to capital punishment that saved their lives; whereas
the groups to which they belonged, and on behalf of which they
had carried out the execution, were campaigning strongly for
capital punishment. In their case, the Amnesty Commission
concluded that they had not told the truth, the full truth about
who else was involved in your conspiracy. Amnesty was refused,
and they are serving out their life sentences.
But other people who did terrible things, the people who
sent the letter bomb that killed a friend and academic colleague
of mine in Mozambique, received amnesty. It was painful to see
people who had done cruel and terrible things getting amnesty,
but that was one of the functions of the Commission.
The third function of the Commission dealt with
reparations. That's the part that is most incomplete at the
moment, and the most controversial. Because there might be a
case coming to my Court, I won't say anything about that, except
that in addition to any money payments that ought to be made, I
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feel very strongly that one needs to provide as much emotional
repair as possible, living memorials identifying the pain of
particular families and groups. In that regard, money might be
part of the answer, but it's not the core of the answer.
How successful has the Truth Commission been? By and
large it's been lauded and praised internationally and held up as
a spectacular example of what can be done to address past
injustice. At the same time, it's been criticized and sometimes
even denounced in South Africa from various quarters with
different kinds of motivations. But to me, the truth is like that.
The truth is painful, it's incomplete, it's raw. It's not satisfying,
it's not consoling in itself. It's the truth about disaster and
trauma and terrible deeds.
What have we accomplished with the Truth Commission?
The first big achievement has been called "the transformation of
knowledge into acknowledgment." There was knowledge that
people had died in detention, that people had disappeared, that
there had been massacres.
But knowledge is factual and
sometimes, as statistical information, it's cold. Acknowledgment
means the information becomes part of you. It enters your
moral and emotional universe. You just don't note it. You hear
it. You think about it.
The pain of the victims was acknowledged by the nation.
We watched the proceedings on television, we heard them on the
radio, we read about them in the press. People in all the
localities watched, listened and learned what had happened to
their neighbors. It's like a double acknowledgment, because for
years, in addition to the pain of the violence done, was the pain
of having to repress it and not being able to tell it for fear of
further punishment. Now at last we live in a country where we
can tell the story of what we went through, we can tell of these
things that happened.
There was acknowledgment by the perpetrators of what
they had done, not necessarily in that deep confessional sense.
The acknowledgment was done in order to gain amnesty.
Frequently, the lawyers were there. As people, almost always
men, appeared in their suits with their prepared statements, I
wished that their emotions could have been more spontaneous
and real, that they had been less advised by their lawyers. The
impact would have been so much greater.
Many of them expressed sorrow to the families for what
they'd done. Sometimes they did it with a kind of half-and-half
mixture of really trying to articulate genuine emotion and yet
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making a prepared statement that they felt might help them.
But it was something. Even if they didn't come out with all of
the truth, even if it was only 20 percent of the truth, it
eliminated any possibilities of denial in the future. No one can
say in five or ten or twenty years, or in another generation,
these things didn't happen, or that they were invented. No, the
testimony came from the mouths of those responsible. In some
ways it was far more chilling and fascinating in a rather awful
way to hear the accounts from them rather than hearing from
the victims or the victims' families what had happened to them.
So there was a form of acknowledgment, even if a semicompelled acknowledgment, by the perpetrators.
The acknowledgment of wrongdoing came from a broad
range of actors. There were ANC security officers who had illtreated captors during the liberation struggle in the camps in
Angola. The ANC insisted that it shouldn't come in to the new
democracy with secrets. Thus, they too testified. The leaders of
the ANC had to take responsibility for actions which had
resulted in loss of life. The leader of the National Party also
testified.
P. W. Botha, the former President, was subpoenaed to give
evidence about documents he had signed as a president. He
refused to appear. He was then prosecuted for defiance of the
subpoena. He was in his 80s. He had heart attacks, was
physically feeble. He was nonetheless convicted by a young
black magistrate. When his trial started, he got support from
some of the old generals, and he made a point about "when you
touch the African tiger, watch out." Someone pointed out we
don't have tigers in Africa. But by the time the trial ended,
there were demonstrators outside, and one had a poster saying,
"P. W. Botha, Meow Meow." Even though he was acquitted on
appeal, the fact is he had been compelled to go through due
process of law. There was no automatic immunity because he
was a former president. The basic values of the new society
triumphed in his case.
But, to me, there was something more profound in the
nature of the process, more elusive. I puzzled about this idea of
truth. How can you have a commission to find the truth? You
find the truth, you put it in a box, you wrap it up, and there we
have the truth. Truth just isn't like that. It's dynamic, it's
ongoing, it's full of contradictions.
I also wondered why it is that so little truth comes out in a
court of law, so little that historians can rely on as established
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historical fact, so little explanation as to the causes of why
things happened, the framework behind the events in a court of
law. Yet the truth, whatever that was, was pouring out lavalike in the Commission hearings, and it worried me as a
professional judicial, forensic truth-seeker.
I worked out a kind of rough-and-ready classification that I
found really helpful. First, there's what I call "microscopic
truth." You map out a small area; you define its perimeters; you
establish the major variables within that; you investigate them;
and you draw certain inferences from your observations.
Positive science is like that; a court trial is like that. In court we
allege that so-and-so and so-and-so on such-and-such a date had
wrongfully, unlawfully and maliciously killed somebody else.
Then the evidence is brought, tested, examined, weighed and a
verdict is reached.
There's what I call "logical truth," the truth implicit in a
proposition in a statement. In this regard, I always think of the
example of when I had the manuscript ready for my book, THE
SOFT VENGEANCE OF A FREEDOM FIGHTER.
I took it to my
agent's colleague in New York (my agent being in London). Her
name was Abbey. Within five minutes I knew her whole life.
She ended up saying, "let's face it, Albie, men are a
fundamentally flawed species."
But I'm a man, so I am
fundamentally flawed. It flows from the general proposition, the
particular can be inferred from that - that's logical truth.
Most of our work in a forensic setting is addressing a
combination of microscopic truth and logical truth, as well as the
play and the interaction between them. For due process of law,
that's what you need. If you're going to send somebody to jail, if
you're going to take away their money, you need these highly
formalized, ritualized processes to justify the particular results.
"Experiential truth" is of a completely different order. The
idea came to me from reading M. K. Gandhi's book, MY
EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH, based on his years as a young
lawyer in South Africa, which transformed him from somebody
who had taken dancing lessons, elocution and French in London,
into the leaner, aesthetic Gandhi that the world knows.
Experiments with truth. To me, experiments were things
you did with Bunsen burners and graphs. Ghandi went to the
Old Fort Prison as part of his passive resistance campaign and
noticed that black African prisoners didn't get condiments with
their food. He said if I want to live like and understand - enter
into the soul - of the most humble amongst us, I must live like
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the most humble amongst us. And so he made the decision to
give up condiments with food. He didn't start with the idea and
apply it to his life. He started with his life. He questioned his
life.
He examined things that were happening to him
experientially and built a philosophy on that basis. Even his
giving up of sex came as a result of his experiences when he was
in a medical auxiliary with the British Colonial forces in what
was then called Zululand. Hundreds of captured Zulu rebels, as
they were called, were being lashed. He would wash their
bodies. He felt if the body is a site of such pain, he couldn't use
his body as a source of pleasure. These were his experiments
with truth, deriving from lived experience certain conclusions
about life, about existence. And, for most of us, the way we
interrogate the world is based far more on experiential truth
than on microscopic and logical truth.
And finally, the fourth category is what I call "dialogical
truth." It's the interaction between all of these experiences and
all of these investigations, swirling, contradicting, fusing, never
ending. The strength of our Truth Commission was the way in
which the experiential truth and the dialogical truth interacted.
This interaction made for a huge drama, a piece of participatory
theater, in the best sense of the word, played out on a stage in
front of the nation.
We heard the laments, we saw the tears, we saw the
torturers - replicating in front of the cameras the way they put
wet bags over the heads of people who today are members of
Parliament. "Tell me, Sergeant Benzien, how could you do it?
How could a human being do this to another human being?" A
simple question. Sergeant Benzien, a former representative of
power who at one time could do whatever he wanted, wept in
front of the cameras. There are so many stories in those images
- the defeat of Sergeant Benzien's whole world, the notion of
torture conveyed in a way that we could all react to it with
shame and embarrassment, the pleasure and delight that these
atrocities were being revealed. To my mind, the true strength of
our Truth Commission process was to be found in the fact that
the nation participated in the whole process, arguing and
debating each case.
The process has enabled us at last to start to live in a single
country with the beginnings of what can be called a single
undivided memory. If we continue to live in a country with
completely divided memories, whites seeing South Africa as
having been this, blacks seeing South Africa as having been
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that, these divided memories, divided relationships with past
pain, play themselves out into the future and perpetuate future
incomprehension.
If we all accept and acknowledge what happened in the
past, at least in its basic outlines, then, as an American put it,
for the first time we South Africans start living on the same
map, we're in the same moral universe. That has been the
Commission's huge achievement. It's not just getting the factual
knowledge; it's not just finding a practical way to enable society
to function with so much hidden crime in the past. It's
establishing that torture, violence, terrorism, repression are
unacceptable, can't be hidden, have to be acknowledged, and
have to be dealt with in some kind of appropriate way. If we
have had any achievement in the last couple of years in South
Africa, it's been to establish that.
In terms of reconciliation, if people were hoping that the
former victims and the former repressors would embrace each
other, they were disappointed. Although it happened in a few
remarkable, astonishing and wonderful instances, it basically
didn't happen. Many of the people who'd suffered, who'd lost
families, felt it's not for the State to forgive. If anyone is to
forgive, it's going to be me. It can be us. But nevertheless, to
the extent that we're living in one country, the foundations of
reconciliation are there. What's really needed for real repair is
transformation of our country, ending the massive inequalities
still very much associated with race, giving people real full-life
opportunities,
overcoming
the
crime,
dealing
with
unemployment, finding humane and effective ways to respond to
the terrible pandemic of AIDS, and in particular, enabling
people to be able to live dignified lives. That will be the true
repair and reconciliation on a massive scale.
Let me conclude by returning to the story with which I
began this lecture. I'm at a party at the end of the year, tired;
we'd worked very hard. The band is playing, and I hear a voice
saying, "Albie." I look around. "Albie." I see a face half
recognizable. "Henry." He's smiling. He comes up to me. We go
into a corner to be able to speak over the sound of the band.
"vWhat happened?" Very animated he said, "I wrote to the Truth
Commission. I told them everything I could, and Bobby and Sue
and Farouk came on their behalf to question me." Bobby, Sue,
Farouk - first-name terms, calling me "Albie." I've been out of
politics for many years, but it was as though he was establishing
an ANC group with himself as a member.
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He continued, "I gave them all of the information I could." I
said, "Yes, Henry, I need only see your face to tell me that what
you're saying is the truth." And I put out my hand and shook
his hand. He went away absolutely elated.

ARTICLE

"KENNEWICK MAN" OR "ANCIENT ONE"? A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
Maura A. Flood*

Our dead never forget the beautiful world that gave them
being.... At night, when the streets of your cities and villages are
silent and you think them deserted, they will throng with the
returning hosts that once filled and still love this beautiful land. 1

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1996, two young men watching
hydroplane races from the banks of the Columbia River near
Kennewick, Washington, stumbled across what would turn out
to be one of the most complete and well-preserved set of ancient,
human skeletal remains ever discovered in this country. 2 As
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.
1. Seattle, Chief of the Dwdmish and Suqudmish Tribes, in a speech at the
signing of the Treaty of Medicine Creek (Jan. 22, 1855) (transferring the aboriginal lands
of his and other tribes to the United States government).
2. Stang, John, Skull Found on Shore of Columbia, TRI-CITY HERALD
(Kennewick Washington), July 26, 1996, available at http://www.kennewickman.com/news/0729.html; See also, Stang, John, Tri-City Skeleton Dated at 9,000 Years

Old, TRI-CITY HERALD, August 28, 1996, available at http://www.kennewickman.com/news/0828.html; and Michael Parfit, The Dawn of Humans: Who Were the First

Americans, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, Dec. 2000 at 58-59; James C.
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soon as radiocarbon dating determined these remains to be
between 9,200 and 9,600 years old, legal wrangling over access
to them began. 3 Scientists want to study and test the remains;
Native American tribes want to rebury the remains; and the
federal government wants to ensure that the remains are
treated in accordance with the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). 4
The legal wrangling continues in Bonnichsen v. U.S., 5 an
action commenced by eight anthropologists seeking to study the
ancient remains. These plaintiffs, the news media, and most of
America know the remains by the name of "Kennewick Man," a
name based on the area in which the remains were discovered. 6
They were so named by James Chatters, the anthropologist who
examined the remains for the local sheriff when they were first
discovered, and who announced that discovery to the world. 7
These remains also have another name, the name of "Ancient
One," which was conferred upon them by the tribes that have
8
claimed them.
The authority to name something or someone is, and always
has been, a significant power.9 The act of naming the remains is
Chatters, Ancient Encounters:Kennewick Man and the FirstAmericans, 55 (2001).
3. Id.
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2001).
5. Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997) (hereinafter,
Bonnichsen v. U.S. or, simply, Bonnichsen).
6. See supra note 2.
7. Stang, John, Tri-City Skeleton Dated at 9,000 Years Old, TRI-CITY HERALD,
August 28, 1996, available at http://www.kennewick-man.com/news/0828.htm; James C.
Chatters, Ancient Encounters: Kennewick Man and the First Americans, 55 (2001); The
custom and practice among scientists is that the one who makes a discovery has the
right to give it a name. See, e.g., DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN,
ARCHAEOLOGY, AND THE BATTLE FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY, xli (2nd ed. 2001); See
also, Roger Downey, Riddle of the Bones: Politics, Science, Race and the Story of
Kennewick Man at 7-14 (2000).
8. The tribes have chosen to refer to the remains as Oytpamanatityt, which
translates into English as "the Ancient One." Native American Graves Protection and
RepatriationsAct: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. at 3
(2000) (Statement of Armand Minthorn of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation); See also, SKULL WARS, supra, note 7, at xli.
9. The Book of Genesis, for example, recites that God gave Adam dominion over
all creatures, including, specifically, the power to name them (Genesis 2:18). England
anglicized all Gaelic names after conquering the peoples of Ireland, Scotland and Wales;
Spain imposed Spanish names on the peoples it found already residing in the Americas;
and the United States required Indians to take on English names in order to qualify for
land allotments and other benefits. See also, SKULL WARS, supra, note 7, at xl. Horace
Axtell, a Nez Perce Elder, explains that his family got the name Axtell when his
grandfather tried to register for an allotment of land from the federal government and
was told he had to have an English name. "He started to leave, saying 'Well, I gotta go
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an exercise of such power, an assertion of the right to claim such
power. These opposing claims of the scientists and the tribes
are grounded in fundamental beliefs: on the one hand, a belief in
importance of scientific knowledge and
the supreme
investigation; on the other hand, a belief in the supreme
The
importance of cultural history, practices and values.
scientists believe that Kennewick Man may reveal information
about the development of mankind and the peopling of the
Americas, and that this information may be lost forever if the
remains are not made available for extensive study and
testing. 10 The tribes believe that the remains of the Ancient One
must be treated with respect, that testing of the bones is a
desecration, that the spiritual journey of the Ancient One has
been disrupted by his removal from the earth, and that he must
be reburied as soon as possible." These contrasting beliefs of
the scientists and the tribes are so diametrically opposed as to
12
have no common ground between them.
The battle over these fragile, ancient bones has given rise to
several significant issues, relating to constitutional rights,
administrative law, the meaning of NAGPRA, and the unique
relationship between the federal government and American
Indian tribes. The focus of this article is the meaning and import

find a name.'" The secretary in the government office stopped him and told him he could
use her last name. "Her name was Axtell. That's where we got the name Axtell."
HORACE P. AXTELL & MARGO ARAGON, A LITTLE BIT OF WISDOM: CONVERSATIONS WITH

A NEZ PERCE ELDER, 2-3 (1997).
10. Plaintiffs'Amended Complaint, Bonnichsen v. U.S., supra note 5, at paragraph
32, page 10. (This amended complaint was filed on January 2, 2001 and is Document
#372 in the records of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon in the
Bonnichsen case; a copy is on file with the author.)
11. Armand Minthorn, "Human Remains Should Be Reburied," position paper
dated Sept. 1996, available at http//www.umatilla.nsn.us/kennman.html (last visited on
12/18/01).
12. Some have characterized the Bonnichsen case as a collision between science
and religion. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF
SCIENCE IN THE LAW, 177 (1999)(2nd ed. 2000). It might be more accurate to characterize
it as a collision between two religions. "Science has been called 'the American faith.'...
Many Americans with little understanding of science unquestioningly accept both its
process and its products. This faith in science has permeated American society since the
colonial era, shaping our culture as well as our social and governmental institutions."
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science
Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 1029 (1997)(possibly add a parenthetical
here). Antone Minthorn, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Umatilla, asserts: "It
is not science versus religion,. . . it is science versus law." Antone Minthorn, Kennewick
Man Issue Damages Relationships, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation, at http:www.umatilla.nsn.us/kennman3.html (last visited on December 18,
2001).
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of NAGPRA, which can be fully appreciated only through
thorough scrutiny and interpretation. This statute is facing its
first significant court challenge - its first opportunity for full
interpretation - in Bonnichsen v. U.S.
The court's
interpretation of NAGPRA will be the key to the resolution of
this case and, undoubtedly, of other cases yet to come. For this
reason, the "dynamic"' 3 or comprehensive method of statutory
interpretation should be used, because it will lead to the most
honest and accurate interpretation of NAGPRA.
According to federal Magistrate Judge John Jelderks, who
presides over Bonnichsen v. U.S., "the threshold issue" in the
case is whether the ancient remains found in Kennewick are
"Native American" within the meaning of NAGPRA. 14 That is
the pivotal question: are these prehistoric remains "Native
American" and therefore subject to the mandates of NAGPRA?
And, if they are, the next crucial inquiry becomes: Have the
claimant tribes established a "cultural affiliation" with the
remains pursuant to NAGPRA, so as to entitle them to
possession of the remains?
This article reviews the factual and legal context of
Bonnichsen v. U.S. It examines the aims, reasoning, and
effectiveness of several canons and theories of statutory
construction, as a necessary prelude to the work of interpreting
NAGPRA. The statute is then interpreted and explicated with
the assistance of those canons and theories, and with particular
focus on the statutory terms, "Native American" and "cultural
affiliation." This interpretation leads to the conclusions that
Ancient One/Kennewick Man is "Native American" within the
meaning of NAGPRA, and that the claimant tribes have
established the requisite "cultural affiliation" to entitle them to
ownership of these ancient remains.
In order to conduct a comprehensive interpretation of
NAGPRA, it is first necessary to examine the language of the

13. WILLiAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
Professor Eskridge describes this dynamic process of interpretation:
Just as the changing factual contexts for interpretation render it dynamic....
so the independent and changing nature of the interpreter ensures dynamic
interpretation .... The interpreter's role involves selection and creativity,
which is influenced, often unconsciously, by the interpreter's own frame of
reference - assumptions and beliefs about society, values and the statute itself.

Id. at 58.
14. Author's personal notes from observation of arguments in court on June 19,
2001 in federal district court for the District of Oregon [hereinafter, "Personal Court
Notes"].
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statute, in light of the relevant canons and theories of statutory
construction. In addition, it is necessary to read congressional
committee reports and hearing transcripts; research legal
precedent; and become familiar with the historical and social
circumstances that prompted enactment of the statute. Every
bit of this effort is essential to a complete and accurate
understanding of NAGPRA. Judges should have no less an
understanding when they construe and apply this or any other
federal statute, and thereby affect the lives not only of the
litigants in the controversy before them, but of much of
American society as well. This article suggests that it is
incumbent upon judges, when faced with an unclear or
15
ambiguous federal statute, to engage in rigorous, "dynamic,"
comprehensive construction of that statute.
The process of statutory interpretation is equal in
importance to its product. That product, a statute whose
meaning has been comprehensively construed in the context of
an actual controversy, can best be appreciated through
participation in the process that led to it. This article is
intended to replicate that process, that "comprehensive
construction" of a statute, with all of its twists, turns and
crossroads. Accordingly, significant attention will be given to
the canons and theories of construction, and the traditional
methods used in interpreting statutes, before those canons,
theories and methods are applied to the interpretation of
NAGPRA.
BONNICHSEN V. U.S. - BACKGROUND, PROCEEDINGS AND STATUS
The anthropologists are busy, indeed, and ready to transport us
back into the savage forest where all human things . . . have
their beginnings; but the seed never explains the flower. 16

The Ancient One 17 was discovered on federal property under
the control of the Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps"),
property the United States purchased from the Walla Walla,

15.

ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13.

16.

EDITH HAMILTON, THE GREEK WAY (1943).

17. In light of this article's conclusion that the remains are Native American
within the meaning of NAGPRA and that the claimant tribes have established a
"cultural affiliation" with the remains, these tribes clearly have the superior right to
name the remains. Accordingly, hereinafter the remains will be referred to solely by the
name of Ancient One.
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Cayuse and Umatilla Indian tribes in 1855.18 Due to the age of
the remains, the Corps gave notice of the discovery to the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation
("Umatilla") and other local tribes. NAGPRA requires, among
other things, that all Native American human remains
discovered on federal property must be repatriated to the
appropriate Indian tribe, in accordance with the provisions of
the statute and its implementing regulations. 19 Five American
Indian tribes, each having a history of residing upon or using
the land on which these remains were discovered, subsequently
joined together to submit a claim for repatriation of the
remains. 20
These claimant tribes are the Umatilla, the
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation ("Colville"), the
Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho, the Wanapum, and the Confederated
2
Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation ("Yakama"). 1
The Corps, and subsequently the U.S. Department of the
Interior (the "DOI"), determined that the remains found in
Kennewick are "Native American" within the meaning of
NAGPRA, that a "cultural affiliation" exists between the
remains and the claimant tribes, and that, accordingly, the
remains must be repatriated to those tribes. 22 A group of
anthropologists commenced a federal court action to challenge
the government's
determinations
and to oppose
the
repatriation 23 of the remains to the tribes. 24 If the Bonnichsen
18. 'Treaty Between the United States and the WallaWalla, Cayuse, and Umatilla
Tribes and Bands of Indians in Washington and Oregon Territories, June 9, 1855
(ratified March 8, 1859), reprinted in 2 Indian Affairs: Laws & Treaties, Vol. 11,694-698
(Charles J. Kappler, ed., Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office)(1904). Pursuant
to this treaty, these several bands and tribes were moved to a single reservation, and
were thenceforth identified by the federal government as the "Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation".
19. 25 U.S.C. §3005 (2001).
20. Bonnichsen v. U.S., 969 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D. Or. 1997).
21. The Yakama were formerly known as the Yakima. The tribe is referred to by
either spelling throughout the documents in the Bonnichsen case. The spelling (or
misspelling), "Yakima," was used by the federal government in its 1855 treaty with this
tribe and has survived as a correct spelling for the name of the tribe.
22. See, Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate
and in Support of Agency Decisionmaking, Document #439 in the Bonnichsen record;
also available at www.kennewick-man.com/documents/fedbrief.html.
23. The use of the word "repatriation" in this statute is noteworthy. This word is a
rarity in American legislation. It is more commonly found in international law. Its
ordinary meaning is 'to bring or send back (a person, esp. a prisoner of war, a refugee,
etc.) to his country or the land of his citizenship." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1966.) In NAGPRA, 'repatriation" refers to the process by which
native human remains and cultural articles are to be identified, claimed, and returned to
native groups. The statute does not separately define this term, however, which means
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plaintiffs prevail, they will have an opportunity to secure access
to the remains for the purpose of conducting extensive studies
and tests.
If the defendant United States prevails, the
determinations of the Corps and DOI will be upheld, and the
remains will be repatriated to the claimant tribes for reburial in
accordance with tribal traditions.
In September 1996, two months after the remains of the
Ancient One were discovered, the Corps published notice of its
25
intent to repatriate the remains to the claimant tribes.
26
Bonnichsen v. U.S. was the response to that notice.
The
plaintiffs sought a restraining order to prevent the repatriation,
and "demanded a detailed scientific study to determine the
origins of the man before the Corps decided whether to
repatriate the remains." 27 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that
they have a First Amendment right to study the remains; that
NAGPRA is unconstitutional because it promotes Native
American religion; 28 and that their civil rights have been
29
violated by the Corps.
The defendants, who include the Corps and several named
Corps employees, moved promptly for dismissal on several
grounds, including failure to exhaust administrative remedies
and failure to state a claim. 30 Judge Jelderks granted that
motion in part, dismissing the civil rights claims, but also
denied it in part, finding that plaintiffs' other claims were
31
legally sufficient and that the matter was ripe for adjudication.
that its ordinary definition is operative.
I believe the various implications and
ramifications attendant upon the use of this single word are, potentially, of great
importance, and should be thoroughly examined. Such examination, however, is outside
the scope of this article.
24. Bonnichsen v. U.S,969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997). The decision to repatriate
in this instance is a recognition of tribal ownership of the remains, pursuant to Section
3002 of N.A.G.P.R.A.
25. Id. at 618.
26. The plaintiffs are: Robson Bonnichsen, C. Loring Brace, George W. Gill, C.
Vance Haynes, Richard L. Jantz, Douglas W. Owsley, Dennis J. Stanford, and D. Gentry
Steele. Owsley and Stanford are affiliated with the Smithsonian Institute; the others are
university professors. In addition, Bonnichsen is the director of the Center for the Study
of the First Americans, in Portland, Oregon. See, Plaintiffs'Amended Complaint, supra
note 10.
27. See Bonnichsen, supra note 24, at 618.
28. See Plaintiffs'Amended Complaint,supra note 10, at 13.
29. See Bonnichsen, supra note 24, at 625.
30. See Bonnichsen, supra note 24, at 619.
31. See Bonnichsen, supra note 24. Included in the motion for dismissal, and in the
judge's decision, was a companion lawsuit brought by a religious group, the Asatru Folk
Assembly, to prevent repatriation of the remains to the tribes (Civ. Action No. 96-1481-
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Following that decision, the Corps withdrew its previous notice
of intent to repatriate the remains, and announced that it would
reconsider the evidence of cultural affiliation between the
remains and the claimant tribes. 32 The Nez Perce and Umatilla
33
tribes then filed briefs in this case, as amicus curiae.
In June of 1997, despite the Corps' withdrawal of its prior
34
determinations, Judge Jelderks vacated those determinations.
The judge explained his action as follows:
A change of activity by the defendant under the threat of judicial
scrutiny is insufficient to negate the existence of an otherwise ripe
case or controversy.... I conclude that this action has not been
mooted... The dispute here concerns a tangible object, whose
custody remains in dispute, and also the rights of various parties
to study (or to forbid the study) of that object.... Nor am I
persuaded that the Corps has entirely abandoned its earlier
decision and is now objectively considering the evidence and the
law without any preconceived notions concerning the outcome. 35

Judge Jelderks remanded for. reconsideration of the
statutory meaning of "Native American" and "cultural
affiliation," and of whether NAGPRA applies to these particular
remains. He also provided the Corps with a list of specific
questions, and directed the Corps to answer those questions
during its reconsideration of this matter. 36 Those questions
included the following:
1. Whether these remains are
why not);
2. What is meant by terms
'indigenous' in the context
case;
3. . . .
4. Whether NAGPRA requires

subject to NAGPRA, and why (or
such as 'Native American' and
of NAGPRA and the facts of this

(either expressly or implicitly) a

JE). The Asatru practice a pre-Christian religion that originated in northern and
eastern Europe. They claimed Kennewick Man/Ancient One as an ancient member of
their religion, following news reports that he exhibits "caucasoid" features. The Asatru
have not filed an amended complaint, and did not appear to present arguments in court
on June 19-20, 2001. For these reasons, they are excluded from the focus of this article.
32. Bonnichsen v. U.S., 969 F. Supp. 628, 637-638 (D. Or. 1997).
33. Id. at 632.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 640-41.
36. Id. at 632, 651-54.
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biological connection between the remains and a contemporary
Native American tribe;
5. Whether there has to be any cultural affiliation between the
remains and a contemporary Native American tribe...;
6. The level of certainty required to establish such a biological or
cultural affiliation, e.g., possible, probable, clear and
convincing, etc. 37

Finally, the judge stayed the proceedings, retained
jurisdiction, denied plaintiffs' motion for an order permitting
them to study the remains, and ordered the Corps to retain
38
custody of the remains.
39
The Corps, pursuant to the provisions of NAGPRA,
requested that DOI take responsibility for making the requisite
determinations concerning the Ancient One, and DOI consented
to do so. 40 Once it agreed to lead agency status, DOI set about
It
the business of answering Judge Jelderks' questions.
authorized additional study and testing of the remains in order
to resolve the issues of "cultural affiliation" and "Native
American" status. This testing was extensive and invasive; it
included the pulverization of bone for the purpose of extracting
DNA. 41 It was carried out despite vigorous opposition from the
claimant tribes.4 2 Many of the tests were done at the urging of
43
the plaintiffs, and by experts recommended by the plaintiffs.
37. Id. at 651-52.
38. Bonnichsen, supranote 32, at 632.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d)(3) (2000): "Ifthe Secretary of the Interior consents, the
responsibilities (in whole or in part) under paragraphs (1) and (2) of the.., head of any
other agency or instrumentality may be delegated to the Secretary .... "
40. Interagency Agreement, signed March 24, 1998. A copy is on file with the
author; also available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/agree.htm. NOTE: As of
12/05/01, access to DOI documents has been been severly restricted by a federal court
order intended to protect Indian trust data. All documents cited herein as available at cr
nps [Cultural Resources, National Park Service] are not presently accessible, and will
not be accessible until the DOI can certify that they contain no data on individual Indian
trusts.
41. Bone samples are taken from the remains, then bone is pulverized into a
powder for purposes of attempting to extract mitochondrial DNA. See DNA Analysis
at
available
also
with
author,
file
on
copies
Reports,
and
www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/merriwether-cabana.htm
www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/kaestle.htm. In addition, five carbon-dating tests, which
also require pulverization of the bone, were conducted on these remains. See, letter of
Francis P. McManamon, DOI Consulting Archaeologist, dated Jan. 11, 2000, available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/nagpra/kennew.htm.
42. Statements made by counsel to the amicus tribes and counsel to the U.S., in
personal court notes.
43. See, Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 22.
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As it turned out,
amount to allow
condition of the
information was
following:

DNA could not be extracted in a sufficient
accurate testing, due to the mineralized
bones. 44 However, a great deal of other
gathered and examined, 45 including the
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The Kennewick remains represent a single individual who most
probably was interred rather than left to decompose on the
surface. ...

Like other early American skeletons, the Kennewick

remains exhibit a number of morphologicalfeatures that are not
found
in
modern
populations....
The
most
craniometricallysimilar samples appeared to be those from the
South Pacific and Polynesia, as well as the Ainu of Japan, a
pattern observed in other studies of early American crania in
North and46 South America ...

Kennewick is clearly not a

Caucasoid.

In January 2000, DOI concluded that the remains known as
Ancient One are "Native American" within the meaning of
NAGPRA. 47 The statutory definition of Native American is
contained in Section 3001(9) of NAGPRA:
Native American' means of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or
culture that is indigenous to the United States.
DOI's determination "was based upon chronological
information supplied by the radiocarbon analysis of bone
4
samples and previously conducted scientific examinations." 8
Those examinations included physical investigation of the bones,
study of the lithic spear point, and investigation of the area in

44. See, DNA Analysis Reports, supranote 41.
45. The various scientific reports are available at www.cr.nps/gov/aad/kennewick.
Most of these reports are extremely technical, but some of the information is
comprehensible even to non-scientists. Two bits of useful information are: (1) the
Ancient One is thousands of years older than any of the specimens with which he was
compared; and (2) all conclusions about which "race" he most closely resembles are based
on probabilities, and those probabilities are based on scientific theories (i.e., enlightened
guesses) about how humans developed over time.
46. Joseph F. Powell and Jerome C. Rose, "Report on the Osteological Assessment
of the 'Kennewick Man' Skeleton," copy on file with the author (also available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/powell-rose.htm.)
47. See page 1 of Secretary Babbitt's announcement letter available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/babb-letter.htm.
The Secretary confirmed this
conclusion in a Decision Memo dated 9/21/00 (see, Defendants'Memorandum, supra, note

22).
48.

Id.
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which the remains were discovered. The remaining issue to be
addressed was that of the appropriate disposition of the Ancient
One. NAGPRA requires, in connection with inadvertent
discoveries, that ownership of claimed cultural items49 shall be
established in accordance with Section 3002(a). That section
50
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) The ownership or control of Native American cultural items which
are excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands after
November 16, 1990, shall be (with priority given in the order
listed) -

(1) in the case of Native American human remains and associated
funerary objects, in the lineal descendants of the Native American;
or
(2) in any case in which such lineal descendants cannot be
ascertained,...
(A)
in the Indian tribe... on whose tribal land such
objects or remains were discovered;
(B)
in the Indian tribe ... which has the closest cultural
affiliation with such remains.. .and which, upon notice,
states a claim for such remains

. . .;

or

(C)
if the cultural affiliation of the objects cannot be
reasonably ascertained and if the objects were discovered on
Federal land that is recognized by a final judgment of the
Indian Claims Commission or the United States Court of
Claims as the aboriginal land of some Indian tribe (2) in the Indian tribe that is recognized as aboriginally
occupying the area in which the objects were
discovered, if upon notice, such tribe states a claim for
such remains or objects ...

Due to the age of these remains, DOI concluded that no
direct lineal descendants exist.51
The remains were not
discovered on "tribal land," because that term refers only to land
within reservations and dependent Indian communities. 52 Nor
is there a U.S. Court of Claims or an Indian Claims Commission
"final judgment" recognizing the site where the remains were

49. "Cultural items" is a defined term that includes human remains. 25 U.S.C. §
3001(3) (2000).
50. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2000)(emphasis supplied).
51. Babbitt letter, supra note 47, at pages 3-4.
See also, Defendants'
Memorandum, supra note 22.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15) (2000).
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found as the aboriginal land of one particular tribe. 53 Therefore,
the focus of DOI's investigation had to be whether a cultural
affiliation exists between the remains and the claimant tribes,
pursuant to subsection 1 of Section 3002(a)(2)(C). NAGPRA
defines "cultural affiliation" as follows:
'Cultural affiliation' means that there is a relationship of shared
group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or
prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group. 54

The statute does not specify a requisite standard of proof for
establishing cultural affiliation in order to determine ownership
of inadvertently discovered remains. However, subsection 2 of
§3002(2)(C) provides that, in the event of competing claims
submitted by different tribes, the tribe which shows "by a
preponderance of the evidence" that it has a "stronger cultural
relationship with the remains" is the tribe in whom ownership
shall vest. A preponderance of the evidence standard is also
specified in §3005(a)(4), which governs repatriation of remains
in the possession of museums or federal agencies at the time of
NAGPRA's enactment. In addition, that section lists relevant
evidence to be considered on the issue of cultural affiliation as:
"geographical,
kinship,
biological,
archaeological,
anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical,
or other relevant information or expert opinion."55
The regulations pertinent to DOI's handling of the issues
concerning the Ancient One include 43 CFR Sections 10.6 and
10.14.56 These regulations mirror the language of NAGPRA
Section 3002, with only slight variation. Section 10.6 provides
53. Babbitt letter, supra note 47, at 3-4. There is, however, a settlement
agreement of an Indian Claims Commission case pertaining to this land, which includes
findings of fact that recognize this area as land utilized by all the tribes that have joined
in the N.A.G.P.R.A. claim for the Ancient One. That is not, however, a "final judgment"
delineating aboriginal land boundaries, so it does not necessarily have preclusive effect
under N.A.G.P.R.A. § 3002(15). The Secretary gave consideration to the settlement
agreement, as evidence of aboriginal occupation of this land, but did not deem it
determinative on the disposition issue. Id. See also, Defendants' Memorandum, supra
note 43.
54. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15) (2000).
55. See supra note 40. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (2001). This section refers only to
repatriation of remains and other cultural articles already in the possession of museums
and federal agencies. However, it offers guidance to the Secretary of the Interior on the
types of evidence Congress deemed acceptable and relevant on the subject of cultural
affiliation.
56. 56 C.F.R. §§ 10.6 and 10.14 (2001).
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that human remains that have not been claimed by lineal
descendants and were not found on tribal lands, shall belong to
"the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that has the
closest cultural affiliation with the human remains. . . , as
determined pursuant to §10.14(c)." Section 10.14 provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
(c)(3)

... Evidence

[of shared group identity] ...

must

establish that a present-day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization has been identified from prehistoric or historic times
to the present as descending from the earlier group.
(d)
A finding of cultural affiliation should be based upon
an overall evaluation of the totality of the circumstances and
evidence pertaining to the connection between the claimant and
the material being claimed and should not be precluded solely
because of some gaps in the record.
(e)
Evidence. Evidence of a kin or cultural affiliation
between a present-day individual, Indian tribe, or Native
Hawaiian

organization

and

human remains .... must

be

established by using the following types of evidence:
Geographical,
kinship,
biological,
archeological,
anthropological, linguistic, folklore, oral tradition, historical, or
other relevant information or expert opinion.
(f)
Standard of Proof. ... Claimants do not have to
establish cultural affiliation with scientific certainty. 57

In September 2000, after considering all the evidence
gathered, which comprises approximately 25,000 pages of
material,5 8 DOI concluded: "that the evidence of cultural
continuity is sufficient to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Kennewick remains are culturally affiliated
with the present-day Indian claimants." 9 The evidence that
established a sufficient nexus between the tribes and the
Ancient One was: "The oral tradition, folklore, traditional
history and geographic evidence .. ,,60 The "geographic
57. Id. § 10.14.
58. This enormous administrative record includes scientific and anthropological
data and reports, expert opinion, information submitted by the plaintiffs, and also oral
history and cultural evidence submitted by the tribes. It is assembled into more than 50
volumes of documents, which volumes are on file in the Bonnichsen court records as
Documents 310 through 366.
59. Babbitt letter, supra note 47, at page 6.
60. Defendants' Memorandum, supra, note 22, at page 11. See also, Babbitt letter,
supra note 47, at 5-7. DOI considered the Indian Claims Commission cases as evidence
of aboriginal occupation. It explained its reliance on this evidence as follows:
[D]isposition under §3002(a)(2)(C)(1) may not be precluded when an ICC

52
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evidence" included evidence that all of the claimant tribes had
lived on or used the land where the Ancient One was discovered.
On the basis of the determination of cultural affiliation, the
Secretary directed that the remains be repatriated to the
61
claimant tribes.
The plaintiffs in Bonnichsen v. U.S. filed an amended
complaint, and moved to have DOI's disposition decision
vacated. 62 Presiding Judge John Jelderks heard arguments for
and against that motion on June 19 and 20, in the federal
district courthouse in Portland, Oregon. In addition to hearing
the arguments of counsel for the parties, Judge Jelderks allowed
63
counsel for each amicus party to present arguments as well.
He also allowed the president of the Society for American
Archaeology, who attended the proceedings without legal
counsel, to make a statement concerning his organization's
64
position on the issues raised in this case.
During the proceedings, Judge Jelderks asked numerous
questions about the meaning and requirements of NAGPRA.
Several questions that he revisited throughout the full day of
argument on June 19th pertained to the statutory terms,
"Native American" and "cultural affiliation." This article has
taken its cue from the judge, and will focus on the meaning of
these terms in its examination and interpretation of the statute.
The various methods and means of interpreting statutes must
judgment did not specifically delineate aboriginal territory due to a voluntary
settlement agreement. If the ICC's findings of fact and opinions entered prior
to the compromise settlement clearly identified an area as being the joint or
exclusive territory of a tribe, this evidence is sufficient to establish aboriginal
occupation for purposes of §3002(a)(2)(C)(1)... The Federal land where the
Kennewick remains were found was the subject of several ICC cases brought
by the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation... These cases
culminated in a final judgment in accordance with a compromise settlement.
Although the compromise settlement did not delineate the aboriginal territory
of the Umatilla, the ICC had previously determined in its opinion and findings
of fact that several Indian tribes, including the Umatilla (WallaWalla and
Cayuse) and Nez Perce, used and occupied this area where the Kennewick
remains were found.
Id. at 6-7.
61. Defendants'Memorandum, supra note 22, at Part IV(B).
62. The Amended Complaint also added DOI, its then-Secretary Bruce Babbitt,
and its consulting archaeologist, Francis McManamon, to the roster of defendants.
63. Personal court notes. Arguments were presented by legal counsel for the
Colville, Nez Perce, Umatilla, and Yakama tribes; and also by counsel for the National
Congress of American Indians.
64. Personal court notes. It was refreshing to observe Judge Jelderks' open
courtroom demeanor, and his willingness to let every party with some stake in the
proceeding have an opportunity to speak.
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be explored, before
construed.

NAGPRA

can be

properly and fully

THEORIES AND METHODS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

There are thousands of articles and books on the subject of
statutory interpretation, 65 most of them produced in the last
twenty years. 66 These works promote several different theories
of interpretation, including Intentionalism, Purposivism, Public
Choice Theory, Positivism, Pragmatism, Realism, and
Textualism. They propose that the correct way to interpret
statutes is objective, subjective, hermeneutical, structuralist, or
even "post-structuralist." This theorizing and posturing has
reached fever pitch in the courts as well as the law journals,
resulting in several instances of dueling opinions issued by
Supreme Court justices on the subject of statutory
67
interpretation.
This state of affairs will inevitably affect the interpretation
of NAGPRA, as it wends its way through the federal courts, in
Bonnichsen and other matters yet to come. It is necessary,
therefore, to examine the various theories of interpretation and
canons of construction that remain popular among the judiciary
and the scholars, in order to make some sense of the
interpretation process before we attempt to make sense of
NAGPRA.

65.

There is an extensive listing of these materials in Footnote 1 of 2A NORMAN J.

SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:01 (West Group 6th ed. 2001).
Particularly interesting works include: REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES (Little, Brown & Co., 1975); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY AND ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (Foundation Press, 2000); POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY
AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (Princeton Univ. Press, 1997); and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (Harvard University

Press, 1990). Other books and articles on the subject of statutory interpretation are cited
throughout this article.
66. At the time of this article, a search for "statutory interpretation" (with no
additional modifiers) in the Westlaw "JLR" (Journals & Law Reviews Combined)
database produced 13,465 articles written after 1981, and 258 articles written in 1981
and earlier years (as of August 1, 2001).
67. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (1994); NASA v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 527 U.S.
229, 119 S.Ct. 1979 (1999); National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1309 v.
Dep't of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 119 S.Ct. 1003 (1999); Johnson v. U.S., 529 U.S. 694,
120 S.Ct. 1795 (2000); Carter v. U.S., 530 U.S. 255, 120 S.Ct. 2159 (2000); and
Chickasaw Nation v. U.S., _ U.S. -_,
122 S.Ct. 528 (2001).
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ConstitutionalRestraints on Statutory Interpretation
The Constitution imposes two clear constraints on the
process of statutory interpretation. First of all, it makes the
68
enactment of statutes the exclusive domain of Congress.
Secondly, a bill introduced in one of the houses of Congress can
become a statute, and thus the law of the land, only if it
progresses through the enactment and presidential signing
process required by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. 69 In
addition, there are two "constitutional assumptions" that have
traditionally affected statutory interpretation. 70 The first is that
Congress must comply with certain norms and expectancies in
communicating with its constituents. Simply put, Congress
must use ordinary English in all of its communications,
including statutes.
The second assumption is that the
Constitution requires Congress to make its laws reasonably
available to the American people. 71 In other words, laws cannot
be kept secret, but must be publicized and made accessible to all
persons who will be expected to comply with those laws.
The Basic Rules of Construction
The two most basic rules of statutory construction are
known as the "plain meaning rule" and the "golden rule." The
"plain meaning rule" holds that, when the meaning of a statute
is "plain," or clear and unambiguous, no further inquiry is
necessary. 72 The sole exception to this is the "golden rule" of
interpretation, which holds that the words of a statute must be
given their ordinary meanings, unless Congress has directed
otherwise or unless doing so would lead to an absurd or
73
incongruous result.
Generally, the supposition is that a statute must be "plain"
or clear in meaning on the basis of the text alone. Some judges,
however, look beyond the text to determine whether the
68.

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1.

See, REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND

APPLICATION OF STATUTES (Little, Brown & Co., 1975) 7; and WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13.

69.
70.
71.
72.
45:02.
73.
canon."
(1996).

DICKERSON, supranote 68, at 7.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1980); 2A SINGER, supra note 65, at §
SINGER, supra note 65, at § 45:12. Some refer to this as the "ordinary meaning
Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 224
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74
statute's meaning is "plain" when viewed in light of its context.
Context may affect the "golden rule" as well, since the ordinary
meanings of words inevitably vary depending upon the context
in which they are used. Judges disagree over what context
consists of, and how much of it is relevant to statutory meaning.
This disagreement about context has created a sort of
"continental divide" between the two primary schools of thought
on statutory interpretation. On one side of the divide are those
who believe that the text of a statute is the primary indicator of
statutory meaning; on the other side are those who believe that
statutory meaning is affected by, and dependent upon, context.
There is only one theory of interpretation currently in
general use which regards the text as determinative of statutory
meaning.
That theory is known, not surprisingly, as
Textualism.
There are several different theories, however,
which advocate the importance of context, and these shall be
referred to collectively, for the sake of simplicity, as "contextual"
theories of interpretation. 75

Textualism
Whether the interpreter favors a textual or a contextual
approach, every exercise in statutory interpretation must begin
with an examination of the statute's text.76 Textualism 7 7 is a
74. "To determine the plain meaning of a statutory provision, we examine not only
the specific provision at issue, but also the structure of the statute as a whole, including
its object and policy." Children's Hosp. and Health Ctr. v. Belshe, 188 F.3d 1090, 1096
(9th Cir. 1999).
75. Some classify these two schools of thought as "objective" (text-oriented) and
'subjective" (context-oriented). The real difference, in practice, is "between disregarding
the legislative history and taking it into account." REED DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, supra note 68, at 83.
Others
characterize the continental divide as being between "formalists," who believe in the
"determinacy" of the text, and "realists," who believe the text has no meaning until its
words are interpreted.
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
LITERARY THEORY: SOME COMMON CONCERNS OF AN UNLIKELY PAr, in INTERPRETING

LAW AND LITERATURE - A HERMENEUTIC READER, 116 (Sanford Levinson and Steven
Mailloux eds., 1988).
76. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981); Demarest v. Manspeaker,498 U.S.
184, 187 (1991). "Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed
statute, one certainly begins there." Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 535 (1947).
77. According to Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a textualist is not wedded
to the literal meaning of a text, but rather is one who construes a statute "...
reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means." SCALIA, A MATER OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 65, at 23. Scalia also makes the statement that "In textual interpretation,
context is everything." Id. at 37. The context he is referring to, however, is extremely
narrow, and often consists of little more than statute itself.
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theory that has been in use, though not necessarily in vogue,
since the late nineteenth century. 78 When faced with the task of
interpreting a statute, most judges, including textualists, start
with the plain meaning rule and the golden rule, giving the
words of a statute their ordinary meanings.7 9 If the statute's
meaning cannot be gleaned from such a reading of the text, then
a textualist may consult a dictionary or dictionaries in order to
construe the language of the statute.8 0 A textualist does not look
to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, for assistance in
determining the meaning of a statute.8 ' If necessary, however, a
textualist will rely on traditional canons of statutory
82
construction.
Textualism posits that the goal of statutory interpretation is
the discernment of statutory meaning, and that the only
relevant sources of meaning are the text and text-related
materials.8 3 The presumption underlying Textualism is that the
use of extrinsic sources, such as congressional committee reports
and other legislative history, is not appropriate, for several
reasons. First, since those extrinsic materials have not gone
through the requisite process for the enactment of law, they are
not law, and cannot be regarded as official pronouncements of
law.8 4 Secondly, legislative history materials are not a reliable
source of information about legislative meaning, due to the self78. Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78
B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1998); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT (Duke Univ.
Press, 199).
79. LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAw 61 (Harper Collins, 1988). This emphasis on
ordinary meaning is in keeping with the "constitutional assumption" that Congress will
speak to its public in language that they can understand.
80. See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 65, at 114; Ellen P.
April, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L. J.
275 (1998); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and
Empiricist, 8 ADMIN. LAW. J. AM. U. 747, 747 (1995).
81. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621, 625
(1990). Eskridge calls the textualism espoused by Justice Scalia and others the "New
Textualism." The Textualism described in this article is really the "New Textualism"
practiced by Justice Scalia and others. The "old Textualism" was nothing but Literalism
with the addition of the "golden rule."
82. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U.L. REV.
1023, 1043 (1998); See also, SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65 at 3435.
83. ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra, note 65, at 228.
84. Id. at 228-229; BREYER, supra note 58, at 862; and SCALIA, supra note 65, at
34-35. See also, John F. Manning, Textualism as a NondelegationDoctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 675 (1997): "[Gyiving decisive weight to legislative history assigns dispositive
effect to texts that never cleared the constitutionally mandated process of bicameralism
and presentment."
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serving nature of comments made in debates and colloquy, and
the sort of deal-making that is inherent in any congressional
vote.8 5 Thirdly, a court's use of extrinsic materials to assist it in
construing a statute would engage the court in legislative,
the
than judicial, activity, thereby violating
rather
86
powers.
of
separation
of
requirement
Constitutional
Lastly, textualists opine that the use of extrinsic materials
in statutory construction is a disservice to the general public.
All persons who may be affected by a statute have a right to rely
on its apparent meaning, and the only source commonly
available to them is the statute itself.8 7 One who expressed this
position particularly eloquently is former Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson:
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept
whenever possible the meaning which an enactment reveals on its
face. Laws are intended for all of our people to live by; and the
people go to law offices to learn what their rights are... Aside
from a few offices in the larger cities, the materials of legislative
history are not available to the lawyers who can afford neither the
cost of acquisition, cost of housing, nor the cost of repeatedly
examining the whole congressional history. To accept legislative
debates to modify statutory provisions88 is to make the law
inaccessible to a large part of the country.

Textualism's critics have succeeded in chipping away at all
four of its cornerstones. First of all, legislative history does not
have to be given conclusive effect, nor treated as the law of the
land, in order for it to provide valuable information relevant to a
An apparently clear statutory
statute's interpretation.8 9
meaning may be confirmed by reference to legislative history;
and a meaning that is ambiguous may be clarified by reference
to legislative history. 90 Secondly, the fact that members of
85. SCALIA, supranote 65, at 32-34.
86. ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 65, at 228-229: "Justice Scalia argues that the
new textualism... is also.., the methodology most consistent with the rule of law and
the separation of judicial from legislative powers in our system." See also SCALIA, supra
note 65, at 22.
87.

DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, supra note

65, at 163 and 165.
88. Schwegmann

Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951);

quoted in EUGENE C. GERHART, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JACKSON: LAWYER'S JUDGE

100 (1961).
89. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 863 (1992).
90. Id. at 848-851; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L.
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Congress may make "deals" in order to get legislation passed is
not cause to discount legislative history entirely. Judges review
evidence of one sort or another in every case. They learn how to
separate the wheat from the chaff, the reliable from the
unreliable. Surely this skill is not lost to them when the
evidence they are considering relates to the legislative history of
a statute. 9 1
The textualists' argument that the use of extrinsic sources
in statutory construction would turn judges into legislators is
spurious. The use of legislative history and other relevant
extrinsic materials need not differ from the use of any other sort
of interpretational aid, such as dictionaries and traditional
canons of construction. 92 While judges are not and cannot be
legislators, they are and always have been makers of law. They
are Congress's partners, albeit junior partners, in the lawmaking business. In addition, a court's use of legislative history
in order to clarify ambiguous statutory terms does not violate
the separation of powers mandate, but rather reinforces
93
Congress's superior law-making role.
The argument that legislative history materials are not
accessible to the public was once the most persuasive argument
against its use. This argument, however, is no longer
persuasive. 94 Legislative history materials, including committee
reports, congressional hearing transcripts, and earlier copies of
a bill, are readily available to the sole practitioner and to the

REV. 621, 622 (1993).
91. "Nor am I convinced that courts can ever do more than bring their generally
critical faculties to bear on the totality of evidence in the legislative record in the same
way that they deal with other complex evidentiary records." Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOwA
L. REV. 195, 214 (1983). In my opinion, that is enough for them to do.
92. BREYER, supra note 89, at 870-873.
93. "The traditional notion is that legislative history/intent should be used to
interpret texts whose meaning cannot be conclusively determined from the text alone.
And, if the meaning of the statutory provision cannot be determined from the text alone,
the idea of trying to discern the intent of the enacting body would seem to further
democratic principles rather than undermine them." William L. Funk, Faith in Texts Justice Scalia's Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution:Apostasy for the Rest of
Us?" 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 825, 841-42 (1997).
94. According to Justice Stephen Breyer: "This argument overlooks the fact that
courts use history to interpret unclear statutes. The use of legislative history can
therefore make it easier, not more difficult, for the law-abiding citizen to plan conduct
according to law. Legislative history is not difficult to find ... Summaries are available
in most libraries and the federal government maintains depository libraries with full
texts of relevant documents." Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation,supra note 89, at 869.
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general public through the nation-wide system of federal
95
depository libraries and through on-line research services.
Finally, if, as Textualism asserts, the ultimate goal of
interpretation is the discernment of meaning, then anything and
everything that could have bearing on that meaning ought to be
96
considered.
The TraditionalCanons of Construction
Textualism does allow for some consideration of context, but
only a very narrow, text-based context. For example, a statutory
provision may be interpreted in relation to the rest of the statute
of which it constitutes a part;97 or an entire statute may be
construed in relation to other statutes, if it is connected with
them as part of a regulatory scheme. 98 The use of traditional
canons of construction is also permissible under Textualism,
when a statute's meaning is not clear and dictionary definitions
do not suffice to make it so. 99 These include text-based canons
that relate to usage and syntax, as well as substantive canons
that apply well-established principles of law or policy to clarify
the meaning of a disputed text.10 0
Two of the traditional text-based canons of construction are
noscitur a sociis, or, "it is known by its companions;"'u 0 and
ejusdem generis, or, "of the same sort," which requires that a
term of general import be construed in light of more specific
95. Several web sites provide access to legislative history materials, free of charge.
Persons who do not have their own internet service may, in most locations, secure such
access at their local public library.
96. In the words of Felix Frankfurter, "If the purpose of construction is the
ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded." Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 541 (1947).
97. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN.L. REV. 321, 355 (1990). This is referred to as the "whole
statute" rule. See also, Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA, 20 HARv. ENvTL. L.
REV. 199, 224 (1996). The practice of interpreting a statute so as to ensure that all of its
provisions work together as an integral whole has also been called "intratextualism."
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). Interpreting a
statutory provision as part of a "whole" may include ensuring that its construction does
not make another provision superfluous, or incongruous, and defining terms used in
more than one section of a statute in the same way.
98.

DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, supra note

65, at 109. This practice of interpreting a statute in the context of related statutes is
referred to as construction in pari materia.Id.
99.

100.

SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65, at 28.

Id.; Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law,

78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1043 (1998).
101.

SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65, at 26.
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For example, a state statute prohibiting

grave desecration might provide: "[N]o person shall willfully
vandalize, deface, mutilate, or otherwise harm any grave, grave
marker or grave contents." In accordance with noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis, the general term, "harm," should be
interpreted in light of the specific terms with which it is listed,
namely, the words "vandalize," "mutilate" and "deface".
Most judges, including textualists, have traditionally used
several substantive canons to assist them in construing
ambiguous or unclear statutes. 0 3 These include two canons that
are particularly relevant to the interpretation of NAGPRA. The
first of these is the "remedial purpose" canon, which suggests
that a remedial statute must be construed broadly so as to give
effect to its purpose. 10 4 The second is the "Indian law" canon.
This canon requires Indian treaties and legislation to be
construed in favor of Indian interests. 105 The Indian law canon
is "a judge-made rule responding to the inequitable treatment of
Indians by the nation in the past. ...
In the face of that
history, and obvious disparities in bargaining power, courts give
Indian tribes the benefit of the doubt." 06 These substantive
canons have a long history of use in the federal courts. Because
these canons are so firmly established in judicial tradition and
precedent, even textualist judges are often willing to rely upon
them, despite the fact that they bring an "extra-textual" element
into the process of statutory interpretation.
There is one other "canon" of sorts that is germane to the
interpretation of NAGPRA. A reviewing court will defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute, if the agency has been
authorized by Congress to implement and administer that
statute. The level of deference due will depend upon several
102. Id.; also, SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 151 (discussing all three of these
"syntactical" canons or "norms" of interpretation).
103. But, see SCALIA, supra note 65, at 28-29. Justice Scalia is not a big fan of the
substantive canons. He grudgingly admits, however, that some of them make a certain
amount of sense and even serve to preserve important principles of law.
104.

WILLIAM

N.

ESKRIDGE,

JR. AND

PHILIP

P.

FRICKEY,

LEGISLATION

AND

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 331 (Foundation Press 2000); also SCALIA,supra note 65, at
28. And see, dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in U.S. v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 548
(1995): "If this case involved the interpretation of a statute designed to confer new
benefits or rights upon a class of individuals, today's decision would be more
understandable, since such a statute would be 'entitled to a liberal construction to
accomplish its beneficent purposes.'"
105. ESKRIDGE AND FRICKEY, supra note 97, at 340; see also SCALIA, supra note 65,
at 27, and SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 156-57.
106. SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 156-157.
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factors, as delineated in Chevron, 0 7 Skidmore, 108 and, most
recently, U.S. v. Mead Corporation.10 9 The DOI's interpretation
of NAGPRA may not qualify for the maximum deference due
under Chevron,1 0 but it is certainly entitled to significant
deference, pursuant to Skidmore and Mead."' This rule of
deference to an administering agency's statutory interpretation
is followed by all judges, textualist and contextualist alike.
Contextual Theories of Interpretation
Several different theories of statutory interpretation may be
clustered together under the "contextual" umbrella. All of them
share the notion that a statutory text read in isolation lacks
meaning, and that it is necessary to read a statute in its proper
context in order to make its meaning fully apparent and
comprehensible. "The statute's text is the most important
consideration.., and a clear text ought to be given effect. Yet
the meaning of a text critically depends upon its surrounding
context.""

2

Two major theories that promote the importance of

context in statutory interpretation are Intentionalism and
Purposivism. Both theories advocate interpreting a statute so as
to determine the "will" of Congress and give it full effect. 113
Intentionalists focus on determining the original intent of
the legislature with regard to a particular statute, and on
effectuating that intent. 1 4 This theory is rooted in the notion
107. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
108. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
109. United States v. Mead Corporation, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (2001).
110. This article is not intended to give an opinion as to whether DOI's
interpretation is or is not entitled to "Chevron" deference. A thorough examination of
the level of deference due to DOI's interpretation in this case, and the effect of the Mead
decision, if any, upon that level of deference, is beyond the scope of this article.
111. There is strong language in the Mead decision indicating that Chevron
deference may be due even to an agency determination that is arrived at through less
than formal procedures: "[Als significant as notice- and-comment is in pointing to
Chevron deference, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative
formality was required and none was afforded." U.S. v. Mead Corporation, 121 S.Ct.
2164, 2173 (2001)(citations omitted).
112. ESKRIDGE, THE NEW TEXTUALISM, supra note 81, at 621 (emphasis in original).
113. In a case concerning the interplay between NAGPRA and the Freedom of
Information Act, the federal district court for Hawaii included the following language in
its decision: "When interpreting a statute, the court's objective is to ascertain the intent
of Congress and to give effect to legislative will.'" Na Iwi 0 Na Kupuna 0 Mokapu v.
Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397, 1412 (D. Haw. 1995).
114. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY AND GARRETT, supra note 65, at 214. Early intentionalists
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that legislative intent is of "supreme importance" 115 in statutory
interpretation because it constitutes, in a representative
democracy, the will of the true sovereign, the people. 11 6 In
attach great
intentionalists
textualists,
contrast with
significance to legislative history materials." 7 Such materials
include House and Senate committee reports, special
commission reports or recommendations, transcripts of
congressional hearings, and earlier drafts of a bill. It is from
these materials that evidence of legislative intent is derived. 18
Critics of Intentionalism charge that "legislative intent" is a
mere fiction, because only individual persons are capable of
having intent, and the legislature is comprised of hundreds of
individuals with varying personal intents. 1 9 It is not likely that
all members of Congress would ever have the same intent with
regard to a particular piece of legislation. 120 It can also be safely
assumed, say the critics, that no member of Congress would
have formed any specific intent with regard to "the unique facts
21
of the case before the court.'
It certainly would be impossible to discover the intent of
every member of Congress with regard to a particular statute.
However, evidence of the intent of some members of Congress
can be gleaned from the statute itself, committee reports, and
sponsors' statements. It may not be unreasonable, once that bill
has become law, to project that evident intent onto a majority of
the members of Congress. 122 The real flaw of Intentionalism is
engaged in 'imaginative reconstruction," through which they attempted to determine
how the legislators who enacted a statute would decide the case at hand. ESKRIDGE,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 22.
115.

EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 159 (1940).

116.

ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra

note 104, at 326.
117. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 14;
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist, 8
ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 747, 747 (1995). "Intentionalists attempt to draw interpretive
references from the legislature's stated goals and from a statute's legislative history." Id.
118. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983).
119. DICKERSON, supra note 65, at 68.
120. Id.
121. LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAW, supra note 79, at 69; see also, John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675 (1997).
122. The critics of Intentionalism would disagree with this. For example, see
Scalia, supra note 65, at 32. They argue that the intent of committee members cannot be
imputed to other members of Congress, because bills are approved for a variety of
reasons and not necessarily because individual members ascribe to the intent of the
sponsoring committee. However, Justice Stevens, concurring in Bank One Chicago v.
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that it focuses on original intent, without regard for the current
environment in which the statute operates.
Purposivism focuses on the discernment and effectuation of
the purpose, or underlying goal, of a statute. 123 A statute's
purpose is sometimes made clear by its text. 124
In most
instances, however, purposivists must rely upon legislative
history in order to interpret a statute. 25 As an approach to
statutory construction, purposivism has a long history of use in
the federal courts. 126 When Justice Holmes referred to the "will"
of the legislature, he was really speaking of the "purpose" of a
statute, and Congress's desire to have that that purpose carried
out:
The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law
shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that
will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the
conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces
the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an
adequate discharge of duty to say: We see what you are driving at,
but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.127

Justice
follows:

Frankfurter

described

statutory

"purpose"

as

Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264 (1996), opined:
Legislators, like other busy people, often depend upon the judgment of trusted
colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute... has
bipartisan support and has been carefully considered by committees familiar
with the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely
on the views of the committee in casting their votes. In such circumstances,
since most Members are content to endorse the views of the responsible
committees, the intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly
regarded as the intent of Congress.
Id. at 276-277.
123. Id.; ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY AND GARRETT, supra note 65, at 213.
124. The words themselves are, "far and away the most reliable source for learning
the purpose of a document." Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1944).
125. NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45:09 (6th Ed
2001).
126. "[Llegislators, like others concerned with ordinary affairs, do not deal in rigid
symbols,. . . stripped of suggestion .... We can best reach the meaning here, as always,
by recourse to the underlying purpose." Borella, 145 F.2d at 64 supra note 112; Keck v.
United States, 172 U.S. 434, 455 (1899). See also, SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 123: "In
cases in which textual and structural approaches are inadequate, a natural and timehonored response is to resort to the 'purpose' of the statute."
127. Holmes, J., opinion in Johnson v. U.S., 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir., 1908), quoted in
POPKIN, supra note 65, at 128.
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Legislation has an aim: it seeks to obviate some mischief, to effect
change of policy... That aim, that policy is not drawn like
nitrogen out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute,
as read in the light of the external manifestations of purpose.
That is what the judge must seek and effectuate ... 128

The purpose of a statute may be thought of as the policy
upon which it is based, or which it seeks to promote. For
example, civil rights statutes are based upon the policy favoring
equal treatment under the law for all Americans. The purpose
of civil rights statutes is to promote or implement that policy.
Based on their observation that every statute has a discernible
purpose and that construing a statute with that purpose in mind
will resolve any textual ambiguities, Professors Hart and Sacks
129
advocated a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.
It is arguable that Intentionalism and Purposivism allow for
considerable flexibility in statutory construction, thereby
increasing the risk that judges will in actuality make their own
law or policy rather than implement Congress's law and
policy.' 30 However, it is equally arguable that a textualist
interpretation which ignores all legislative history runs the risk
of defeating the congressional intent and purpose behind that
13
statute. '
Why continue to announce that only where the statute is
ambiguous is it subject to construction?
Why should the
legislative intent be defeated simply because the statute may seem
clear and unambiguous on its face, when the court could by
applying any of the existing rules of construction, actually
ascertain true legislative intent? 132

128.

Frankfurter, supra note 92.

129.

ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY AND GARRETr, supra note 65, at 333-334.

130. SCALIA, supra note 65 at 17-18.
131. As Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett put it:
Even if one accepts Justice Scalia's premise that courts are supposed to play a
neutral, nondiscretionary, and perhaps even mechanical role in statutory
policy implementation, it is not clear that his new textualism advances that
goal.
LEGISLATION, supra note 65, at page 238.
132. CRAWFORD, supra note 115, at §175. It should be noted that Crawford did not
use the terms "interpretation" and "construction" as synonyms. According to Crawford,
"interpretation" is the "process of discovering the true meaning of the language" in a
statute, using only text-based sources; and "construction" is the process of using extrinsic
sources to draw conclusions about statutory meaning, legislative intent, and statutory
purpose. Id. at §157. In other words, interpretation is what a textualist does, while
construction is what anyone using legislative history materials and other "context-based"
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Intentionalism is the less attractive of the two theories,
with its focus on original intent and its disregard of legal and
social developments.
For that reason, statutory purpose is
preferable to legislative intent as a focal point for the
interpretive process.
"Dynamic" statutory interpretation 133 is the most preferable
method of statutory construction because it is the most
comprehensive. It utilizes a variety of guidelines, legal precepts,
and sources of information in order to construe the meaning of
the statutory text, thereby incorporating the best of the textbased and context-based theories. Professor Eskridge describes
this dynamic enterprise as follows:
We do not discover the truth of the provision by limiting our vision
to the bare text, or to the original legislative intent, or to current
policy. All of these perspectives work together, and each teaches
us something. 134

Professors Eskridge and Frickey have also described the
dynamic process as one of "practical reasoning,"1 35 which
includes consideration of "a broad range of textual, historical,
and evolutive evidence" and reflects what judges actually do
when they interpret statutes. 136
The dynamic, practical
reasoning form of interpretation includes consideration of the
text, congressional intent, statutory purpose, and the existing
legal and social environment. It also includes recognition of the
fact that the interpreting judge is an integral element of the
interpretational "mix" - that statutory interpretation is a
creative enterprise, and that the judge is a participant in that
137
enterprise.
"Dynamic"or "Comprehensive"Statutory Interpretation
The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no
sources does.
133. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 65.
134. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 613 (1990).
135. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 97.
136. Id. at 322 and 359. "Evolutive" evidence includes things like prior
implementation of the statute, current understandings of the Constitution and
fundamental notions of fairness and justice, and relationship between the subject statute
and newer, related statutes or policies. Id. at 359.
137. Id. at 345.
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intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation. 138

This statement, when made by Professors Hart and Sacks in
1958, was undoubtedly an accurate description of the current
state of affairs in the field of statutory interpretation. And it
was, no doubt, equally accurate and descriptive of then-current
circumstances when Professor Reed Dickerson used it as a
launching point for his book, The Interpretationand Application
of Statutes, in 1975.139 Now, in the year 2002, there remains no
better way to describe the current state of affairs with regard to
statutory interpretation than to borrow the very same words
140
used by Hart and Sacks forty-four years ago.
There are several circumstances that have contributed to
the lack of a single, generally accepted theory of statutory
construction in American jurisprudence and jurispractice. First
of all, theory does not always translate well from the printed
page into practice. We can talk and write interminably (and
indeed, it seems we have 41 ) about how statutes ought to be
interpreted, but that does not necessarily bring us closer to
accurate interpretation of specific statutes in actual
controversies. 142 Secondly, legal scholars have apparently been
searching for the Holy Grail of interpretation, the one true and
glorious theory that will enable all lawyers and all judges to
correctly construe all statutes in all situations. The Holy Grail
exists only in mythology.
Another circumstance that has prevented the ascension of
one theory of interpretation to a position above all others is the
simple fact that judges are human. As human beings, whether

138.
HENRY M. HART, JR., and ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 1201 "Tentative Edition" (Harvard

Law School 1958).
139.

REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

1

(1975).
140. See, SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65, at 14 (quoting
HART and SACKS, supra note 138, at 1201). Justice Scalia sees this as a "sad
commentary," and continues: "Even sadder, however, is the fact that the American bar
and American legal education, by and large, are unconcerned with the fact that we have
no intelligible theory." Id. The current state of affairs is not that we lack any intelligible
theory of statutory construction, but that we have so many intelligible theories from
which to choose.
141. See, supra notes 65 and 66.
142. ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 322. See also, ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Lon L.
Fuller 122 (1984) (stating "A theory of interpretation cannot decide concrete cases. It
can only specify steps to be taken and structure the exercise of judgment").
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they realize it or not and whether they admit it or not, judges
are influenced in every situation by what they value, what they
believe, and what they understand about the world around
them. 143 In a diverse society, there will always be divergent
views about what is right and good and just. 144 A review of the
decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the last fifteen
months should convince all doubters that it is indeed impossible
for justices to completely set aside everything that makes them
who they are, even when they make the best of efforts to do so.
Eskridge and Frickey's dynamic interpretation process
takes the judge's personal element and adds it to the mix,
recognizing that interpretation is a creative process. 45 This
dynamic approach is the most inclusive and comprehensive of
the established theories and methods. It allows judges to look to
a wide variety of sources and circumstances for guidance
relating to the meaning of a statute. It takes into account the
will of Congress as well as the text of the statute. It also takes
into account the "will of the people" by placing importance on
developments in the social and legal environment. Eskridge and
Frickey describe the process as the weaving together of various
threads - text, intent, purpose, legislative history, current policy
- into a strong cable that is capable of supporting the end result,
the construed and explicated statute. 46 The greater the number
of factors looked to for statutory meaning, the more the element
of a judge's personal opinions and beliefs is diluted.
The truth of the matter is that comprehensive
interpretation mirrors reality, because judges typically do weave
together various threads of information, text, and precedent to

143. Max Radin reached a similar conclusion more than seventy years ago, when he
noted that the choices a judge must make in the process of interpreting a statute are
influenced, "by those physical elements which make him [or her] the kind of person that
he [or she] is. That this is pure subjectivism and therefore an unfortunate situation is
beyond the point. It is hard to see how subjectivism can be avoided or how the
personality of the judge can be made to count for nothing in his [or her] decision on
statutory interpretation as on everything else." Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43
HARV. L. REV. 863, 881 (1930). See also, ESKRIDGE, supra note 134; Martha Minow,
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); and Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental
States Relevant for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation?85 CORNELL L. REV.
1609, 1617-19 (2000).
144. E.g., "We are, quite simply, a diverse society ... The fact cannot be avoided
that the appropriate vision of society, the individual, and the relationship of individuals,
and the appropriate distribution of society's wealth are substantive issues that cannot
help but affect judicial decisions." POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, supra note 65, at 195.
145. ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 345.
146. Id. at 351.
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arrive at the meaning and import of a statute. Judges who
purport to be concerned mainly with purpose do examine the
words and syntax of a statute. Judges who purport to be
concerned with nothing but the text do look outside the text for
statutory meaning. For example, in Bush v. Gore, in which the
Supreme Court construed a Florida election statute, Justice
Scalia, the champion of New Textualism, stated: "[T]he clearly
1 47
expressed intent of the legislature must prevail."
If, in some circumstances, judges do not engage in such a
"weaving" process, it is because there is no need to do so.
Legislative intent, statutory purpose, and textual meaning are
woven inextricably together in a symbiotic relationship from the
inception of the legislative process. Purpose gives rise to intent,
which then augments meaning, which effectuates purpose, and
so forth. Societal values and legal policies change and develop
and affect purpose, intent and even textual meaning, and the
process begins anew.
The process of construing a statute may be regarded as akin
to the threading together of a braided cable, as Eskridge and
Frickey suggest. Or, it may be regarded as akin to the creation
of a stew or ratatouille in which every ingredient complements
the others and in which the flavors mingle and transform and
work together to create the final product. This is the sort of
process that is necessary for honest, reasonable, and accurate
interpretation of a federal statute. It is this sort of dynamic,
comprehensive interpretation that will enable us to discern the
meaning and import of NAGPRA.
COMPREHENSIVE INTERPRETATION OF

NAGPRA

A comprehensive construction of NAGPRA requires the use
of relevant canons of construction, and the combination of textbased and context-based theories of interpretation.
This
dynamic, comprehensive approach includes the following:
" Determination of the purpose, or underlying policy goal, of the
statute at issue;
" Examination of the statutory text for meaning, using the
statutory purpose as a guide to meaning;
" Interpretation of the text with the assistance of traditional textbased and substantive canons of construction, when
147. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Scalia, J. and Justice Thomas) (emphasis added).
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applicable; and
9 Further interpretation of the text in light of the circumstances
that prompted the statute's enactment, the legislative history
of the statute, and the current legal and social environment.
A statute's purpose may be apparent on its face. In some
instances, however, legislative history must be consulted early
on in the interpretation process, for evidence of the statutory
purpose or policy goal. Comprehensive construction, then, is not
a linear process, but is instead a back-and-forth-and-back-again
process of gauging and re-gauging purpose and meaning in order
to arrive at an honest and complete understanding of a statute.
This is the process that should be used to interpret NAGPRA.
This process begins with the legal and social context that gave
rise to the statute.
Social Context
In 1940, legal scholar Felix Cohen wrote with dismay about
the continuation of discriminatory practices against American
Indians. 4 8s He called for "positive effort to secure appropriate
legislation that will secure to the Indian equal treatment before
the law." 149 Decades later, Congress made an effort to meet that
challenge, in connection with the treatment of American Indian
graves and burial artifacts.
That effort culminated in the
enactment of NAGPRA by the 101st Congress in 1990.150 This
statute has been hailed as "human rights" legislation, 151 and as
the vehicle that has put an end to "academic racism" against
152
Native American graves and ancestral remains.
All states have common law and statutory protections
148. This article uses the term "American Indian" to describe native persons and
tribes. This term was chosen because the law still, for the most part, refers to
indigenous Americans as Indians, and to avoid confusion with references to the term,
"Native American," as it is used in NAGPRA. No disrespect is meant to any native
persons or tribes who would prefer to be called Native American instead of Indian.
149. Felix S. Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145,
191 (1940).
150. 7 U.S.C. § 4367 (1990).
151. Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990: Senate
Committee Report on S.R. 101-473, 101st Cong. (1990)(Statement of Senator Daniel
Inouye).
152. Walter Echo-Hawk, in argument on behalf of amicus tribes and NAIA,
arguments in Bonnichsen v. U.S. before Judge Jelderks in the federal district court for
the District of Oregon, June 20, 2001 (personal court notes). See also, Jack F. Trope and
Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act:
Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 35, at pages 36, 59 (1992).
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against the desecration of burial sites and cemeteries. 153 These
laws are not intended to, nor do they, promote certain religious
beliefs, although many persons do have strong religious beliefs
regarding treatment of the deceased. These laws do, however,
recognize a certain sensibility that is common to many persons
of differing beliefs and backgrounds. That sensibility is one of
respect for the remains of deceased human beings. 54 Courts
have traditionally held, however, that this country's laws
protecting burial places do not cover American Indian burial
1 55
grounds and human remains.
The differential treatment of native burials has not been
relegated to our distant past. In 1982, a California appellate
court held that a Native American burial ground was not a
"cemetery" within the meaning of the state statute affording
protection to the contents of cemeteries. 56 That decision was
based upon legal precedent, which in turn was based upon
attitudes that prevailed in this country for centuries. The
remains of deceased Indians were never accorded the respect or
care with which society usually treats human remains, and they
were never protected from harm by the common law or state
statutory law. 5 7 As a result, it became necessary for Congress
58
to afford them such protection, through federal legislation.

153. See also, New York Penal Law § 145.23 (cemetery desecration in first degree is
a felony); Texas Health & Safety Code § 711.0311 (desecration or removal of remains,
and other acts of damage to cemetery, constitutes a felony); Idaho Code § 18-7027
(damage to any marker, crypt or other place of burial is a misdemeanor) and § 18-7028
(removal of remains from place of interment is a felony punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both).
154. Trope and Echo-Hawk, supra, note 152, at 38; Virginia H. Murray, A "Right"of
the Dead and a Charge on the Quick: Criminal Laws Relating to Cemeteries, Burial
Grounds and Human Remains, 56 J. Mo. Bar 115 (Mar./Apr. 2000).
155. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra, note 152, at 39-42.
156. Wana the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc., 128 Cal.App.3d 536 (1982);
see also Trope and Echo-Hawk, supra note 152, at 46. The failure to treat Indian burial
places as sacred is related, in part, to the fact that non-Indians expect burial places to be
marked with stone monuments and other memorials to the dead. Indian burial grounds
contain no such markers or memorial monuments. It has taken centuries for the rest of
America to understand that, for American Indians, there is no memorial more fitting,
respectful, and beautiful than earth itself.
157. Trope and Echo-Hawk, supra note 152, at 38-48. Scientists have long looted
Indian burial sites for Indian remains and subjected those remains to study, destruction,
or display in museums. The U.S. Surgeon General, by order issued in 1868, directed the
removal of the heads and other body parts of Indian war dead for study at the Army
Medical Museum. Id. See also, THOMAS, SKULL WARS, supra note 7, at 57.
158. Legislation is well suited to furthering the goal of equality. "Clear delineations
of permissible and prohibited forms of conduct contribute significantly to the realization
of equal treatment under the law, which is one of the basic requirements of justice. ... ."
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NAGPRA, in addition to protecting the sanctity of native
burial grounds, mandates that all museums receiving federal
funds shall inventory the native human remains and burial
artifacts in their possession, notify the tribes associated with
those items, and return the items to those tribes. 159 The statute
also requires that Native American remains and burial artifacts
inadvertently discovered on tribal or federal land be repatriated
to the tribe that establishes the closest cultural affiliation with
those remains or items. 160 It is this requirement that has come
into play in Bonnichsen.
Pursuant to NAGPRA, the Corps was required to make the
discovery of the Ancient One known to all tribes with a history
of use or occupation of the land where the discovery was
made.' 6' In accordance with the statute, the tribe that makes a
claim for such remains, and establishes a "cultural affiliation"
with the remains, is entitled to custody and ownership of the
remains. 62 The issues of whether the Ancient One is "Native
American," and whether the claimant tribes have sufficiently
established a "cultural affiliation" with him cannot be resolved
until the statutory terms, "Native American" and "cultural
affiliation," are construed. Before we turn to those terms,
however, we must examine the purpose of the statute and
explore whether the substantive canons of construction govern
the way in which we should interpret this statute.
The Substantive Canons Applied to NAGPRA
The "remedial purpose" canon provides that remedial
legislation should be construed broadly, or liberally, so as to give
full effect to its purpose. 63 This canon of statutory construction
is firmly established in judicial tradition, having been used by

EDGAR BODENHEIMER, POWER, LAW AND SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE WILL TO POWER AND
THE WILL TO LAW (1972).

159. 25 U.S.C. § 3003 (2001). This is a simplified description of what is in reality a
complex process.
160. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d) (2001). This requirement put an end to what was
apparently the government's common practice of making such remains available to
scientists who wished to study them, according to a comment made by one of the
plaintiffs during the Bonnichsen court proceedings (personalcourt notes).
161. Id.
162. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2001).
163. See, e.g., Primer v. Kuhn, 1 U.S. 452, 453 (1789); Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S.
318, 323 (1867); U.S. ex rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 557 (1943); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332,336 (1967).
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the Supreme Court since its earliest days. 164 A statute is
remedial if it creates new rights, addresses a social evil or
"mischief," or establishes a remedy for redress of an injury. 165
NAGPRA does all three. It establishes in American Indians,
Native Hawaiians and Native Alaskans the right to claim, and
recover ownership of, human remains and cultural patrimony
with which they have some connection. It aims to eradicate the
looting of native burial sites and sale of burial artifacts by
criminalizing such behavior, and it provides a remedy
(repatriation) for the injuries resulting from past occurrences of
such looting and desecration.
The statutory provisions are sufficient in and of themselves
to inform us that NAGPRA is remedial in nature. The statute's
legislative history confirms this conclusion.
According to
Senator Daniel Inouye, co-chair of the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs and one of the sponsors of NAGPRA, the
statute's purpose is to put an end to a certain form of racism:
When human remains are displayed in museums or historical
societies, it is never the bones of white soldiers or the first
European settlers that came to this continent that are lying in
glass cases. It is Indian remains. The message that this sends to
the rest of the world is that Indians are ... different from and
inferior to non-Indians. This is racism... [T]he bill before us
today is not about the validity of museums or the value of
scientific inquiry. It is about human rights. 166
Whether regarded as human rights legislation, 167 or simply
as legislation that redresses an old and continuing injury and
aims to prevent its reoccurrence, NAGPRA is undoubtedly a
remedial statute. In accordance with the traditional canon,
therefore, NAGPRA should be construed in such a way as to give
full effect to its remedial purpose. Additional support for this
position comes from the language of the statute itself:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to (1) limit the authority of any Federal agency or museum to (A) return or repatriate Native American cultural items to

164.

165 Id.

165. SUTHERLAND STAT CONST § 60.2 (6th Ed., Singer, ed.).
166. 136 Cong. Rec. S17174 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990)(statement of Sen. Inouye).
167. Trope and Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
RepatriationAct, supra note 152, at 36.
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Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations, or individuals,
and
(B) enter into any other agreement with the consent of the
culturally affiliated tribe or organization as to the disposition
of, or control over, items covered by this Act;
(4) limit any procedural or substantive right which may otherwise
be secured to individuals or Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian
organizations; .... 168

The import of this section is that NAGPRA should not in
any event be construed so as to limit or restrict rights native
peoples have in connection with securing custody of ancestral
remains and cultural articles. This is a clear directive from
Congress that NAGPRA is to be construed liberally, and that the
rights of Native Americans and the underlying purpose of the
statute should guide that construction. When Congress has
169
made its desires known, the courts must abide by them.
The "Indian law" canon of statutory construction, which is
also firmly established in judicial tradition, requires that Indian
legislation be construed in favor of Indian interests. 170 This
canon was first utilized in the interpretation of treaties between
tribes and the federal government. However, courts have long
applied the canon to statutes as well, construing Indian-related
statutes liberally, so as to resolve ambiguities in favor of Indian
rights. 17 1 NAGPRA confers on Indian tribes and individuals a
new right, and it provides mechanisms for the protection of this
right. That makes it Indian legislation. 72 Any reasonable doubt
of that should be put to rest by the final section of the statute:
This Act reflects the unique relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations
and should not be construed to establish a precedent with respect

168.

169.

25 U.S.C. § 3009 (2001).
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REvOLUTION, supra note 65, at 133-34.

See also, BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 94 (1924).
170. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886); Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New
York, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
171. ScALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65, at 27. In connection
with statutes (as opposed to treaties), the Indian law canon is really just a specialized
version of the remedial purpose canon.
172. Counsel to the Bonnichsen plaintiffs argued in court that NAGPRA is not
Indian legislation (personalcourt notes).

MONTANA LAW REVIEW
to any other individual, organization or foreign government.

Vol. 63
173

Pursuant to the traditional canon, therefore, NAGPRA must
be construed in favor of the Indian rights or interests at stake.
The primary Indian interest protected by NAGPRA, and at issue
in Bonnichsen, is the right to bury one's dead in accordance with
cultural traditions and to expect their burial places to remain
undisturbed. The statute carves out no exception for human
remains or cultural articles of great antiquity. In fact, the
requirement
that
cultural
affiliation
be
established
"prehistorically" indicates that ancient remains are intentionally
174
within the scope of the coverage afforded by NAGPRA.
Therefore, even remains as ancient as the Ancient One may well
be subject to NAGPRA, if they otherwise meet the definition of
"Native American." Any interpretation of the statute that would
exempt ancient remains from its reach would be detrimental to
the Indian interest at stake, and contrary to the established
Indian law canon of construction.
The Meaning of "NativeAmerican"
§3001(9). Native American means of, or relating to, a tribe, people,
or culture that is indigenous to the United States.

only

It is clear from the language of the statute that it applies
to "Native American" remains and artifacts: "The

ownership or control of Native American cultural items ... shall
be .... ,,175 It is also clear that "Native American," in NAGPRA,

is not a synonym for "American Indian," as it is in common
usage. This is apparent from a reading of the definition in
relation to the statute as a whole. Elsewhere in NAGPRA, the
words Indian and Indian tribe are used. Congress could have
used these terms in its definition of Native American, but it did
not. Therefore, Congress did not intend Native American to be
understood as a synonym for American Indian in this particular
statute.
In order to understand the statutory term Native American,
then, we must make certain that we understand the meaning of
the words used to define that term. We must determine what
"indigenous," "tribe," "people" and "culture" mean, as used in the
173.
174.
175.

25 U.S.C. § 3010 (2001).
25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (2001).
25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2001)(emphasis supplied).
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statute. These are familiar words, but they are words that have
multiple meanings. When a word or phrase is capable of being
understood in more than one way, it is said to be ambiguous,
and it requires further clarification. 1 76 The statutory definition
of "Native American" is intended to help us interpret the
statute, but we cannot do that properly until we interpret the
definition itself.
The component words of the definition of Native American
are not separately defined. The word "indigenous" commonly
means native to a particular place. 17 7 Dictionary definitions are
not evidence, and cannot be given conclusive effect in connection
178
with statutory meaning, but they can provide useful guidance.
Indigenous is defined in two standard dictionaries as
follows:
Indigenous: 1. Originating in and characterizing a particular
region or country; native... 2. Innate; inherent; natural ....Syn.
1. Autochthonous, aboriginal, natural. 179
Indigenous: 1. Born or produced naturally in a land or region;
native or belonging naturally to (the soil,180region, etc.). (Used
primarily of aboriginal or natural products.)

Since the word "aboriginal" is used in these definitions of
indigenous, it may be helpful to have the precise meaning of
that word as well. Random House defines aboriginal as: "1. Of,
pertaining to, or typical of aborignies.... 2. original or earliest
known; native; indigenous. "s181 The Oxford English Dictionary
offers the following:
Aboriginal: 1. First or earliest so far as history or science gives
record; primitive; strictly native, indigenous. Used both of the
races and natural features of various lands. 2. Dwelling in any
POPKIN, supra note 65, at 187; Donna D. Adler, A Conversational
176. See, e.g.,
Approach to Statutory Analysis: Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say, 66 MISS.
L. J. 37, 37 (1996); SUTHERLAND STAT CONST § 45.2 (6th Ed., Singer, ed.).
177. Judge Jelderks commented during the court arguments that indigenous is a
word that might seem simple, "but isn't really quite that simple." Personal court notes,
June 19, 2001.
178. MCI Telecommunications v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 240, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 2236
(1994)(Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion).
179. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 973 (2nd ed. 1993).
180.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 867 (2ND ED 1989).

181. RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 180. "Aborigine" is defined as: "one of the original
or earliest inhabitants of a country or region." Id.
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182
country before the arrival of later (European) colonists.

It is possible, using these definitions that clarify the
meaning of "indigenous," to construct a more detailed definition
of the statutory term, "Native American":
"Native American" means of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or
culture that originated in or dwelled83 in the United States
before the arrival of European colonists. 1

It is not possible to reach a full understanding of the term
"Native American", until the statutory meaning of the words,
"tribe," "people," and "culture" is determined. "Tribe" has many
meanings, but those most germane to this discussion appear to
be the following:
Tribe: 1. Any aggregate of people united by ties of descent from a
common ancestor, community of customs and traditions,
adherence to the 184
same leaders, etc. 2. A local division of an

aboriginal people.

Tribe: L.a. A group of persons forming a community and claiming
descent from a common ancestor;... b. A particular race of
recognized ancestry; a family.... 3. A race of people; frequently
85
applied to a group of primitive people.1

The word "people" may need no explanation, but since it,
too, has various meanings, the following dictionary definitions
may be helpful:
People: 4. the entire body of persons who constitute a community,
tribe, race, nation, or other group by virtue of a common culture,
history, religion, or the like .... 186
People: 1. A body of persons composing a community, tribe, race,
or nation. 2.a. The persons belonging to a place, or constituting a

182.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 35 (2ND ED 1989).

183. The use of the word "indigenous" to refer to people who populated a region
before Europeans colonized it is consistent with its use in international law, according to
a statement made in court by Walter Echo-Hawk, co-counsel for the National Congress of
American Indians. (Personalcourt notes).
184.

RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2018 (2ND ED. 1993).

185.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 503 (2ND ED. 1989).

186.

RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1436 (2ND ED 1993).
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tribe, people or culture. This language does not appear to
mandate that human remains must be "of or relating to" a
modern Indian tribe. On the contrary, the use of the term
"indigenous" is an indication that the remains are required only
to have some connection to a tribe or people that lived in this
country before European colonization. "Relating to" could be
construed as "related to," as in "akin to" or "of the same family,"
but that does not appear to be its meaning in this section of the
statute. Other sections of NAGPRA refer specifically to "lineal
descendants," a very clear reference to family relationship. It
may reasonably be concluded, therefore, from the context of this
section within the statute as a whole, that "relating to" in the
definition of "Native American" has a broader meaning than
relation by blood or family ties.
What, then, does "relating to" mean? In common usage,
"relating to" is used interchangeably with the phrases, "in
connection with" and "in relation to." According to Webster, "in
relation to" means: "concerning; regarding; with reference to." 19 1
The word "relate" means, among other things, "to connect or
associate, as in thought or meaning;"1 92 or "to have reference
(often followed by to)." 93 It appears, then, that "of, or relating
to" in Section 3001(9) of NAGPRA means: "belonging to or being
a member of, or having some connection or association with."
Accordingly, the statutory term "Native American", as applied to
human remains, and as enriched and clarified by the definitions
of the words comprising that term, may be expressed as follows:

"Native American" means belonging to or being a member of, or
having some connection or association with, a tribe/clan/
community/people/group of persons connected by culture, that
originated in or dwelled in the United States prior to the arrival of
European colonists.
The DOI has defined Native American, in the regulations
implementing NAGPRA, as follows: "The term Native American
means of, or relating to, a tribe, people or culture indigenous to
the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii." 94 This
definition mirrors the statutory language, and is congruent with

191.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED (1971).

192.
193.
194.

INTERNATIONAL

Id.
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 180.
43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d) (2001).

DICTIONARY

OF

THE

ENGLISH
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particular... company or class.... 3.c. Those to whom any one
of one's tribe, clan, family, community...
belongs; the members
7
8

etc., collectively.1

To complete the triad, "culture" is defined as:
Culture: 5.b. A particular form or type of intellectual
Also, the civilization, customs,
artistic
development.
of its
especially
at
a
certain
stage
achievements, etc., of a people,
88
development or history. 1
Culture: 3. a particular form or stage of civilization, as that of a
certain nation or period. 4. the sum total of ways of living built up
by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation
189
to another.

The definitions set forth above indicate that the words,
"tribe" and "people," are synonyms. Both terms refer to groups
of persons who have some connection with each other. That
connection may be based on geography, religion, family
relationship, or some other factor. "Culture" refers to the
characteristics and accomplishments of a group of people, such
as belief systems and practices, social customs, and artistic
creations. The traditional canon of construction, noscitur a
sociis,190 suggests that "culture" should be interpreted in relation
to the words with which it is listed. The application of noscitur a
sociis turns "culture" into a synonym for "tribe" and "people,"
and its meaning thus becomes "a group of persons known for
their particular culture." Based on these three terms, as fully
explicated, the statutory term, "Native American," can be
expressed as follows:
Native American means of, or relating to, a tribe/clan!
community/people/group of persons connected by culture that
originated in or dwelled in the United States prior to the arrival of

European colonists.

There is one more portion of this statutory definition that
must be clarified, and that is the requirement that Native
American human remains be "of, or relating to" an indigenous
187.
188.
189.
190.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 504, 505 (2ND ED. 1989).
Id. at 121.
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 180.
Discussed supra.

2002

"KENNEWICK MAN" OR "ANCIENT ONE"

the statutory definition. 195
DOI has explained its interpretation of this term as follows:
[WIe consider that the term 'Native American' is clearly intended
by NAGPRA to encompass all tribes, peoples, and cultures that
were residents of the lands comprising the United States prior to
historically-documented European exploration of these lands. 196

This interpretation corresponds with the dictionary
definitions consulted herein and with the detailed explanation of
the term "Native American" developed through examination of
the statutory text and those dictionary definitions. The DOI's
interpretation of "Native American" is, therefore, consistent
with the construction of the statutory term derived through
examination of the text as clarified by dictionaries and
traditional syntactical canons. In other words, using nothing
more than the theory of Textualism, it is possible to arrive at a
meaning of "Native American" that is clear and comprehensible,
and that correlates with the meaning DOI has assigned to that
term.
Even when a court concludes that the meaning of a
statutory provision is clear, it may look to legislative history to
confirm its conclusion. 197 In this case, the meaning of "Native
American" as explicated in the foregoing discussion is confirmed
by a review of NAGPRA's legislative history. H.R. 5237, the bill
that became NAGPRA, contained the definition of Native
American that now appears in the statute. Every precursor bill,
however, in the Senate and the House, contained a narrower
definition of that term. For example, the earliest of these
precursors, S. 187, contained the following definition:

195. Plaintiffs in Bonnichsen argue otherwise (personal court notes). They argue
that a difference in meaning is created because the statute reads, ". . . of, or relating to, a
tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to..." (emphasis added), while the regulation
reads, ". . . of, or relating to, a tribe, people or culture indigenous to. . . ."

Plaintiffs

contend that the words "that is" in the statute indicate a requirement that human
remains be related to an existing Indian tribe, and that the DOI has attempted to
remove that requirement by removing those two words from its definition of Native
American. Id. This is an untenable position. The words "that is" are not essential to the
meaning of the definition; it means the same thing whether they are included or not.
196. Letter of Francis P. McManamon, Departmental Consulting Archaeologist, to
Lt. Col. Donald Curtis, Jr., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, dated Dec. 23, 1997; available
at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/nagpra/kennew.htm and referenced there as "Letter to
USACOE on Kennewick Man."
197. Breyer, supra note 89, at 848-51; Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183
(1993).
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The term 'Native American' means any individual who is (4)
(5)
(6)

an Indian, or
a Native Hawaiian, or
198
an Alaskan Native, including Aleuts and Inuits.

S. 102.1, introduced by Senator McCain, contained a
definition of "Native American" that was virtually identical to
that contained in S. 187. S. 1980, introduced by Senator Inouye,
and based largely upon the language in the National Museum of
the American Indian Act, 199 was the first to broaden the
definition of Native American. It defines 'Native American' as
"an individual of a tribe people or culture that is indigenous to
200
the Americas and such term includes a Native Hawaiian."
The House also had two bills that preceded its final one on
the protection of native graves and repatriation of cultural
patrimony. In March of 1989, Representative Charles Bennett
introduced H.R. 1381, and Representative Morris Udall
introduced H.R. 1646. Both bills defined "Native American" in a
way that mirrors those definitions in S. 187 and S. 1021 by
simple reference to Indians, Native Hawaiians, and Native
Alaskans. H.R. 5237, which replaced S. 1980 and was enacted
into law, contained from the time of its introduction the
definition of "Native American" that is now in the statute. 20 1
This indicates that Congress fully intended the term "Native
American" to have a broader meaning than the earlier bills
would have given it, and that this explicated version of the
statutory term reflects that Congressional intent.
It is still necessary to determine whether the Ancient One
fits the definition of Native American. He lived on land now a
part of the United States, long before European settlers arrived.
198.

199 Natie Amnerican Musecum Claims CommissionAct, Senate Hearing 100-931 on S. 187, Senate Select Committee on Indian

Aflr, 100th Congress, July 29, 1988.

199. National Museum of the American Indian Act, Pub. L. No. 101-185 (codified as
20 U.S.C. 80q, et. seq.) (1989)(creating a new Museum of the American Indian as a part
of the Smithsonian Institution. It also requires the Smithsonian to inventory all its
native human remains and sacred artifacts, and to repatriate them to the appropriate
tribes in accordance with the statute and with regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of the Interior).
200. Senate Hearing 101-952, on S. 1021 and S. 1980, Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs, 101st Congress, May 14, 1990 (quoting S. 1980 section 16).
201. Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native American
Graves Protectionand RepatriationAct, and the Unresolved Issues of PrehistoricHuman
Remains, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 369, 415-416 (1998).
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For this reason, he can be described as native or indigenous to
the continent. He survived life-threatening injuries suffered
years before his death - the embedding of a stone spearhead in
his hipbone, and the crushing of two ribs. For that reason, it is
reasonable to conclude that he belonged to some tribe or group of
people, because he could not have survived those injuries on his
own. 20 2 The "culture" that the Ancient One is identified with can

be referred to as that of the people of the Windust Plateau in the
Late Holocene period of history. 203 It is possible, then, to
identify the Ancient One in the way that remains must be
identified in order to be deemed "Native American." Therefore,
the Ancient One is Native American within the meaning of
NAGPRA.
The Meaning of "CulturalAffiliation"
§3001(2). "Cultural affiliation" means that there is a relationship
of shared group identity which can be reasonably traced
historically or prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe
or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group.

NAGPRA mandates that ownership of inadvertently
discovered Native American remains shall be in the lineal
descendants, or in the tribe on whose tribal (reservation) lands
the remains were found, or in the tribe with the closest cultural
affiliation. 204 In addition, if cultural affiliation cannot be
"reasonably ascertained," then ownership vests in the tribe that
has been recognized, in a "final judgment" of the Indian Claims
Commission or the U.S. Court of Claims, as the aboriginal
occupant of the land on which the remains were found. 20 5 In any
event, it is incumbent upon the interested tribe or lineal
descendants to submit a claim pursuant to NAGPRA.
In order to establish a "cultural affiliation" with claimed
remains, a tribe must, in accordance with the definition of that
term, show a "relationship of shared group identity" between
itself and the "earlier identifiable group" with which the remains
are associated. The statute does not specify just how close or
strong a relationship that must be. The use of the word

202. Powell and Rose, Report on the OsteologicalAssessment of the 'Kennewick Man'
Skeleton, supra note 46.

203.
204.
205.

Id.
25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) and §3002(d) (2001).
25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(C)(1) (2001).
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"prehistorically" in the definition of "cultural affiliation" further
obscures the issue of proof. Prehistory is, to a large extent, a
great unknown. How close a relationship or connection could
possibly be traced "prehistorically"? And just what is a "shared
group identity"?
It is advisable, in connection with the comprehensive
interpretation of NAGPRA, to use dictionary definitions as an
aid to discerning the meaning of cultural affiliation. First,
however, it should be recalled that NAGPRA is a remedial
statute aimed at redressing past injustice and preventing its
future reoccurrence. It is a statute that has as its purpose the
eradication of "academic racism" 20 6 and blatant disregard for the
sensibilities of native peoples with regard to their deceased
ancestors and burial grounds. It is a statute that must be
construed honestly and reasonably in light of this remedial
purpose and the Indian interests it protects.
The term "shared group identity," as a component of
"cultural affiliation," requires clarification. The word "shared"
presents no problem: it means, in common understanding and
usage, something owned or enjoyed by more than one person. In
the definition of cultural affiliation, it clearly means something
attributable to, or associated with, both the claimant tribe and
the "earlier identifiable group." In order to understand "shared
group identity," however, we need to determine just what the
statute means by "group" and "identity." Starting with the word
"group" will facilitate explication of both phrases in which the
word appears - that is, it will lead to an understanding of both
"shared group identity" and "identifiable earlier group."
The word "group" generally means two or more things or
It also, however, has numerous more specific
persons.
meanings. The dictionaries inform us that "group" means,
among other things:
1. any collection or assemblage of persons or
Group: (noun)
things; cluster; aggregation. 2. a number of persons or things
ranged or considered together as being related in some way. 3.
Ethnol. A unit of social organization less complex than a band. 207

206. Term used by Walter Echo-Hawk, co-counsel for the National American Indian
Association, during arguments in federal district court on June 20, 2001 (personalcourt
notes). See also, SKULL WARS, supra note 7, Chapter 4: 'A Short History of Scientific
Racism in America."
207.

RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1966). [Emphasis supplied.)
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Relationship: 3: an aspect or quality (as resemblance, direction,
difference) that can be predicated only of two or more things taken
together: something perceived or discovered by observing or
thinking about two or more things at the same time: CONNECTION.
215

Finally, then, the definition of "cultural affiliation" may be
fully explicated, as follows:
"Cultural affiliation" means that there is some identifying trait,
custom, characteristic or other identifying feature that the
claimant tribe and the earlier band or group of persons have in
common with one another; and that this common identifying
feature creates a connection between the modem tribe and the
earlier group, which can be traced historically or prehistorically.

This statutory term, as construed, must now be applied to
the Ancient One. Was he a member of an "earlier group"? The
evidence indicates that he was. He had a stone spearhead
embedded in his hipbone when he was a young man, yet he
survived, and the bone shows no trace of infection. 216 This
indicates that he had others to help him with this injury, and
that they knew something about healing wounds and preventing
infection. He also suffered an injury resulting in crushed ribs
some years prior to his death. 217 This, too, was a lifethreatening injury that he could not have survived without
assistance. 218 Finally, two separate reports concluded that,
based on the condition of the remains and other relevant factors,
the Ancient One had been interred after death. The persons who
buried him likely had some relationship with him or they would
not have made the effort to bury him, and they must have
believed that burial was the appropriate treatment for the
remains of a deceased person. On the basis of this evidence, it
would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Ancient One was
a member of a group.
It is now necessary to determine the level of proof applicable
to the element of cultural affiliation under NAGPRA. The
statute does not specify a standard of proof for cultural
affiliation, but it does suggest that a preponderance of the

215.
216.
217.
218.

Random House Dictionary, supra note 208.
Powell and Rose, OsteologicalReport, supra note 46.
Id.
Id.
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evidence might be appropriate. 2 19 The Secretary of the Interior
found that the claimant tribes had established cultural
affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence. 220 The brief DOI
submitted in Bonnichsen avers that the Secretary's finding of
cultural affiliation is reasonable because it is based on a
preponderance of the evidence. 221 The statute itself, however,
does not require this level of proof.
When a tribe submits a claim for remains, and those
remains are determined to be Native American within the
meaning of NAGPRA, any reasonableproof of cultural affiliation
should be sufficient for approval of that claim. It is only when
there are two or more competing claims that NAGPRA requires
a claimant tribe to establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that it has the closest, or strongest, cultural affiliation
with the claimed items. 222 This is the only mention of any
standard of proof that appears in the statutory language
governing ownership of inadvertently discovered remains and
artifacts .223
Admittedly, it would be rare for a statute to require proof in
an amount less than a preponderance of the evidence. However,
NAGPRA is not a typical statute. It is remedial in nature, it is
Indian legislation, and it embodies an apology for injuries
inflicted upon native peoples not only with the acquiescence of
the government but pursuant to government order. 224 NAGPRA
is, in essence, a revolution on paper. And revolutions require
extraordinary measures. The plain language of the statute
appears to require no more than a scintilla of evidence showing
a cultural connection between a claimant tribe and the remains
or artifacts claimed, except that greater proof is required when
necessary to resolve competing tribal claims. Therefore, in the
absence of competing tribal claims, the statute does not require
that proof of cultural affiliation rise to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence.
The legislative history supports this reading of the statute.
The Senate Report on S. 1980, which was subsequently replaced

219. See discussion in Bacground Section, supra.
220. Babbitt letter, supra note 47.
221. Defendants'Memorandum, supra note 43,at 11.
222. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C)(2) (2001).
223. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2001).
224. HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS, supra, note 7, at 57. See also, Trope and EchoHawk, supra note 152; In the 1860's, the Surgeon General ordered all field officers to
collect Indian crania and skeletons and send them to the Army Medical Museum.
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by H.R. 5237, mentions that proof of cultural affiliation should
be "by a simple preponderance of the evidence," but that
discussion of proof is limited to claims for human remains and
cultural articles in the collections of museums or federal
agencies. 225 The House Report on H.R. 5237, the bill that
became NAGPRA, includes the following discussion concerning
proof of cultural affiliation in connection with ancient remains:
Where human remains and associated fimerary objects are
concerned, the committee is aware that it may be too difficult, in
many instances, to trace an item from modern Indian tribes to
prehistoric remains without some reasonable gaps in the historic
or prehistoric record. In such instances, a finding of cultural
affiliation should be based upon an overall evaluation of the
totality of circumstances and evidence... and should not be
precluded solely because of some gaps in the record. 226

All that is lacking in the proof submitted with regard to the
Ancient One is a continuous connection from the claimant tribes
all the way back to the Ancient One's lifetime 9,500 years ago.
Even if cultural affiliation must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence, the gap in time is not sufficient
reason to preclude a finding of cultural affiliation. The evidence
suggesting cultural affiliation includes geographical location, 227
oral histories of the claimant tribes that they have resided in
that area of Washington State for all time, and the lack of any
"migration stories" in the oral histories of these tribes. 228
Another piece of evidence indicating a cultural affiliation
between the tribes and the Ancient One is the conclusion,
reached by two separate teams of scientists, that the Ancient
One was purposefully interred after death. This indicates a
belief held by the "earlier group" that burial was appropriate for
deceased persons, which corresponds with the belief held by the
claimant tribes. All of this information, considered together, is
sufficient to establish a nexus between the claimant tribes and
the Ancient One.

225. Senate Report on S.101-473, supra note 152.
226. House Report 101-877, Oct. 15, 1990, to accompany H.R. 5237.
227. The findings of fact in the settlement of the ICC actions provided this evidence,
along with other historical evidence of the occupancy of this area by the Umatilla and
other tribes and bands of American Indians.
228. Babbitt letter, supra note 47; also Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 22.
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ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE TRIBES' CLAIM
TO THE ANCIENT ONE

The 1855 treaty between the U.S. and the Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation provides additional
support for the government's decision to repatriate the Ancient
One to the tribes. The Umatilla have an unqualified right to
ownership and possession of the Ancient One pursuant to that
treaty, by which they sold their tribal lands, including the land
on which the Ancient One was discovered, to the U.S.
government. Federal courts have frequently held that a tribe
may retain certain rights, powers and interests not expressly
granted or relinquished by it in a treaty. 229 The Umatilla did not
intend to relinquish their rights as kin or caretakers of any
human remains buried beneath the lands conveyed in the 1855
treaty. Therefore, they retained such rights and those rights
remain in effect to this day.
In accordance with the Indian law canon of construction,
treaties must be construed in favor of Indian interests. The
interest at stake here is the cultural tradition of honoring
deceased ancestors and protecting their remains from
disturbance. The tribes and bands of Indians whose lands were
transferred to the U.S. through that 1855 treaty, now known
collectively as the Umatilla, would never have relinquished their
rights to protect the remains of their ancestors. They would
never have agreed that, by selling their land, they were also
selling the bones of all deceased persons buried in that land.
They held those bones sacred, and believed that they should be
allowed to rest in the earth for all time.
This belief is expressed in the statement of Armand
Minthorn, a member of the Umatilla Board of Trustees, in
connection with the Ancient One:
My tribe has ties to this individual because he was uncovered in
our traditional homeland - a homeland where we still retain
fishing, hunting, gathering, and other rights under our 1855
treaty with the U.S. Government....

229. U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905); see also Trope
and Echo-Hawk, supra note 152.
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Group: (adj.)l: of or relating to a group: belonging to or shared by
the members of a group as a whole:

COLLECTIVE. 208

The use of the word "band" is worth noting, because it is
particularly relevant to the subject matter of NAGPRA and to
the tribes that have claimed the Ancient One. The parties to the
1855 treaty with the U.S., by which the U.S. purchased the land
on which the Ancient One was discovered, were the "Walla20 9
Wallas, Cayuses, and Umatilla tribes, and bands of Indians.
For this reason, it makes sense to examine the definition of
"band" also, because it may help us to understand the statutory
meaning of "group."210 The pertinent definitions of this word are
as follows:
Band: 4. a division of a nomadic tribe; a group of individuals who
move and camp together.

211

Band: 3.a. a group of persons, animals or things: as b: a body of
persons often brought together by a common purpose or bound

together by a common fate or lot; specif a relatively self-sufficient
tribal subgroup that is mainly united for social and economic
reasons. 212

"Identity" is not the simplest of concepts, because it is the
2 13
essence of what makes a person herself, and not someone else.
Personal identity may include hair color, intelligence, religious
affiliation, ancestry, education, height and weight, and more.
None of these attributes, other than height and weight, could
ever be established in connection with prehistoric, North
American remains.
It is necessary to focus on the sorts of qualities or
information that might identify several persons as a unified
group, because NAGPRA refers to "group" identity. Traits of

208.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1971).

209. Treaty with the WallaWalla (1855), 12 Stat. 945, supra note 18.
210. The meaning of "band" may inform the meaning of "group," in the same way
that the meaning of "aboriginal" informs the meaning of "indigenous" in the statutory
definition of "Native American."
211. RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 208.
212. ENTRY 3 FOR WORD "BAND," WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 209.
213. "Identity: 2. the condition of being oneself or itself, and not another. 3.
Condition or character as to who a person or what a thing is." RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY, supra note 208.
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group identity could include geographic location, cultural rites
and customs, diet, artworks, physical characteristics, language,
tools, and accoutrements such as baskets and cooking vessels.
The ancient Greeks, for example, are known for their temples,
sculpture and literature. Individual American Indian tribes
may be identified in connection with their traditional customs,
artwork, oral histories, and geographic location (for example, the
"Plains Indians" or "Indians of the Northern Rockies"). None of
these attributes identifies everything of importance about a
group, but each provides an element of the group's identity.
With this in mind, a comprehensible explanation of the term
"shared group identity" may be crafted, as follows:
"Shared group identity" means some identifying feature that is
common to both groups, such as physical characteristics, cultural
practices, geographical location, or other identifying feature.

The term "earlier identifiable group" must also be explicated
in connection with the construction of "cultural affiliation." The
word "earlier" is easy enough: it just refers to a group that
existed earlier in time than the modern day. The word "group"
has already been examined.
It refers to a gathering of
individuals bound together by something they have in common.
Group may also refer to a tribal sub-group, or a group smaller in
size. than a band (which is smaller than a tribe), which lives and
travels together. The word "identifiable" is likely meant to refer
back to "shared group identity"; therefore, it requires that the
earlier group have some distinguishing or identifying feature
with which it may be associated. It does not mean that the
group must have a name that science has bestowed upon it,214
nor does it require that there be a large collection of tools or
textiles or other goods by which the group can be identified.
The meaning of the word "relationship" is the final element
necessary for a complete understanding of "cultural affiliation."
In ordinary understanding, "relationship" means a connection
between two people or two things. The dictionary definition
confirms that understanding of the word:

214. During the arguments on June 19 and 20, Judge Jelderks often came back to
the question, "Who is this earlier group? What are they called?" This is a natural
question to ask, because we all tend to want names for things as a way of understanding
and classifying them. The statute does not require, however, that a name exist for the
earlier group mentioned in the definition of cultural affiliation.
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Our religious beliefs, culture, and adopted policies and procedures
tell us that this individual must be re-buried as soon as possible.
Our elders have taught us that once a body goes into the ground, it
is meant to stay there until the end of time. 230

The Umatillas' treaty with the federal government must be
construed in light of these beliefs and the understandings the
tribes would have had at the time the treaty was signed.
Pursuant to such a construction of the 1855 treaty, the Umatilla
have the right to take custody of the Ancient One's remains and
return them to the earth.
This position is strengthened by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Idaho v. United States, in which the Court held that
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe retained title to lands submerged under
Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. 231 That decision rests,
in large part, upon evidence indicating that the Coeur d'Alene
tribe viewed the lake and river as vitally important to them at
the time they were negotiating their treaty with the federal
government. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, noted:
"The intent [of Congress], in other words, was that anything not
consensually ceded by the Tribe would remain for the Tribe's
benefit ... .,"232 Similarly, in the case of the 1855 treaty between
the Umatilla and the federal government, anything not ceded by
the Umatilla was retained by and reserved in them. One of the
rights retained by and reserved in the Umatilla is the right to
recover possession of any human remains buried in their tribal
lands before those lands were transferred to the U.S. pursuant
to the 1855 treaty.
CONCLUSION

NAGPRA must be construed in light of its remedial
purpose, in accordance with its statutory definitions of Native
American and cultural affiliation, and in the context of its
legislative and social history. The use of a comprehensive or
"dynamic" approach to interpretation, including a focus on
statutory purpose as a guide to meaning, makes possible an
honest, complete, and accurate interpretation of the statute.
Such comprehensive construction is necessary in order to
determine the meaning and scope of the statute, to give full

230.
231.
232.

Armand Minthorn, Human Remains Should be Reburied, supra note 11.
Idaho v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2135 (2001).
Id. at 2145.
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effect to the statute's remedial purpose and full benefit to the
Indian interest at stake, and to give full effect to the will of
Congress. In the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo:
When the legislature has spoken, and declared one interest
superior to another, the judge must subordinate his [or her]
personal 233
or subjective estimate of value to the estimate thus
declared.

The legislature has spoken: it has declared that the
interests of American Indians, Native Alaskans, and Native
Hawaiians in the remains of their deceased ancestors, no matter
how ancient, are superior to any interests that scientists might
have in those remains. The Ancient One is "Native American"
as defined by the statute, and the claimant tribes have
established a cultural affiliation with him as required by the
statute. Accordingly, the Ancient One must be repatriated,
without further delay, to the tribes that have claimed him as
their own.

233.

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 94 (1924).

ARTICLE

AGRICULTURAL LIENS UNDER REVISED
ARTICLE 9
Scott J. Burnham*

I. INTRODUCTION.

Montana has rarely met a Uniform Law it didn't like.
Although Montana has now lost its distinction of having enacted
more Uniform Laws than any other jurisdiction, it still ranks
near the top.1 Often the first to enact a Uniform Law, Montana
has occasionally had few followers. When a Uniform Law is
enacted in only a couple of jurisdictions, it fails to produce
national uniformity.
Uniform Laws are the product of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 2 (assisted, in
the case of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), by the
*

Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law. I am grateful for

the research assistance of Ryan Hyslop, then a student at The University of Montana
School of Law, and the comments of David Gray Carlson, Professor of Law at Cardozo
School of Law.
1. See UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, DIRECTORY OF UNIFORM ACTS AND CODES:
TABLES - INDEX 9-80 (Master ed. 2001)(Table of Jurisdictions Listing Uniform Acts
Adopted). Among the other strong finishers are Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Maine, and Minnesota.
2. Additional information may be found at the organization's web site,
<http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/default.asp> (last visited Nov. 2, 2001).
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American Law Institute),3 an organization created in 1892 to
promote uniformity among state laws.
Commissioners are
chosen from each state and meet annually to review the drafts
that have been prepared by a Drafting Committee and reviewed
4
through an extensive process.
Uniform Laws fill a need in a state lacking a professional
legislature. The product comes before the legislature readymade - the drafting has been done, the interest groups have
been heard from, the competing policies have been weighed, the
effort to construct workable and enactable legislation
completed. 5 As long as the products reflect high quality,
legislators can feel comfortable with the brand name. Indeed,
the very name "Uniform Law" may inspire confidence; it is
reassuring that other jurisdictions are using the product. In
fact, even if there are few adopting jurisdictions, the Uniform
Law still serves as model legislation for the state.
As with most virtues, however, the strengths of Uniform
Laws are also their weaknesses. One of those strengths is, to
coin a phrase, uniformity. The greatest achievement of the
Uniform Laws process, the Uniform Commercial Code, states its
underlying purpose explicitly: "to make uniform the law among
the various jurisdictions." 6 To promote uniformity, NCCUSL
strongly discourages the adopting jurisdiction from enacting
variations. 7 But the enactment of a Uniform Law in a particular
jurisdiction often sets off a chain reaction among existing
statutes. In the process of replacing or reconciling related
statutes, oversights frequently occur, especially in a state with
as complex a body of statutes as Montana.8 More significantly,
the "one size fits all" philosophy of NCCUSL may result in a
jurisdiction enacting statutes that do not meet its regional
needs.
3. "There is potential tension in the partnership because the partners have
somewhat different goals. At the risk of over-simplification, the goal of the ALI is to 'get
it right' (on the merits) and the goal of NCCUSL is to 'get it right enough to get it
enacted.' Resolving this tension is not an easy task because of disagreements over what
is 'right' and how to get there." Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from
the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 608 (2001).
4. See generally Fred Miller, The View from Experience, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 621
(2001).
5. See generally Robert E. Scott, Symposium on the Revision of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: The Politics ofArticle 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
6. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (2000).
7. See Miller, supra note 4, at 622.
8. The 2001 corrections bill for Revised Article 9 runs 100 pages, almost as long
as the original 1999 enactment. See S.B. 23, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2001).
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These strengths and weaknesses may be seen in the
Montana enactment of Revised Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in 1999. 9 The name itself reveals a conflict
between the Uniform Law and the enacting jurisdiction. To fit
within the structure of the Montana Code Annotated, old Article
9 was codified as Chapter 9 of Title 30. Perhaps in the interest
of national uniformity, however, no one calls it by its enacted
name, "Chapter 9," and I shall continue the practice of calling
the Montana enactment "Article 9."10 This article does not
address the overall effect of that revision." Rather, this article
explores the adoption of Revised Article 9 in one microcosm its effect on agricultural lien statutes.
The drafters of Revised Article 9 wrestled with the issue of
what to do with agricultural liens. One proposal was to preempt them completely, incorporating agricultural liens within
Revised Article 9.12 The final result represents a compromise,
incorporating the liens for some purposes but not for others.
Like most compromises, the result is unsatisfactory. It may
prove workable in some states, but Montana has a unique set of
agricultural lien statutes that do not accommodate themselves
13
to the Code scheme.
This article examines the impact this Uniform Law has on

9. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-9A-101 to -709 (2001)(effective date 07/01/01). Where
the distinction is significant, this article refers to the revision as "Revised Article 9" and
to the version that has been repealed as "old Article 9."
10. Actually, things are more confused than that. To prevent confusion between
the repealed sections of old Article 9 and the newly enacted sections of Revised Article 9
that have the same uniform section number, the Montana Code Commissioner
determined that Revised Article 9 would be codified as Chapter 9A. While I shall refer
to the sections by their uniform numbers, the reader will look for them in the Montana
Code Annotated in Title 30, Chapter 9A.
11. Nevertheless, I cannot resist a prediction. Perhaps unfamiliarity with the
revision makes it appear more overwhelming than it is, but to this student familiarity
produces not repose but a conviction that the revised statute is in fact overwhelming.
Each state fell in line in haste, enacting it because of the call for the greater good of
uniformity, but our leisure will provide much opportunity to repent. We will long for the
old code, not just because it was familiar, but because it was comprehensible. The
principal author of the old Article 9, Grant Gilmore, explained that the accessability of
the Code made secured financing safe for "country bankers." Grant Gilmore, The Good
Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant
Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 (1981). The revision makes secured financing
accessible to no one.
12. See Keith G. Meyer, Should the Unique Treatment of Agricultural Liens
Continue?, 24 IND. L. REV. 1315, 1348-56 (1991).
13. The variety of agricultural liens in different jurisdictions may be surveyed in
Steven C. Turner et al., Agricultural Liens and the U.C.C.: A Report on Present Status
and Proposalsfor Change, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 9 (1991).
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these native agricultural liens and urges reform of the Montana
agricultural lien laws. Revision of Article 9 did not cause
agricultural liens to become problematic.
The accretion of
changes over time has made them untidy, but Revised Article 9
puts that untidiness in stark relief.14 The process of reform
should not only eliminate existing conflicts, but result in an
improvement in the law. I caution, however, that I am not
always sure of the direction that reform should take. One
strength of the academic ivory tower is that I can survey the
problem with dispassion; the concomitant weakness is that I
lack the experience in the field, as it were, to fashion a solution
that will prove workable in practice. For, in the process of
reform, we must always remember another laudable purpose of
the Uniform Commercial Code: "to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties."15 My role is not to dictate the
particular solution to each problem, but to outline the problem
and present the competing considerations. I am hopeful that
others will then take up this cause and give us, at least in this
area, a body of law that will serve the final underlying purpose
of the UCC: "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions. "16
Part II of this article clarifies the Revised Article 9
definition of Agricultural Liens. The article then examines the
claims various creditors may have to the same collateral. Part
III reviews the attachment process and Part IV the perfection
process. Part V reviews the conflict between the secured party
and a buyer of farm products, indicating the conflicts between
Article 9 and the federal Food Security Act. 17 Part VI then
explores the Montana agricultural lien statutes, indicating
conflicts among those statutes and conflicts between those
statutes and Revised Article 9. Part VII lays out a proposal for
addressing the conflicts noted throughout the article.
II. AGRICULTURAL LIENS UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9.
Although we may think of the term "agricultural lien" as
describing any lien on farm products, in fact the term is a term

14. See Donald W. Baker, Some Thoughts on Agricultural Liens Under the New
U.C.C. Article 9, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1417 (2000).

15.
16.
17.

U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (2000).
§ 1-102(2)(a).
7 U.S.C. § 1631 (2001).
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of art. It is, however, a term that means different things in
different statutes, having one meaning under Revised Article 9,
another meaning under Montana Code Annotated Title 71, and
another under other statutes. While old Article 9 did not apply
to statutory liens,' 8 Revised Article 9 expressly applies to
agricultural liens. Section 9-109(a)(2)(1)(b) provides that "this
article applies to ...an agricultural lien."19 The change is more
limited than that section suggests, however, for not all of
Revised Article 9 applies to agricultural liens and the applicable
provisions apply only to agricultural liens as defined in the
statute. The definition provides:
"Agricultural lien" means
interest, in farm products:

an interest, other than a security

(A) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for:
(i) goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor's
farming operation; or
(ii) rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with
its farming operation;
(B) which is created by statute in favor of a person that:
(i) in the ordinary course of its business furnished goods or
services to a debtor in connection with a debtor's farming
operation; or
(ii) leased real property to a debtor in connection with the
debtor's farming operation; and
not depend on the person's possession
(C) whose effectiveness does
20
of the personal property.

Under this scheme, an agricultural lien is not a "security
interest," which is defined as "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation." 21 Therefore, although Revised Article 9 applies to
agricultural liens, only those parts of Revised Article 9 that
expressly refer to agricultural liens, rather than those that refer
only to security interests, are applicable to agricultural liens.
There are, in fact, few sections that expressly apply to
agricultural liens. On the other hand, a "secured party" is
defined to include both "a person in whose favor a security
18. U.C.C. § 9-104(c) (1998) (repealed 2001). The historical background leading to
the exclusion of agricultural liens from old Article 9 is explored in Baker, supra note 14.
19. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(2) (2000).
20. § 9-102(a)(5) (emphasis added).
21. § 1-201(37).
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interest is created" and "a person that holds an agricultural
lien."22 Therefore, when Revised Article 9 refers to a "secured
party," it refers to both a person holding a security interest and
a person holding an agricultural lien.
According to the Revised Article 9 definition, the principal
difference between a security interest and an agricultural lien is
that a security interest is a consensual lien, arising only by
contract between the creditor and the debtor, while an
agricultural lien is a creature of statute, arising when the
creditor satisfies the statutory requirements, irrespective of the
consent of the debtor.
Furthermore, the definition limits
agricultural liens to the statutes that do not make the lien
dependent on possession. The statute determines the scope of
23
the lien and may determine its priority.
Although the definition of agricultural liens includes
statutes that give a landlord a lien in connection with a lease of
farm property, there are no such statutes in Montana. In
Montana, therefore, a Revised Article 9 agricultural lien is a
statute that gives a non-possessory interest in farm products
which secures payment or performance of an obligation in favor
of a person that in the ordinary course of its business furnished
goods or services to a debtor in connection with a debtor's
farming operation. 24 Because lien law, both within and without
Article 9, is largely a matter of determining 1) whether a lien
becomes effective, 2) the scope of the lien, 25 and 3) its priority
among the various claimants to the debtor's property, we will
approach the issue of the relationship between agricultural liens
and Revised Article 9 by looking at the various competing
claimants to the farm products of a debtor.
22.
§ 9-102(a)(72).
23. See Part VJ.B., infra. If the statute does not provide a priority, the Article 9
default rule of first to file or perfect governs. § 9-322(a)(1), (3).
24. Although the definitions of farm products (§ 9-102(a)(34)) and farming
operation (§ 9-102(a)(35)) have changed somewhat, the changes have no effect on the
agricultural liens. Compare § 9-109(3) (repealed 2001).
25. The scope of the lien is not relevant to our inquiry. Nevertheless, the lienor
must carefully study the statute to determine the scope of the lien. For example, the
property to which the lien attaches varies. The Seed or Grain Lien attaches to the crops
produced from the seed, and seed or grain threshed from those crops. The Threshers'
Lien attaches to crops threshed by the lienor's machine. The Hail Insurance Lien
attaches to crops grown on the insured land and seed and grain threshed from those
crops. The Spraying or Dusting Lien attaches only to the grain or crops dusted. The
Farm Laborers' Lien, however, applies to all crops grown raised or harvested by the
farmer (except for feed sufficient to maintain certain animals for three months!). But
the laborer claiming under the Farm Laborers' Lien would apparently have a claim only
to the crop, and not to the grain threshed from that crop, for the statute is so limited.
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III. SECURED PARTY V. DEBTOR.

A creditor such as a bank may take a security interest in
farm products. Under old Article 9, a creditor acquired a
security interest in collateral of a debtor by having the debtor, in
return for value given, grant the interest in a signed writing
that describes the collateral. 26 This simple requirement for
attachment is largely unchanged by Revised Article 9, except
that the Code now requires an "authenticated record" rather
than a signed writing, to accommodate electronic commerce.27
Revised Article 9 also more clearly specifies what constitutes a
sufficient description of the collateral, allowing for example, "a
type of collateral defined in the UCC," but not a supergeneric
description, such as "all the debtor's personal property." 28
For example, in consideration of a loan of $100,000, in an
authenticated record, farmer Ingmar Swenson grants First
Bank a security interest in Swenson's farm products. This
transaction is effective to give First Bank a security interest in
Swenson's collateral, farm products as defined in § 9-102(a)(34).
Once its security interest has attached to the collateral, First
Bank can of course foreclose on the property in the event of
default. 29 The security interest also attaches to the proceeds of
the collateral, such as cash from the sale of a crop. 30
IV.

SECURED

PARTY V. OTHER SECURED PARTIES AND THE
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE.

Although attachment is sufficient to give the secured
creditor rights as against the debtor, a prudent creditor will
perfect its security interest by filing in order to gain priority
over other secured creditors and to defeat the trustee in
bankruptcy in case the debtor declares bankruptcy. The creditor
does so under Revised Article 9 by filing a financing statement
containing the required information with the appropriate filing
office. While the filing rules have substantially changed, the
contents of the financing statement have not, although it is not
easy to discern the required contents from the Code. Section 9502, "Contents of a Financing Statement," provides:

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

U.C.C. § 9-203 (1998) (repealed 2001).
U.C.C. § 9-203 (2000). Mercifully, even the section number is unchanged.
§ 9-108.
§ 9-601(a)(1).
§ 9-315(a)(2).
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(a) A filing statement, to be sufficient, must:
1) provide the name of the debtor;
2) provide the name of the secured party or a representative of
the secured party; and
31
3) indicate the collateral covered by the financing statement.

This is not the end of it, however. Section 9-516 provides that
"Filing does not occur with respect to a record that a filing office
refuses to accept because" certain enumerated information is
lacking. 32 In other words, Revised Article 9 doesn't affirmatively
require that creditors include the § 9-516 information in the
financing statement, but if they don't, the filing office may reject
it. This information includes the mailing address of the secured
party and the debtor, and an indication of whether the debtor is
an individual or an organization. If the debtor is an
organization, the information includes the type of organization,
jurisdiction of organization, and organizational identification
number for the debtor if any. 33
Figuring out where to file, however, is problematic, for
Revised Article 9 substantially changed the choice of law rules.
Section 9-301 provides that "while a debtor is located in a
jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection,
the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a
security interest in collateral." 34 Section 9-307 provides that an
individual is located at the individual's principal residence, but
a registered organization is located in the state under which it is
organized. 35
Therefore, if the Montana ranch where the
collateral is located is owned by an individual residing in
Montana, Montana is the appropriate jurisdiction for filing; if
the debtor is a California corporation, California is the
appropriate jurisdiction for filing; and if the debtor is a Colorado
LLP, Colorado is the appropriate jurisdiction for filing.
Once the creditor has found the relevant jurisdiction in
which to file, in Montana and most jurisdictions, except for
filings with respect to standing timber, minerals, and fixture
31. § 9-502(a)(1)-(3).
32. § 9-516(b).
33. U.C.C. § 9-516(b)(5)(A)-(C) (2000). The Montana standard form financing
statement also asks for the social security number of taxpayer ID number, but this
information is not required by the Code.
34. § 9-301(1).
35. § 9-307(b).
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filings, the place of filing is the office of the Secretary of State. 36
Filing is done under the name of the debtor. 37 An error in the
financing statement, such as an error in stating the name of the
debtor, is not fatal to an effective filing if the filing office's
standard search logic would find it.38 In Montana, under the
search logic adopted by the Secretary of State, the search logic
will find only the exact name of the debtor. 39 Secured parties
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9A-501 (2001); U.C.C. § 9-501 (Official Comment 2)
(2001). Although not relevant to the present discussion, it might be noted that the major
change is that when the collateral is consumer goods, the financing statement is filed
with the Secretary of State, not with the county.
37. U.C.C. § 9-502 (2000).
38. § 9-516.
39. Defining Search Criteria for Uniform Commercial Code Certified Searches,
MONT. ADMIN. R. 44.6.201 (2001), provides:
(1) The secretary of state provides information regarding centrally filed
uniform commercial code records from requests to office staff and via the
secretary of state website. These searches are certified for their accuracy.
(2) Searches provided by the secretary of state are "exact name" searches. Only
the precise name requested, with very little variation, is searched and certified.
(3) The basic standards for searching individual and entity names are that:
(a) there is no limit to the number of matches that are returned in response
to a search request;
(b) no distinction is made between upper and lower case letters;
(c) punctuation marks and accents are disregarded; and
(d) spaces in any field are disregarded.
(4) Basic standards for searching individual names include:
(a) exact match of surnames and exact match of first names; and
(b) middle names become an initial or blank space.
(5) Basic standards for searching business names include:
(a) an exact match of the name requested;
(b) "the" at the beginning of a name is disregarded;
(c) words and abbreviations that indicate the existence or nature of an entity
are disregarded. These include:
(i)association;
(ii)assn;
(iii)business trust;
(iv)chartered;
(v)chtd;
(vi)co;
(vii)company;
(viii)co-op;
(ix)cooperative;
(x)corp;
(xi)corporations;
(xii)credit union;
(xiii)cu;
(xiv)fcu;
(xv)federal credit union;
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must file in the exact legal name of the debtor; anything else is
not an effective filing and the security interest will be
unperfected.

(xvi)federal savings bank;
(xvii)fsb;
(xviii)gp;
(xix)general partnership;
(xx)inc;
(xxi)incorporated;
(xxii)joint stock company;
(xxiii)joint venture;
(xxiv)jsc;
(xxv)jv;
(xxvi)lc;
(xxvii)limited;
(xxviii) limited company;
(xxix)limited liability company;
(xxx)limited liability limited partnership;
(xxxi)limited partnership;
(xxxii)llc;
(xxxiii) HIp;
(xxxiv) llp;
(xxxv)lp;
(xxxvi) ltd;
(xxxvii) ltd co;
(xxxviii) na;
(xxxix) national association;
(xl)pa;
(xli)partnership;
(xlii)pc;
(xliii)plc;
(xliv)pllc;
(xlv)professional association;
(xlvi)professional corporation;
(xlvii)professional limited company;
(xlviii)professional limited liability company;
(xlix)registered limited liability partnership;
(1)rllp;
(li)sa;
(lii)savings association; and
(liii)trust.
(6) A search of the secretary of state's database will not result in accurate
findings if:
(a) first or last names are misspelled;
(b) non-universal identifiers are in the name and not included in the search
request, such as "a Montana corporation" or "a general partnership";
(c) nicknames or shortened versions of names, i.e., if the debtor's first name
is filed as "Robert," the search will not result in finding "Bob"; or
(d) plurals are used in the search but not in original filing.
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Example. If the Montana financing statement used the individual
name "Ingemar Swenson" instead of the legal name "Ingmar
Swenson," the financing statement would not be effective.
Example. If the Montana financing statement used the corporate
name "Ingmar Swenson Natural Food, Inc.," instead of the legal
name "Ingmar Swenson Natural Foods, Inc.," the financing
statement would not be effective.

Although the appropriate jurisdiction for filing may have
changed on July 1, 2001, a filing made in the correct place under
old Article 9 remains effective for its duration. 40 Searchers must
therefore look for filings in the appropriate place under both old
Article 9 and Revised Article 9. We will now look at how a
perfected security interest fares against other claimants.
V. SECURED PARTY V. BUYER.

Assume First Bank has a security interest, properly
perfected under Revised Article 9, in Ingmar Swenson's farm
products and Swenson sells his wheat crop to General Mills.
Does First Bank's security interest remain attached to the crop
in the hands of General Mills? With any other kind of collateral,
the answer would be found in § 9-320 and the answer would be
yes. But with respect to farm products, this particular Article 9
issue has been preempted by federal law and the answer is now
found in the Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA).4 1 Under the
federal scheme in a state with central filing such as Montana,
the secured party prevails over the buyer, but only if the secured
party has filed an effective financing statement.
The rub is that the requirements for an effective financing
statement under the FSA and the requirements for a financing
statement under Revised Article 9 differ. 42 The significant
40. See U.C.C. § 9-705(c) (2000), codified in Montana as MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9A705(3) (2001). (See also U.C.C. § 9-403 (1998) (repealed 2001), which was replaced by
U.C.C. § 9-515 (2000).)
41. 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (2001).
42. The Food Security Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4), provides:
(4) The term "effective financing statement" means a statement that(A) is an original or reproduced copy of the statement, or, in the case of a
State which (under the applicable State law provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code) allows the electronic filing of financing statements
without the signature of the debtor, is an electronically reproduced copy of
the statement;
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differences are that the FSA requires the signatures of the
secured party and the debtor, a social security number or Tax ID
number, a description of the farm products, and a description of
the property where the collateral is located, while Revised
Article 9 requires none of this information. On the other hand,
Revised Article 9 requires for organizational debtors, the type of
organization, the jurisdiction of organization, and an
organizational identification number, while the FSA does not.
A prudent creditor perfecting an interest in farm products
will include in the financing statement not only information that
will satisfy Revised Article 9 to give the creditor priority over
other creditors, but also the information that will satisfy the
Food Security Act to give the creditor priority over buyers of the
collateral. While reform that would reconcile these conflicting
requirements would be desirable, it is unlikely that change will
be forthcoming at the federal level. Montana has made the FSA
requirements easier to satisfy by prompting the filer to include
43
all the relevant information on the financing statement.
VI. SECURED PARTY V. AGRICULTURAL LIENOR.

A. AgriculturalLiens that must be filed under Title 71.
As we saw earlier, "agricultural lien" has a particular

(B) other than in the case of an electronically reproduced copy of the
statement, is signed and filed with the Secretary of State of a State by the
secured party;
(C) other than in the case of an electronically reproduced copy of the
statement, is signed by the debtor;
(D) contains,
(i) the name and address of the secured party;
(ii) the name and address of the person indebted to the secured party;
(iii) the social security number of the debtor or, in the case of a debtor
doing business other than as an individual, the Internal Revenue Service
taxpayer identification number of such debtor;
(iv) a description of the farm products subject to the security interest
created by the debtor, including the amount of such products where
applicable; and a reasonable description of the property, including [the]
county or parish in which the property is located[.]
43. See State of Montana Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement - Form
REVFS-1 at http://sos.state.mt.us/css/BSB/Filing-Forms.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2001).
Form REVFS-1 requests a specific collateral description and signatures to comply with
"Farm Bill" requirements. Presumably, by "Farm Bill," the Secretary of State means the
Food Security Act. The form does not indicate that the Social Security number or Tax ID
number of the debtor are also required by the Food Security Act but not by Revised
Article 9.
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meaning under Revised Article 9. In Montana, the following
statutes (the "Title 71 liens") clearly qualify as agricultural liens
45
for this purpose: Farm Laborers' Liens, 44 Seed or Grain Liens,
Hail Insurance Liens, 46 Threshers' Liens, 47 and Spraying or
Dusting Liens. 48 These liens all give the party who provided
goods and services to the farmer on credit a lien on certain of the
farmer's property. The lien may therefore conflict with the lien
acquired by a secured party under Revised Article 9. To
determine the applicable rules to resolve that conflict, we must
first find the jurisdiction whose law is relevant to the
transaction. We saw that the choice of law rules with respect to
a security interest looked to the location of the debtor. The
choice of law rules with respect to an agricultural lien, however,
look to the location of the farm product. Section 9-302 provides:
While farm products are located in a jurisdiction, the local law of
that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or
nonperfection,
and the priority of an agricultural lien on the farm
49
products.

So, if First Bank takes a security interest in the crops raised on
a Montana ranch owned by a California corporation, and Seedco
secures an agricultural lien on the same crop, California law
provides the rules for perfection and priority of the security
interest, but Montana law provides the rules for perfection and
priority of the agricultural lien.
Assuming we are dealing with Montana farm products, let
us look in detail at one of these statutes to determine how the
lien is obtained, the property it attaches to, and its priority as to
other liens. The seed or grain lien provides:
71-3-701.

Lien for seed or grain. Any person, company,

association, or corporation who furnishes to another seed to be

sown or planted or funds or means with which to purchase seed to
be sown or planted or to be used in the production or cultivation of

a crop or crops on the lands owned or contracted to be purchased,
used, leased, occupied, or rented by him or held under government

entry, upon filing the statement provided for in 71-3-703, has a
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-401 to -408 (2001).
§§ 71-3-701 to -705.
§§ 71-3-711 to -713.
§§ 71-3-801 to -810.
§§ 71-3-901 to -909.
U.C.C. § 9-302 (2000).
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lien not exceeding the purchase price of the seed or grain
furnished upon the crop produced from the seed or grain
furnished, or any part thereof, and upon the seed or grain
threshed from the crop to secure the payment of the amount or the
value of the seed or grain furnished50 or the funds or means
advanced to purchase the seed or grain.

This lien seems straightforward. The lienor furnishes seed or
the money to purchase the seed which is used to plant a crop
and obtains a lien in the amount of the price of the seed or
grain 5 ' and the lien attaches to the crop itself and the seed or
grain threshed from the crop. The lien obtains a priority over
other liens, including security interests. 52 The wrinkle is in the
language which provides that the lienor obtains the lien "upon
filing the statement provided for in 71-3-703." That section
provides:
71-3-703.
How to obtain lien.
Any person, company,
association, or corporation who is entitled to a lien under 71-3-701
shall, within 90 days after the seed or grain is furnished or the
funds, means, or money advanced for the seed or grain, file in the
office of the secretary of state a statement of agricultural lien as
provided in 71-3-125. Unless the person entitled to a lien files the
lien statement within the time required, he is considered to have
53
waived the right to a lien.

The lien is not obtained - does not attach - unless the lienor
makes a lien filing in the Secretary of State's office within 90
days after the grain is furnished. To one schooled in security
interests, filing as a condition precedent to effectiveness makes
no sense. Security interests attach between the secured party
and the debtor when the lien is granted. The purpose of a filing
system is public notice. Why should the lien creditor be required
to give pubic notice to make the lien good against the debtor?
Furthermore, why should the lienor have 90 days to file the
notice? It seems to me there is a difference between extending
credit and getting stiffed. If the purpose of the lien statute is to
give the unpaid seller an opportunity to recover payment, then
50.

MONT.CODE ANN. § 71-3-701 (2001).

51. The carelessness with which the statute is drafted is indicated by the fact that
the lien is obtained by providing "seed," but attaches in the amount paid for "seed or
grain."
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-702 (2001). Priorities are discussed in greater detail
in section VI.B., infra.
53. § 71-3-703.
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the extended period might make sense. But if the purpose of the
statute is to protect a creditor who is entering a credit
transaction, there is no reason the creditor could not take the
steps at the time credit is extended. Here, it appears that the
seed or grain lienor is extending credit, for the intention seems
to be to allow the farmer to receive the seed at the beginning of
the cultivation cycle and pay for it at the end of the cycle, a
period that, in the absence of judicious application of MiracleGro, will probably exceed 90 days.
If I have correctly discerned the purpose of the seed lien,
then it closely resembles the purpose of the superpriority given
under Article 9 to a creditor who enables the debtor to obtain
additional financing when the debtor's collateral is already
encumbered by an existing security interest containing an afteracquired property clause. For example, if First Bank has a
security interest in debtor's inventory, Second Bank may finance
the purchase of additional inventory and obtain a superpriority.
Similarly, the Farmer who has given a security interest in her
crop to First Bank is able to secure the means to plant a new
crop from Seedco by giving Seedco a Seed or Grain Lien. Old
Article 9 contained a limited superpriority in crops in § 9312(2).54 This provision was not carried over in the body of
Revised Article 9, but a similar provision was placed in an
appendix for states to consider. 55 The optional provision was not
enacted in Montana.56
One difference between Article 9 superpriority statutes and
Title 71 liens is that the security interest given a superpriority
is a purchase money security interest, attaching only to the
additional collateral provided by the new creditor. The Title 71
lienor, on the other hand, provides no additional collateral, so
the lien attaches to the same collateral claimed by the secured
party, somewhat diminishing the collateral available to the
secured party. For example, Second Bank's superpriority in
inventory attaches only to the inventory provided by Second
Bank, while Seedco's Seed or Grain Lien attaches to the same
crop as First Bank's security interest. The policy question
seems to be whether Seedco should be allowed to provide the
farmer the means to cultivate another crop at some risk to First
Bank, which has first priority in the crop. Under existing law,
54. U.C.C. § 9-312(2) (1998) (repealed 2001).
55. U.C.C. § 9-324A (2000), "Priority of Production-Money Security Interests and
Agricultural Liens."
56. See S.B. 153, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999).
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the fact that such liens have been enacted and given priority
indicates the question has been answered in the affirmative, but
review might question that policy.
If the policies favor the creation of such a lien, it would
make sense to fashion it like a purchase money security interest
with a superpriority. 57 If the lien was modeled after the
purchase money security interest in inventory 58 or livestock, 59
the lienor would have a lien good against the debtor without
filing, but would have a priority over secured creditors only if it
filed and gave notice to creditors with conflicting liens at the
time the credit was extended. Such a scheme would bring the
lien within the sphere of Revised Article 9.
Whatever else is done with the Title 71 liens, it is most
important that the filing process be reformed, for enactment of
Revised Article 9 has made it unclear what steps the lienor must
take to file. The drafters of Revised Article 9 intended that
agricultural liens would be perfected by filing in the same
manner as security interests. Recall that § 9-302 provides that
"local law" governs perfection. However, with the enactment of
Revised Article 9, there are now two local laws governing
perfection in Montana. Revised Article 9 provides one scheme.
Under it, § 9-308(b) provides that "an agricultural lien is
perfected if it has become effective and all of the requirements
for perfection in Section 9-310 have been satisfied."60 Section 9310(a) provides that "a financing statement must be filed to
perfect all security interests and agricultural liens."6 1 At first
blush it may appear that an agricultural lien may be perfected
by an Article 9 filing.
Section 9-308(b), however, provides that "an agricultural
lien is perfected if it has become effective" and it has been
properly filed,62 and the Title 71 liens all provide that they are
not effective unless the statement required by § 71-3-125 is
filed. 63 The § 71-3-125 statement contains requirements that
57. See U.C.C. § 9-324 (2000), "Priority of Purchase-Money Security Interests."
58. § 9-324(b).
59. § 9-324(d).
60. § 9-308(b).
61.
§ 9-310(a).
62. § 9-308(b) (emphasis added).
63. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-125 (2001) provides in pertinent part:
(2) A statement of an agricultural lien is sufficient if it:
(a) gives the names and addresses of the debtor and lienor;
(b) describes the type of lien and its statutory authority;
(c) describes the collateral;
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differ from the requirements of the Revised Article 9 financing
statement. The § 71-3-125 statement must be signed by the
lienor, must describe the service or product furnished, must
state the county in which the farm products are located, and
must state particulars with respect to each type of lien, while
the Revised Article 9 financing statement contains no such
requirements.
Because the filing requirements of Title 71 and Revised
Article 9 are inconsistent, it is not clear which prevails. This
issue will come to a head when an agricultural lienor files a
financing statement pursuant to the requirements of Revised
Article 9 and a creditor with a security interest in the crop will
claim the lien is not effective because the lienor did not provide
the information required by § 71-3-125. The authorities suggest
that if there are two filing systems, then the legislature,
knowing of the older system, must have intended the newer one
to prevail. 64 Under this view, because Revised Article 9 is
newer, it supplants § 71-3-125.65 The argument might make
sense as between two competing filing systems for purposes of
perfection. But the agricultural lien statutes prescribe filing for
the lien to become effective, in other words, for it to attach.
There must be attachment before there is perfection. Because
(d) contains the notation by the secretary of state of the date of filing and
filing number;
(e) is signed by the lienor;
(f) describes the service or product furnished. If the collateral is farm
products, the statement must state the county in which the farm products
are located, designated by type of farm product.
(g) states the price or wage agreed upon or, if the price or wage was not
agreed upon, the reasonable value of the service or product furnished;
(h) states the amount remaining unpaid;
(i) states the terms and period of employment if it is a farm laborer's lien
filed pursuant to part 4 of this chapter;
(j) describes the land upon which seed or grain was or will be sown, planted,
or used if it is a lien for seed or grain filed pursuant to part 7 of this chapter;
(k) describes the land upon which the grain or crops were grown and the
place the grain or crops are presently stored if it is a thresher's lien filed
pursuant to part 8 of this chapter;
(1) describes the land upon which the service was performed if it is a lien for
spraying or dusting filed pursuant to part 9 of this chapter; and
(m) states the starting date of insurance coverage if it is a lien filed
pursuant to part 7 of this chapter.
64. See Ross v. City of Great Falls, 1998 MT 276, 291 Mont. 377, 967 P.2d 1103.
65. See Linda Rusch, Farm Financing Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.
J. 211, 236 n.170 (1999), which states, "If the statute creating the lien has different
perfection requirements, presumably Revised Article 9 will override those
requirements."
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the Title 71 lien does not even arise until it is filed under § 71-3125, filing of the Title 71 liens serves a different purpose than
filing of security interests, which is required only for purposes of
perfection. This distinction persuades me that filing under
Revised Article 9 is not sufficient to perfect a Title 71
agricultural lien, and that the secured party would prevail in
66
this dispute.
The same conflict arises with respect to contests between
the lienor and a buyer. According to Revised Article 9, the
agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding sale as
long as it is perfected. 67 This protection is provided in Title 71,
but again, only if the § 71-3-125 statement is filed. Section 71-3125(1) provides:
Unless a statement of an agricultural lien has been filed in the
office of the secretary of state as provided in this chapter, a buyer
who, in ordinary course of business as defined in 30-1-201(9), buys
a farm product takes it free of any lien created by this chapter
68
even though the lien is otherwise perfected.

For example, if the lienor claiming a Seed or Grain lien filed
pursuant to Revised Article 9 and the farmer sold the crop to
General Mills, General Mills would claim that the filing was not
effective because § 71-3-125 was not complied with. The lienor's
rights as against the buyer are also significant in bankruptcy,
for under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may avoid a
statutory lien that "is not perfected or enforceable at the time of
the commencement of the case against a bona fide purchaser
that purchases such property at the time of the commencement
of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists. ''69 If the lien
were filed under Article 9 but not under Title 71, the trustee
could avoid it.
The solution to this problem is for the legislature to repeal
the filing requirements of Title 71, thereby making Revised
66. See Great Falls Farm Machinery Co. v. Rocky Mountain Elevator Co., 94 Mont.
188, 22 P.2d 303 (1933), which supports this view (holding that a thresher was not
entitled to a Thresher's Lien if he did not file within the statutory period). The court
held that the lienor lost his right to a lien when he failed to file. The court cited with
approval a series of Idaho cases, explaining that '[ilf the filing is made within the
statutory period, then the lien relates back in such a way as to give full force and potency
to it from the beginning, but if the filing is not made, the inchoate right never ripens into
an actual lien." Id. at 195, 22 P.2d at 305.
67. See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1) (2000).
68.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-125(1) (2001).

69.

11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (2001).
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Article 9 filing the means to perfect agricultural liens. Although
the purpose of filing is to give notice to other creditors, it may
not be easy for a creditor to find the filed agricultural lien.
Recall that under Revised Article 9, the place for perfecting a
security interest is the location of the debtor, which may not be
Montana in the case of a registered organization.70 The Title 71
liens, however, are filed with the Montana Secretary of State.
This practice would not change even if the perfection scheme
was governed by Revised Article 9, for agricultural liens follow
71
the location of the farm products, not the location of the debtor.
Thus in the case of a Colorado partnership that owns a ranch in
Montana, a searcher looking for liens in Colorado would not find
agricultural liens filed in Montana under either the Title 71
scheme or the Revised Article 9 scheme. The burden of finding
the relevant filings could be placed on the secured party, but
because the agricultural liens are usually filed after the security
interest has been filed, the secured party would be required to
search continuously. The better solution might again be found
in the superpriority statutes, which require both filing and
direct notice to existing creditors in order to achieve the
72
superpriority.
Even under Revised Article 9, the perfected agricultural
lienor has no claim to proceeds (unless the proceeds are also
farm products). Section 9-315(a)(2) gives such a right only to a
secured party. 73 For example, if Seedco had a Seed or Grain
Lien in a farmer's crop, and the farmer sold the crop to General
Mills, the lienor would have no right to the cash received by the
farmer. Revised Article 9 leaves the right to proceeds up to the
local lien laws and the Title 71 lien laws grant lienors only very
limited rights to proceeds. For example, § 71-3-701 provides
that the Seed or Grain Lien applies to the crop produced and to
"the seed or grain threshed from the crop." 74 Another policy
question to be determined is whether the agricultural liens
should extend to proceeds. Continuing the analogy to Article 9
superpriorities, the purchase money security interests attach to
75
proceeds.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
that the

See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2000).
§ 9-302.
§ 9-324(c), (e).
§ 9-315(a)(2).
MONT. CODE ANN.§ 71-3-701 (2001). See U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 2 (2000).
The purchase money security interest generally attaches to all proceeds, except
superpriority in inventory attaches only to cash proceeds. See U.C.C. § 9-324(b)
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We have so far scrutinized the Seed or Grain Lien. The
other liens, the Hail Insurance Lien, Threshers' Lien, Farm
Laborers' Lien, and Spraying or Dusting Lien, all serve the
same purpose of allowing the farmer to complete the crop cycle
on credit. If they serve the same purpose, they should be treated
similarly, and given a superpriority if the proper filing and
notice is complied with. A possible exception is the Farm
Laborer's lien, which provides:
Who may have lien-priority. (1) Any person who
performs services for another in the capacity of a farm or ranch
71-3-401.

laborer has a lien on all crops of every kind grown, raised, or
harvested by the person for whom the services were performed
during that time as security for the payment of76any wages due or
owing to such persons for services so performed.

This statute is essentially a wage protection statute, allowing
All
the laborer a lien to recover for services rendered.
employees, including farm laborers, have the protection77 of
modern wage statutes in the event of nonpayment of wages. It
is questionable whether this lien serves any purpose if there is
an alternative available. Before arriving at any conclusion on
that question, it would be helpful to know whether the statute
has in fact any proven utility and whether the Department of
Labor could effectuate the same purpose under existing wage
protection statutes.
B. Priorityof Title 71 agriculturalliens.
Assuming the agricultural liens are effectively created,
Revised Article 9 provides the priority rules. Although the
general rule is that conflicting security interests and
78
agricultural liens rank according to priority in time of filing,
an exception recognizes that the statute that creates the
agricultural lien may provide a different priority. 79 Most of the
Title 71 lien statutes contain such a priority rule that 1) ranks
them ahead of security interests, and 2) ranks them among each
other. These rules are badly written and contradictory. For
example, the Seed or Grain Lien has "priority over all other
(2000).
76.
77.
78.
79.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-401 (2001).
See § 39-3-204.
U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2000).
§ 9-322(g).
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liens and encumbrances" 80 while the Threshers' Lien has
"priority over any mortgage, encumbrance or other lien .. .. ,81
It is doubtful that the addition of "mortgage" to the latter list is
meaningful. Meanwhile, the Farm Laborers' Lien has "priority
over all liens, chattel mortgages and encumbrances. . .

."82

It

does not appear significant that "mortgage" became "chattel
mortgages." The Hail Insurance Lien, however, does not state a
priority. Section 71-3-711 states that it is "subject to any seed
lien,"83 suggesting that the intent was to make it inferior to that
lien but superior to all others. It appears, therefore, that the
legislative intent was to give all of these liens priority over
security interests, and the following priority among themselves:
1. Seed or Grain Lien (§ 71-3-702)
2. Hail Insurance Lien (§ 71-3-711)
3. Threshers' Lien (§ 71-3-804)
4. Farm Laborers' Lien (§ 71-3-401(2))
5. Spraying or Dusting Lien (§ 71-3-904)

It seems a clear policy to give these liens priority over security
interests, but if there is any logic to the priority scheme among
the Title 71 liens, I cannot discern it. The task for reform would
involve determining some basis for priority and clearly stating
the priority. If no policy basis can be agreed upon, the liens
could be given priority according to the default rule, the order of
filing. Alternatively, there could be no priority, with each lien
equal to the others and, in the event of insufficient collateral to
satisfy all of them, apportionment pro-rata.84
A table summarizing these aspects of Title 71 liens is
attached at the conclusion of this article as an Appendix,
Agricultural Liens Filed Under MCA § 71-3-125.
C. Other agriculturalliens.
In reciting the priorities among the Title 71 liens, I
neglected to mention that the Spraying or Dusting Lien states
that it does not have priority over the lien for warehouse
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-702 (2001).
§ 71-3-804.
§ 71-3-401(2).
§ 71-3-711.
This is the scheme now with pipeline repair liens. See § 71-3-1007.
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services.85
This aberrant provision, which was probably
overlooked during earlier revisions, nevertheless serves as a
reminder that Montana has enacted agricultural liens other
than the Title 71 liens.
The Agisters' Lien, as evidenced by its name, is an ancient
relic. It is not clear whether the Agisters' Lien is an agricultural
lien as defined in Revised Article 9. Section 71-3-1201(1))
provides:
If there is an express or implied contract for keeping, feeding,
herding, pasturing, or ranching stock, a ranchman, farmer,
agister, herder, hotelkeeper, livery, or stablekeeper to whom any
horses, mules, cattle, sheep, hogs, or other stock are entrusted has
a lien upon the stock for the amount due for keeping, feeding,
herding, pasturing, or ranching the stock and may retain
86
possession of the stock until the sum due is paid.

The statute provides that the lienor may retain possession of the
livestock he or she has kept, fed, herded, pastured, or ranched.
If the may in the statute means the lienor may retain possession
in order to secure a lien, then the may means must and the lien
is dependent on possession, which would disqualify it from being
an agricultural lien as defined in Revised Article 9. If the may is
permissive, meaning the lienor secures a lien whether there is
possession or not, then it is a Revised Article 9 agricultural lien.
It might be noted that in the Mechanic's Lien that follows in the
next subsection, the legislature expressly stated that "the lien is
dependent on possession."8 7 This change in language indicates
that the legislature was capable of using language requiring
possession when it meant to create a possessory lien, thereby
suggesting that the word "may" in the prior statute was
intended to make possession permissive.8 8 Nevertheless, the
85.

See § 71-3-904.

86.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-1201(1) (2001).

87. § 71-3-1201(2) provides:
(2) Every person who, while lawfully in possession of an article of personal
property, renders any service to the owner or lawful claimant of the article by
labor or skill employed for the making, repairing, protection, improvement,
safekeeping, carriage, towing, or storage of the article or tows or stores the
article as directed under authority of law has a special lien on it. The lien is
dependent on possession and is for the compensation, if any, that is due to the
person from the owner or lawful claimant for the service and for material, if
any, furnished in connection with the service. If the service is towing or
storage, the lien is for the reasonable cost of the towing or storage.
88. The "Golden Rule of Drafting" states, "Never change your language unless you
wish to change your meaning, and always change your language if you wish to change
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author believes the legislative intent was to make the lien
dependent on possession.
This statute is in need of
89
clarification.
According to § 71-3-1202, this lien does not need to be filed
with the Secretary of State to attach, but it loses priority to a
perfected Article 9 secured party or "other party with a recorded
lien"90 if the lienor does not give notice to that party directly. 91
If this requirement were not onerous enough, the agister must
send the notice within 30 days of when the agister received the
property, long before the debt is unpaid. An agister would have
to be especially untrusting soul to have an effective lien.
If the Agisters' Lien is a Revised Article 9 agricultural lien,
not requiring possession, then the statute is in conflict with
Revised Article 9, which requires the lienor to file a financing
statement with the Secretary of State in order to obtain priority
over other agricultural lienors and secured parties rather than
notifying them directly. 92 Moreover, the section contains its own
rules for foreclosure on the lien. One of the sound reasons for
bringing agricultural liens within the scope of Revised Article 9
is to apply the same foreclosure rules. If the Agisters' Lien is
dependent on possession, then it needs to be modernized and
harmonized with the Mechanic's Lien that follows it.
Section 71-3-601 provides for a Loggers' Lien that may be
obtained either by the person who did the logging or by the
person who allowed the logging on his or her land.93 Like the
other Title 71 liens, it is not effective unless filed, in this case
within 30 days after the services have been performed. This lien
has yet another filing scheme, with filing in the county in which
the logs were cut. While this scheme was at one time consistent
with Article 9, under Revised Article 9, security interests in
extracted timber are no longer filed in the county, but with the

your meaning." SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING CONTRACTS § 15.4.5 (2d ed. 1993).
89. In Vose v. Whitney, 7 Mont. 385, 16 P. 846 (1888), the issue was whether the
plaintiff alleged facts that satisfied the elements of the statute when he received the
cattle from a deputy sheriff who did not own them. The court held that plaintiff stated a
claim, and in presenting the facts, noted that the plaintiff had possession of the cattle.
More recently, in Daniels-Sheridan Federal Credit Union v. Bellanger, 2001 MT 235,
16, 307 Mont. 22, 36 P.3d 397, the court held the claimant under an agisters' lien "lacked
both possessory and contractual bases for a valid agister's lien."
90. I'm not sure who that could be, as the liens filed under § 71-3-125 do not
encumber livestock. Perhaps another creditor claiming an Agisters' Lien.
91. See § 71-3-1202.
92. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (2000).
93. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-601 (2001).
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Secretary of State where the debtor is located. 94 The lien has
priority over all other liens. 95 Reform of this lien should provide
secured parties be given notice of this lien, either through filing
with the Secretary of State or through both filing and direct
notice.
The Warehouseman's Lien 96 coordinates with Revised
Article 9 because it appears in Article 7 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which deals with Warehouse Receipts, Bills of
Lading, and other Documents of Title. The statute gives the
warehouseman a lien for services against the goods covered by
the warehouse receipt. Because it is dependent on possession, it
is not a Revised Article 9 agricultural lien. The warehouseman
does not need to do anything to perfect it except retain
possession. The lien is what old Article 9 called "a lien arising
by operation of law"97 and Revised Article 9 calls a "possessory
lien."9 8 As such it has priority over a perfected security interest.
Finally, § 81-8-301 provides that "a livestock market to
which livestock is shipped may not be held liable to any secured
party for the proceeds of livestock sold through the livestock
market by the debtor unless notice of the security agreement is
filed" with the Department of Livestock.99 This provision alerts
the creditor with a security interest in livestock to file not only
with the Secretary of State, but also with the Department of
Livestock. The contents of the required notice differ from the
contents of a Revised Article 9 financing statement. 10 0 To
simplify this process, perhaps the Montana financing statement
could designate that a security interest in "livestock" is being
claimed. The Secretary of State could then transmit these
financing statements to the Department of Agriculture to satisfy
the statutory requirement, saving the creditor the necessity of
double filing.

VII. CONCLUSION: INQUIRIES AND PROPOSALS.
Decades ago, Grant Gilmore, the principal drafter of the
original Article 9, wrote, "It is too much to hope that states

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See U.C.C. § 9-501, cmt. 3 (2000).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-602 (2001).
See § 30-7-209.
U.C.C. § 9-310 (1998) (repealed 2001).
U.C.C. § 9-333 (2000).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-8-301 (2001).
See § 81-8-302.
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which enacted the Code will concurrently review and revise the
local collection of lien statutes." 10 1 He was sadly correct. The
enactment of Revised Article 9 now raises a similar hope that
the Montana agricultural liens will be brought into harmony
with the Revised Article 9 scheme.
One of the strengths of old Article 9, perhaps its principal
strength, is that it took disparate devices for securing interests
in personal property and united them into one device - the
security interest. Revised Article 9 incorporates additional
forms of collateral, but provides exceptions to the general rules
for most of them. Creditors can now take a security interest in
bank deposits, tort claims, health insurance receivables, and so
forth, but the rules for each form of collateral differ, exceptions
compounding on exceptions. Secured financing now begins to
resemble the situation prior to adoption of the old Article 9,
except that the different financing devices are now collected
under the same roof. Agricultural liens suffer from the same
fate, all the more so because the governing rules are found
outside of Article 9 as well as in exceptions within Article 9.
I believe a desirable direction of reform is simplification
that brings agricultural liens into the mainstream of Article 9
security interests and creates fewer exceptions to standard
practices. As between revising Article 9 and revising other
statutes, the latter should always be considered first, given the
policy of keeping Uniform Laws uniform among the states.
In the short run, the Secretary of State has used his power
to promulgate filing forms under Article 9102 and under § 71-3125103 to assure that a creditor claiming an agricultural lien
provides all information necessary to file an effective statement
under either of those statutes or under the Food Security Act. 0 4
In this way, no secured party or agricultural lienor would be
prejudiced by guessing wrong as to how to file under Revised
Article 9.
One initial inquiry is whether the agricultural liens serve
any significant commercial purpose. Are the transaction costs in
obtaining and foreclosing on them so out of proportion to the
amounts of money involved that they make little economic
sense? The Farm Laborers' Lien might be addressed by the
wage protection statutes and the others abolished if they have
101.

2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 887 (1965).

102.
103.
104.

U.C.C. § 9-401 to -407 (2000).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-125 (2001).
7 U.S.C. § 1631 (2001).
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little utility. 105 If retained, the liens should be rewritten for
clarity, to determine what products they attach to and whether
they attach to proceeds.
The purpose of the filing requirement for agricultural liens
should be explored. Is filing necessary for attachment? If filing
for notice is considered desirable, filing under § 71-3-125 should
be replaced with perfection under Article 9. The purpose of the
time provisions within which the lienor must file should also be
explored. If the purpose of the liens is to facilitate the extension
of credit, then short time periods are sensible, but if the purpose
of the liens is to facilitate the recovery of unpaid bills, then
longer time periods make more sense. One proposal would be to
model the liens on the Article 9 superpriority statutes, requiring
the lienor to file and to give notice in order to obtain first
priority.
The statutes should also be rewritten to state clear and
consistent priorities among themselves. They should be silent
on remedies, deferring to the Revised Article 9 scheme for
10 6
creditors' remedies on default.
If the agricultural liens are brought within Article 9, one
aspect of Title 71 that might be retained is the attorney fees
provision, which allows the court to award "money paid and
attorney fees incurred for filing and recording the lien and
07
reasonable attorney fees in the district and supreme courts."
Without this provision, the transaction costs of pursuing an
agricultural lien would not be economical. It might be argued
that because Article 9 does not award attorney fees to secured
creditors, agricultural lienors should not be given this right
either. However, because most secured creditors include such a

105. Tana Gormely, Filing Specialist for the Montana Secretary of State, informs
me that as of June 5, 2001, there were on file 183 Seed and Grain Liens, 15 Farm
Laborer Liens, 1 Hail Insurance Lien, 11 Threshers Liens, and 190 Spraying and
Dusting Liens. These liens are not necessarily active. Other than the Hail Insurance
Lien, which lapses on March 1 of the succeeding year, and the Farm Laborers' Lien,
which has no provision for termination, the others must be terminated by the creditor.
Prior to the enactment of statutes enacted with Revised Article 9, there were no
incentives for termination. See §§ 71-3-704, -713, -808 and -908.
106. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(72)(B) (2000) defines "Secured party" to include "a person
that holds an agricultural lien." Thus the provisions that give rights to a secured party
on default give the same rights to an agricultural lienor. For example, § 9-606 provides:
Time of Default for Agricultural Lien. For purposes of this part, a default
occurs in connection with an agricultural lien at the time the secured party
becomes entitled to enforce the lien in accordance with the statute under which
it was created.
107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-124 (2001).
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provision in the security agreement, this statute can be viewed
as giving the same right to those whose liens arise by operation
of law rather than by contract.
These modest reforms would go a long way to improving the
muddled state of agricultural liens in Montana.
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PART I. INTRODUCTION
Each U.S. court of appeals draws to some extent upon other
circuits' cases. Unlike the Supreme Court with its almost
entirely discretionary jurisdiction, the courts of appeals have
mandatory jurisdiction and thus must decide all the cases before
them. Any circuit court of appeals can at times defer a decision
until another court, particularly the Supreme Court, has decided
the issue before it. However, in the courts of appeals, with the
parties' urging the judges are likely to look laterally at the
actions of the other courts of appeals which have faced the same
or similar issues.
The most routine use of other circuits' cases is to support
various, often non-central points. Beyond that, however, judges
of any one court of appeals note whether other circuits' cases
join and support, or diverge from and are in conflict with, the
law of their own circuit. References to intercircuit conflicts are
found in majority opinions, as when judges say why their court's
position is preferable to that of some other circuits; in dissents
from the panel opinion, when a judge says the majority is
creating an intercircuit conflict; and in dissents from denial of
en banc reconsideration of a case, when similar arguments are
made. This activity -particularly how courts of appeals respond
to the possibility that their actions will create intercircuit
conflicts, including their attempts to limit intercircuit conflict
before cases are taken to the Supreme Court- has received
little scholarly attention.'

1. The major exception is Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and
FederalAppellate Structure, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1029 (1999). That article reports a study
commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), after Congress, in the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, asked the FJC to study 'the extent and effect of unresolved
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soon as they first appear, it is suggested that some courts of
appeals have shifted position, thus eliminating the intercircuit
conflict. However, this has never led to systematic treatment of
how the courts of appeals in fact dealt with incipient or actual
intercircuit conflicts, so that we remain with a virtual absence of
work on the topic.
To help repair that omission, this article presents an
examination of how courts of appeals deal with those conflicts as
they decide cases that may produce a conflict or may reinforce a
side in a pre-existing conflict. The purpose here is not to perform
a statistical analysis of the frequency with which the issue of
intercircuit agreement or divergence takes place or of the
proportion of certain types of responses. Instead, it is a look at
intercircuit conflict through the eyes of court of appeals judges,
with the focus on process. Court of appeals judges' treatment of
real or claimed intercircuit conflicts is illustrated by examples.
In looking at those cases, we limit our attention to those aspects
of the case implicating intercircuit conflict. Our interest is not
in the details of the doctrinal analysis in which the judges
engage in their published opinions but in the types of discussion
they have about the questions before them. 3 Here one must
remember that there are cases in which intercircuit conflict is
the Supreme Court's focus when it grants review, but in the
court of appeals, there was no discussion of real or possible
conflict. This may have been because the conflict had not yet
developed or because some interpretations of the point at issue
had not yet been put on the table.
I do not take issue here with the assumption, implicit in
most discussion of intercircuit conflicts, that all intercircuit
conflicts should be eliminated or at least kept to a bare
minimum. For present purposes, I take that debatable
assumption as a given, because it is an important part of the
background against which judges deal with the issue, and
because most of their discussion seems to be based on its
implicit acceptance. 4 Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that
the assumption is debatable. One might argue, for example, that
differing interpretations of a legal point should be allowed to
"percolate" before the Supreme Court intervenes to eliminate
3. The reader may examine those cases which are cited to obtain a better feel for
the relative importance of the intercircuit conflict issue within the case.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1388 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986)
("Unnecessary conflicts among the circuits are to be avoided."). The question, of course, is
what constitutes an "unnecessary" conflict.
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This article provides an exploration of federal appellate
judges' treatment of the case law of other circuits in connection
with actual and claimed intercircuit conflicts. As such, it is a
departure from the attention usually given to intercircuit
conflicts from the perspective of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
keeps tabs on intercircuit conflicts as lawyers claim they
develop. In that line of scholarship, there are several principal
questions examined. One is when, on the basis of its Rule 10(a)
that intercircuit conflict will be a consideration in granting
certiorari, the Court does grant review to those conflicts and
when it does not, as well as the reasons why it does so. Another,
related question is whether the court deals sufficiently with
such conflict or whether more capacity to announce national law
2
is needed.
Despite the many studies of this genre, comparable
attention has not been given to how lower courts have treated
intercircuit conflict. In these studies, in connection with mention
of the notion that conflicts should be allowed to "percolate," that
is, that the Supreme Court should not try to resolve them as
conflicts between federal judicial circuits." Id. at 1036. While Hellman examines
instances where one court of appeals does not draw on potentially dispositive out-ofcircuit cases, the present article provides instances in which judges have used such
cases. Hellman deals only with cases containing dissents, while the present article draws
on any cases, whether or not the panel is internally divided. The two articles also use
somewhat different perspectives in discussing use of cases from another circuit: Hellman
focuses on whether uncertainty within other circuits would be reduced by making
binding the ruling of the first court to deal with a question, while the present article
provides instances where that has happened on a de facto basis.
2. Major work on intercircuit conflicts and the extent to which the Supreme Court
resolves them includes: SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN E. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE
SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS

(1988); Estreicher and Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 NEW YORK U. L. REV. 681 (1984); New York
University Supreme Court Project,59 NEW YORK U. L. REV. 823 (1984).
Important related works are H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA
SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991), and DORIS M. PROVINE, CASE
SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1980).

Of particular importance is the more recent work Arthur D. Hellman, By
Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56
U.PITT. L. REV. 693 (1995), and Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a Darkling Plain:
Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 247. A professor at University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Hellman was deputy
director of the Commission of Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (the
Hruska Commission) in the early 1970s and then chief of staff attorneys for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. His frequent work on the subject made him the
logical candidate for the Federal Judicial Center-sponsored study noted above. See
Hellman, supra note 1. Much of Hellman's work is related to the proposal to divide the
Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose
Time Has Not Yet Come, 57 MONT. L. REV. 261 (1996).
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the conflict.
Court of appeals judges' consideration of other circuits' cases
and of claims of intercircuit conflict does not take place in
separate, discrete steps in the decision of a case. Rather it occurs
at a number of loci in the decision-making process as part and
parcel of a seamless web of judicial decision-making. The initial
and most basic place for consideration of possible intercircuit
conflict is the three-judge panels which decide the vast majority
of cases in the U.S. court of appeals. In discussing the case
before them after receiving briefs and hearing argument, the
members of the panel will examine and discuss cases from
outside the circuit,
particularly in the absence of circuit
precedent on point. Not only must they deal with pre-existing
intercircuit conflict, but they may also face claims, by lawyers or
their panel colleagues, that to adopt a particular position would
be to create an intercircuit conflict.
Once the panel issues its disposition, a claim of an
intercircuit conflict may be raised either by lawyers petitioning
for rehearing or rehearing en banc, or by judges outside the
panel ("off-panel judges") who are stimulated by party initiative
or act independent of it to monitor their colleagues' work. Those
judges may "stop the clock" to ask the panel to reconsider its
position. Or, if the panel will not amend its opinion in a manner
acceptable to the off-panel judge, that judge may ask the court
to rehear the case en banc to adopt a position that would not
5
cause an intercircuit conflict.
Data for this paper are drawn from two sources. One is
published opinions of the U.S. courts of appeals from the 1990s,
including dissents from denials of rehearing en banc.6 The other
5. Intercircuit conflicts are also debated within en banc courts, a matter outside
the scope of this article.
6. To supplement the author's files, a WESTLAW scan using the command TE
(CIRCUIT /5 CONFLICT!) & DA(AFT 1989), that is, "circuit" within five words of
'conflict," was performed for Ninth Circuit cases from 1990 through late 1999 to capture
as many mentions of intercircuit conflict as possible, even if unusable cases also
appeared. The scan produced headnotes and text embodying a reference to conflict for
329 cases; both published opinions from the Federal Reporter and so-called "not-forpublication" memorandum dispositions, which WESTLAW posts for the Ninth Circuit,
were included. Because "conflict" also appears in reference to intracircuit conflict and
other inter-court conflict, between the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court or between
federal and state court rulings, as well as in such concepts as "conflicting testimony" and
'conflict of interest," of the 329 cases mentioning "conflict," only 135 cases involved
references of any sort to intercircuit conflict.
The opinions in the 135 "good hits" were then examined to determine the
context of the specific language about intercircuit conflict and to see if discussion of other
circuits' rulings appeared elsewhere in the opinion. This step is a necessary step because
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is case files. The latter are important because published
opinions do not tell us about the process by which the judges
have considered claims of intercircuit conflicts or even whether
judges have discussed such conflicts when no judge chooses to
mention them in the court's disposition. The casefiles do record
the judges' discussion as they decide cases and agree on the
disposition they will issue.
The judges of the Ninth Circuit have their chambers at
dispersed locations throughout the circuit in addition to circuit
headquarters at San Francisco. They are scattered from Seattle,
Portland, and Boise in the north, to Phoenix, San Diego, and Los
Angeles in the south, and to Fairbanks, Alaska, and Honolulu
outside the contiguous forty-eight states. Most communication
among the judges is neither face-to-face nor spoken on the
telephone. This is the case for several reasons. One is that the
judges are aiming toward a written product. They also use
written communication because of their geographic dispersion;
because panels of the court rotate, so that judges who sit
together one month likely sit with other colleagues the next; and
because some sit (are "on calendar") while others are in their
chambers working on opinions. The judges communicate with
each other about cases primarily by means of the court's
internal e-mail system, with memoranda and draft opinions
printed out in the recipient's chambers. There they become a
hardcopy record of judges' communication with each other. In
the appropriate case file, they join in-chambers memoranda
between clerks and judge and an occasional notation about a
7
telephone call.
only one judge -likely to be the dissenter- may write explicitly of an "intercircuit
conflict" but the other judges may have discussed the same cases without referring to
"conflict." This suggests that the search, while over inclusive as noted, may also have
been under inclusive to the extent that the judges, without ever using the "magic words"
of "circuit conflict," discussed other circuits' doctrine that differed from the Ninth
Circuit's position. Herman v. Tidewater Pac. Inc., 160 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1998), provides
an example. It was a "hit" because of the mention of "conflicts" with respect to a
subsidiary issue but did not "hit" on the panel's far more extensive discussion of the
case's chief issue, on which the circuits had taken diverse positions but with respect to
which the word "conflict" does not appear in the text of the opinion. Under-inclusiveness
is not a serious problem here, as the present study does not undertake to calculate the
proportion of cases in which the intercircuit conflict issue is raised, but instead deals
with how conflict is handled when it is raised.
7. For detail on communication among Ninth Circuit judges, both before and after
installation of the e-mail system, see Stephen L. Wasby, Communication Within the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: The View from the Bench, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1
(1977); Stephen L. Wasby, Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern for
Collegiality, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 73 (1987); Stephen L. Wasby, Technology and
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The files used in this study are those of one Ninth Circuit
judge, from closed cases in the mid-1980s through the mid1990s. Basing a study on the files of only one judge does mean
that there are many Ninth Circuit cases for which published
opinions are available but information about the preceding
within-panel discussion is not. Nonetheless, material in a single
judge's files is quite likely to be reasonably representative of
communication within a court of appeals. The reason is that in
due course any judge sits with all other judges of the court. As a
result, any one judge's files contain communications to and from
many colleagues, including those not on panels with the judge
but who have communicated in their role as off-panel monitors.
The case files are fairly complete for most cases,8 although
occasionally context makes clear that some memos have not
reached the file. The files contain communications among the
three members of a panel considering a case; 9 communications
with off-panel judges who have commented on, and requested
changes in, the panel's disposition; and communication within
the entire court in relation to requests to rehear cases en banc. 10
Like any internal court communication, the materials in
these files are confidential, and the author was allowed access to
them on that basis. When published opinions are discussed, they
will, of course, be cited as per normal practice. However, because
the material drawn from the case files is confidential, it will for
the most part be presented without mention of the name of the
judge whose memorandum is being quoted and often without
mention of the name of the case. Materials presented in this
article without attribution or citation are drawn from these
Communication in a Federal Court: The Ninth Circuit,28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1988);
and Stephen L. Washy, Technology in Appellate Courts: Electronic Mail in the Ninth
Circuit, 73 JUDICATURE 90 (1989).
8. There may be variations from one chambers to another in the types of
documents retained. It is also possible that a judge willing to grant access to files in
closed cases to someone not on the court's staff, even if fairly knowledgeable about the
courts, might leave more rather than less material in those files. The author's
impression from discussions with judges is that they are too busy with the press of
everyday business to have time to sort through case files selectively to create a favorable
'paper trail." Few have a systematic "deaccession policy" for documents.
9. As with the Supreme Court, there is no transcript of the judges' post-argument
deliberation of a case. There is a "conference memo" prepared by the presiding judge,
summarizing the judges' positions to a greater or lesser extent and memorializing the
writing assignment.
10. The latter material is particularly complete in these particular files because, as
the court's en banc coordinator, the judge oversaw activity after a panel had issued its
disposition even when not participating in the within-panel discussion (if any) with
respect to intercircuit conflict.
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confidential materials, and as a result, the reader should not be
looking for the types of citations that would appear as a matter
of course in the usual law review article engaging in doctrinal
analysis.
After this introduction, Part II provides some background
on the intercircuit conflict issue. Part III contains discussion of
whether judges' mention of intercircuit conflict is a rhetorical
device. Some attention is also given there to the role of
intercircuit conflict in holding en banc courts and to the relation
between court of appeals' treatment of conflicts and the
Supreme Court. Parts IV and V constitute the principal part of
the article. Part IV is a discussion of the judges' use in their
opinions of cases from other circuits, with a particular focus on
treatment of intercircuit conflict, and their responses to
dissenters' claims of such conflict. In Part V, we turn to see how
questions of intercircuit conflict are handled during the decisionmaking process leading to an opinion. The article concludes with
a brief summary and with a suggestion for further needed
research.
Most discussion of intercircuit conflict begins with the
mention of the conflicts in the judges' opinions. That warrants
using public mention as our starting point before we move on to
the previously-unexamined process by which the judges grapple
with claimed intercircuit conflict. Separation of pre-opinion
activity from the ultimate formal disposition also makes some
sense because matters discussed within the panel may not be
visible in the ultimately filed opinion; this is likely if disputes
over other circuits' rulings are resolved there. That may occur
when a judge who complained about an intercircuit conflict
chooses not to file a separate writing, as a result of having
obtained some modification of the majority opinion, from a
feeling that publication may call more attention to the case than
is warranted, or from a lack of passion to proceed. An off-panel
judge's claim of intercircuit conflict in a "stop clock" memo or en
banc call may likewise not result in a published dissent from a
denial of rehearing en banc. Here we must remember that
judicial opinions are not reports of the exchanges or bargaining
that took place before the opinion was put into final form, so
that judges do not report discussion of possible or actual
intercircuit conflicts. 1

For example, a Fourth Circuit case that figured prominently in a Ninth Circuit
11.
panel's internal discussion received no mention in the opinion in the case. See United
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policy-making does not mean that, from the perspective of court
of appeals judges, such conflicts are not an important matter.
We can begin to obtain some sense of the importance of the
matter at that level of the court system if we put aside an
implicit assumption that resolution of those conflicts is possible
only when they arrive at the Supreme Court's docket. To the
extent that court of appeals judges do pay attention to
intercircuit conflict, they may reduce it by preventing it from
developing or by eliminating it in its infancy. If instead of
attending to the Supreme Court's treatment of conflicts, we look
at how they are treated in the courts of appeals' published
opinions and during the intra-court discussion that leads up to
those opinions, what becomes clear is that court of appeals
judges are sensitive to conflicts and do pay considerable
attention to what their colleagues in other circuits are doing
when the same issues face more than one court.
Attention to intercircuit conflicts only after they arrive at
the Supreme Court, and the lack of attention to the process by
which the court of appeals themselves deal with intercircuit
conflict, may result from the related implicit and inaccurate
assumptions of "circuit independence" and "mutual ignorance."
These notions are that, in developing the rulings which are in
conflict, each court of appeals acts with full independence of all
the others, and that court of appeals judges lack awareness of
other circuits' rulings which conflict with their own decisions.
Indeed, the portrayal by advocates of the need for additional
capacity to deal with the "flood" of intercircuit conflicts almost
seems to be depicting the courts of appeals as manufacturing
such conflicts without heed to other circuits.
The picture presented here is quite different. While not all
court of appeals judges address claims of intercircuit conflicts in
great depth, and sometimes do not address them at all, "the
name of the game" seems to be conscious consideration of the
possibility of such conflicts, coupled with an effort to avoid them.
In short, appellate judges take seriously the charge to reduce or
minimize such conflicts before they reach the Supreme Court.
We find that judges express concern for maintaining national
uniformity in the law 17 and -as will be discussed more fully17. See, e.g., Judge Kleinfeld's statement that "on this matter of national tax policy
there is something to be said for uniformity among the circuits," so that the claimant's
argument was not "so strong as to justify a conflict" between the Ninth Circuit and
another court. King v. United States, 152 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1998). In another
case, he stated that "Because of the importance of predictability to commercial relations,
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take seriously the norm that they should not casually create
intercircuit conflicts.
Their paying heed to other circuits'
decisions is part of their participation in a coherent institution, 18
and it allows us to speak of the courts of appeals, sometimes
thought of as "regional", as part of a coherent national system. 19
Indeed, many of the times that the Supreme Court has taken a
case to resolve an intercircuit conflict, that conflict has already
been discussed below. 20 In short, cases from circuits which are in
conflict or at least in tension with each other do not simply float
up, each independent of the others, to the Supreme Court.
To be sure, there are instances when two courts of appeals
are unaware of a conflict between their decisions because the
lawyers did not call the conflict to the court's attention or
because vagaries of timing "hid" one case from the other court.
Additionally, there can be instances where two U.S. courts of
appeals come up with the same result, or end up in conflict,
without explicitly drawing on each other.2 1 Hellman suggests
that where "the disagreement involves a narrow issue that does

as well as deference to our sister circuits, we shall not lightly create an intercircuit
conflict affecting commerce nationally." Portland 76 Auto/Truck Plaza Inc. v. Union Oil
Co. of California, 153 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1998).
18. "Because judges identify strongly as members of an institution.... they
respond to the views of other judges not because it was strategically useful for them to do
so in terms of their own policy preferences but because they were professionally
committed to the notion of coordinated institutional doctrine." Anne Bloom, The Post
Attitudinal Moment: Judicial Policymaking Through the Lens of New Institutionalism,
35 LAw & Soc REV. 219, 226-227 (2001).
19. There is some evidence that state courts, although not part of a single "system"
as are the U.S. courts of appeals, likewise pay attention to each others' rulings in much
the same way. See Carey Goldberg, Massachusetts Case Is Latest to Ask Court to Decide
Fate of Frozen Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, November 5, 1999, at A20 ("But legal experts say a
consensus of sorts has been emerging, though it is nonbinding and has come out of the
state courts, which watch each other's decisions as they make their own.").
20. Arthur Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology
of Intercircuit Conflicts 31 (April 2000) (paper presented to Midwest Political Science
Association) (on file with author) ("Most often, the acknowledgment of conflict will be
found in the court of appeals decision that is brought for review."). In noting intercircuit
conflict, the Supreme Court acknowledges that this has taken place. See discussion
infra.
21. The latter may have been the situation with the two cases-a Sixth Circuit
case and a Ninth Circuit case-on in rem civil forfeiture that the Supreme Court
reviewed together. U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (decided together with United
States v. $405,089.23). The Supreme Court majority said the two lower courts had the
'same view." At least in the material the Supreme Court quoted there was no explicit
reliance by one court on the other. Of particular note is the finding that in roughly onethird of the cases Hellman examined in his Federal Judicial Center study of intercircuit
conflicts, "neither the majority nor the dissent cited any out-of-circuit precedents on the
issue that gave rise to disagreement within the panel." Hellman, supra note 1, at 1057.

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 63

panel to reconsider its disposition, or seeking to have the court
rehear a case en banc. At those times, although an intercircuit
conflict may be the central or determinative issue or may even
be the only issue before the court, in order to reinforce their
position they often include other elements with the intercircuit
conflict claim. These elements include whether the court has
developed an intracircuit conflict, 34 which only an en banc court
may eliminate just as only an en banc court may overrule past
circuit precedent, and whether there is a conflict with the
Supreme Court. And a third is the creation of intercircuit
conflict.
One can see the combination of some of these elements in a
dissent from the court's denial of en banc rehearing. There the
dissenting judges complained that the panel's ruling
"contradicts the plain language of the [statute], conflicts with a
prior decision of this circuit, and creates a needless intercircuit
conflict with all courts of appeals that have addressed the
issue."35 In another case, a dissenting judge complained not only
about the intercircuit conflict he alleged the majority was
creating, but also said the court's decision also contravened a
Supreme Court decision and created a conflict within the
circuit. 36 Not only may claims of intercircuit conflict be
entangled with other elements, but they may also be related, for
example, when an intercircuit conflict is said to be mirrored by
37
intracircuit divisions.
The mixture of intra- and inter-circuit conflict claims is
illustrated in two cases in which the panel itself called sua
sponte for en banc hearing before issuing its ruling. In the
Shabani drug conspiracy case, 38 briefs and oral argument had
convinced the panel
"that Ninth Circuit opinions are in
39
conflict." Although not the basis for the panel's en banc call,
34. See, inter alia, Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory
and Practice of Precedent in a Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989),
Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Processin the Large Appellate
Circuit, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Stephen L. Washy, Inconsistency in the U.S. Courts
ofAppeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1979).
35. Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 74 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.
1996) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
36. Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1245
(9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
37. See In re Yochum, 89 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1996) ("This intra-circuit conflict
mirrors the circuit split.")
38. United States v. Shabani, 993 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513 U.S. 10
(1994).
39. Unattributed quotations are taken from internal court communications to
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make it less necessary for judges to monitor other circuits'
32
rulings on a continuous basis.
In addition to what members of a panel learn from the
attorneys in a case, their clerks, and their own reading, their
colleagues also call to their attention real or possible conflicts
that they have missed. This is most likely after the panel has
filed its disposition, with an "off-panel" colleague making an
internal request for reconsideration or a call for rehearing en
banc, and often the panel will modify its opinion somewhat to
take into account their colleague's concerns. However, a panel is
able to alter its opinion more easily if it has not yet issued its
33
mandate.
PART III. CONFLICT CLAIMS AS RHETORIC
Are conflicts "real" or are claims of conflict only used for
rhetorical effect? Judges of varying ideological positions may
agree on the presence of intercircuit conflicts in some cases. Yet,
the use made of claims that conflict is present, particularly
where other judges say it does not, leads to the suspicion that
such claims are also rhetorical devices. After examining that
topic, in this section, we move on to look at the relation between
claims of intercircuit conflict and whether a court of appeals
should sit en banc, and then briefly at how intercircuit conflicts
implicate the court of appeals' relation with the Supreme Court.
Judges claiming that their colleagues' actions will create an
intercircuit conflict almost invariably argue against such a
conflict as they claim to seek intercircuit uniformity. Judges do
so most often while dissenting, "stopping the clock" to get the
32. Knowledge of other courts of appeals' views also results from judges sitting in
those courts. In such situations, visiting judges learn primarily about new procedures
for handling cases. However, they also bring some of their own circuits' law with them.
One judge talks about having "insinuated" himself into the law of another court by using
'some liberal ideas from the Ninth Circuit." When the court on which he was sitting
relied on its own old circuit precedent, he concurred separately to argue that the case
was wrongly decided. The court of appeals then sat en banc to correct the law.
Interview with Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, 9tb Cir. Court of Appeals, in Sisters, Ore.
(October 10 1999). See also Morstein v. Nat. Insurance Services, Inc., 74 F.3d 1135 (11th
Cir. 1996) (panel decision, Goodwin J., concurring), rev'd en banc; 93 F.3d 715 (11th Cir.
1996).
33. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute,173
F.3d 890, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (supplemental opinion) ("In the same week that our
opinion issued, the Fifth Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a False Claims
Act qui tam suit in federal court .... Since our sister circuit implicitly challenged our
jurisdiction. . and our mandate has not issued,., we think it appropriate to... explain
why we believe we should stick with the order of decision we adopted.").
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intercircuit conflict was also implicated, both because the Ninth
Circuit cases cited to a Fifth Circuit ruling, which in turn was
based on the conflicting doctrine from that circuit, and because,
as the panel noted, "This circuit stands alone in its
interpretation" of the relevant statute. Then in the Butros v.
INS case,40 when the panel had sought en banc hearing because
of an intracircuit conflict, a judge who had sat on the allegedly
conflicting case wrote to distinguish it, but in so doing,
introduced mention of an existing intercircuit conflict.
In the debate over "en-bancing" some cases, conflict with
Supreme Court precedent has been added to the combination of
intracircuit and intercircuit conflict. In a labor election case, 4 1 a
judge stopped the clock "because the opinion is arguably in
conflict with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent"; here
too intercircuit matters were also implicated because an earlier
Ninth Circuit ruling the present panel used drew on a Fifth
Circuit case. Although in a later memo, the "calling" judge made
clear that his "major concern is to keep Ninth Circuit law
intact," he added the claim of intercircuit conflict. In another
case, concerning the law of search and seizure, this judge again
combined claims, saying "the decision conflicts with Supreme
Court precedent and with our own. It also needlessly creates an
intercircuit conflict."
The likelihood that a dispute over an intercircuit conflict
will be mixed with other issues is particularly true for a
mandatory jurisdiction court. A certiorari court could limit its
consideration to the issue causing the intercircuit conflict.
However, there is an expectation that a mandatory jurisdiction
court, although it can apply canons of judicial restraint to avoid
reaching some issues presented, is expected to reach most of
them. If the issue containing the conflict is important, judges
may have no way out but to decide what stance to take on the
intercircuit conflict and to decide as well what weight to give
that issue relative to other major factors.
When a judge combines all these elements, it may be
another way of saying, "This is a really bad decision." Such
combining of claims thus gives rise to the question of whether
intercircuit conflicts are "real" or are (simply) used as a
which the author was allowed access. They are used without citation to the case or to
the judge making the statement.
40. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc).
41. Am. W. Airlines v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 969 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1992), amended
by, 986 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1992).
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rhetorical device to gain an advantage for the position being
advocated, as is done in certiorari petitions to get the Supreme
Court's attention. The claimant may believe that a conflict
actually exists or there may be a colorable argument that there
is indeed a conflict in rulings. However, exaggeration is likely,
with opposing parties left to debunk the claim by showing that
cited cases are inapposite or by distinguishing them. At times
the claim seems to be little more than a mask for dislike of the
result the majority has reached, made not to protect the
principle of uniformity in national law, but because one judge
does not prefer the proposed result. The many calls for rehearing
en banc made by judges known to be at one end of the ideological
spectrum or the other gives further credence to the notion that
those calls are something of a cover for result orientation.
Because a judge who piles claim on claim may create a
stronger position than if the claim were limited to only one
element, it is not unusual to find that a dissenting judge
complaining about his majority colleagues, or an off-panel judge
complaining about a panel, will combine a complaint about an
intercircuit conflict with complaints about other sins committed
by the majority. We see this in Judge Kozinski's dissent to the
Gaudin en banc's holding that materiality is an element of the
offense of making a false statement in a matter within a
government agency's jurisdiction.
He called the majority's
opinion a "tsunami":
It's not every day, after all, that we provoke a conflict with
every other regional circuit, defy Supreme Court authority,
implicitly overrule several lines of our own case law-thereby
creating a spider web of secondary circuit conflicts- and pave
the way for successful habeas petitions for scores, perhaps
hundreds, of prisoners convicted of a broad range of federal
42
crimes.
At times, litanies like these make it appear that a judge
may be throwing mud at the wall in the hopes that some will
stick - claiming intercircuit conflict, intracircuit conflict, and
conflict with the Supreme Court, as well as crimes against man
and nature-and they reinforce the notion that claims of
intercircuit conflict are used as a rhetorical device.
The question of whether intercircuit conflict claims are

42. United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 954 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). Despite the hyperbole, the Supreme Court, which not infrequently listens to
Judge Kozinski, affirmed. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
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Judge) was said to have been like Chief Justice Burger in
wanting a rule that the court must go en banc if there was to be
an intercircuit conflict. While the court declined to adopt such a
rule-perhaps because if a case were going to go to the Supreme
Court, the en banc process would add another year-the court
did have a rule that a panel creating an intercircuit conflict
should notify the court to that effect. 46 Under this regime, in a
case where a government petition for rehearing alleged an
intercircuit conflict, Judge Wallace wrote to his colleagues, "Our
General Orders indicate that if the suggestion contains as one of
its grounds the allegation that the opinion initiates a conflict
with another court of appeals, the panel is to advise us," and
therefore "[itis incumbent upon the panel to advise the court of
47
this alleged conflict."
The Ninth Circuit has since added procedures by which
attorneys in the court's Case Management Unit monitor certain
types of cases and notify the entire court about them; among
those cases are those in which the panel expressly disagrees
with another circuit. This procedure, a result of the work of the
court's Evaluation Committee, makes it unnecessary for a panel
to advise colleagues of the conflict, but Judge Wallace's point is
met.

48

It is also interesting to note what happened when the
Supreme Court, in reversing a Ninth Circuit decision, noted
that, although not the basis of the reversal, an intercircuit

46. For the practice in another circuit, see this note in a Fifth Circuit case: "In
accordance with Court policy, this opinion, being one which initiates a conflict with the
rule declared in another circuit, was circulated before release to the entire Court, and
rehearing en banc was voted by a majority of the non-recused judges in active service...
"Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 516 n.* (5th Cir. 1999).
47. Memorandum from Judge J. Clifford Wallace, to all 9th Circuit judges
(December 17, 1991) (on file with author) (regarding, Soler v. Scott, 942 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1991), vacated, Sivley v. Soler, 506 U.S. 969 (1992)). In another case, there was a
contretemps over the meaning of the rule. Judge Wallace stopped the clock so a panel
which had consciously created a circuit conflict could comply with the provisions of the
General Orders by informing the court of the circuit split. Another judge then pointed
out that the rule did not apply because the relevant party "has never alleged that there
is an inter-circuit conflict," not even in response to an order requesting the parties' views
on whether the case should be heard en banc. The panel opinion's author also pointed
out that the panel had already commented on why it had rejected the cases from two
circuits(As the amended opinion read, "This holding puts this circuit in conflict with two
other circuits.") Those responses led Judge Wallace to withdraw his "stop clock." (In
this and other instances without citation to a case or identification of judges, material is
taken from case files made available to the author.).
48. See David R. Thompson, The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Evaluation
Committee, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 365 (2000).
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(mere) rhetoric or something more bears on the dispute among
political scientists studying the judiciary as to whether (only)
attitudes and ideology explain judges' voting, or whether law
counts for something in that explanation. To the extent that a
judge with known ideological proclivities engages in serious
examination of a range of options from other courts, and
explains why the position he or she adopts is ultimately to be
preferred, one might say that the legal notion of "avoiding
intercircuit conflict" in fact does mean something independent of
ideology. However, if judges of easily identifiable ideological
persuasion repeatedly claim "intercircuit conflict" in a way that
would seem to be a cover for seeking particular results, attitude
may be said to trump the "legal" explanation.
A. Conflicts and Sitting En Banc.
Independent of whether or not judges' claims concerning
intercircuit conflict are rhetorical tools used to achieve a soughtafter policy result, such claims affect decision-making within a
court of appeals because the presence of an intercircuit conflict
may affect the decision as to whether the court should rehear a
case en banc. The Ninth Circuit's present formal position is that
an intercircuit conflict regarding a rule of national application is
a basis for the court's taking a case en banc. 43 Indeed, in a
recent case, a judge even used the possibility of one to argue that
the court should go en banc."
Likewise, nonexistence of an
intercircuit conflict can be proffered as reason for not hearing a
case en banc. In a rare concurrence from a rejection of
suggestion to rehear en banc, Judge Kleinfeld observed for
himself and two other judges that factors which "probably
explain the court's decision not to rehear the case en banc"
included the facts that "[t]he court's decision was compelled by
well established precedent. There is no inter- or intra-circuit
45
conflict."
There are judges who believe strongly that the presence of a
(claimed) intercircuit conflict is reason for an en banc hearing.
Indeed, Judge J. Clifford Wallace (later the Ninth Circuit's Chief
43. 9th Cir. R. 35-1.
44. Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith, 109 F.3d 551, 557 (9th Cir. 1997) (on denial of
rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("A direct conflict with another circuit doesn't yet
exist, but one may be on the horizon.").
45. Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 138 F.3d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1998) (on denying
rehearing en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). This case also illustrates the interplay of
intercircuit conflict with other elements.
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PART II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we examine some background concerning
intercircuit conflicts, including whether they are a "problem"
and how courts of appeals avoid them. A principal reason why
the Supreme Court is the focus of almost all discussion about
intercircuit conflicts is that the presence of an intercircuit
conflict is one criterion used by the Supreme Court in
considering whether to grant review. Indeed, along with "the
importance of the issue," resolution of an intercircuit conflict is
12
the reason stated most frequently for granting certiorari.
Another reason for this focus is that starting in the 1970s, policy
debate about the federal court system centered on whether the
national court system had sufficient capacity to resolve
intercircuit conflicts. In particular, the question posed was
whether the Supreme Court adequately performed that task or
whether, as recommended by the Freund Study Group and by
the Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate System
(the Hruska Commission), the perceived need for greater
capacity to settle unresolved conflicts required a National Court
of Appeals or comparable judicial body to assist the High
13

Court.

Neither the National Court of Appeals or any proposed
variant was enacted, and the idea is no longer on the front
burner. The retirement of Justice Byron White from the United
States Supreme Court removed the "resident nag" who, in
dissents from denials of certiorari, regularly reminded his
colleagues of the intercircuit conflict cases the Court had refused
to review. 14 Moreover, the recent substantial decrease in the
Supreme Court's plenary docket has undercut the argument
that the system lacks sufficient present capacity to resolve such
conflicts. Important studies, particularly by Arthur Hellman,
also demonstrated that the seriousness of the purported effect of
intercircuit conflicts on national "primary actors" conducting

States v. Schram, 9 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1992).
12. See the studies discussed and cited at STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 215 (4th ed. 1993).

13. Commission on Revision of Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and
Internal Procedures 29-31 (1975).
14. His statements were noted by the lower courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("circuit courts now conflict on the proper
standard for evaluating 'pretextual stop' claims." Citing Cummings v. United States, 112
S.Ct. 428 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)).
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their activities in more than one circuit, was exaggerated. 15 One
might expect lawyers attempting to get the Supreme Court's
attention to emphasize intercircuit conflicts. However, these
studies showed that not all such putative conflicts are clear and
direct, as many are only "sideswipes" (that is, partial or oblique
conflicts rather than direct ones) and many others can be
eliminated by distinguishing cases. Moreover, conflicts allowed
to "percolate" may resolve themselves as some circuits fall in
line with other circuits and new statutes or regulations resolve
other intercircuit disagreements.
In considering the dimensions of the "problem," we must
also remember that not all issues are equally likely to result in
different interpretations that vary from one circuit to the next.
The issue must be one that recurs in several circuits. Examples
are federal criminal and civil procedure, which are national in
scope, and some areas of regulatory policy such as labormanagement relations. Even where an issue is recurring across
the circuits, in the Ninth Circuit, "no pattern is discernible in
terms of the issue areas." 16 If, however, an issue arises
exclusively or predominantly in one circuit, then the possibility
of intercircuit conflict is reduced. For example, many of the
Indian fishing rights cases arise in the Ninth Circuit; they also
turn on treaties specific to a single tribe. In the 1970s, cases on
border searches without warrants occurred primarily in the
Ninth Circuit and to a lesser extent in the Fifth Circuit, the two
circuits with extensive borders with Mexico. Another example is
cases in admiralty, which occur in a larger but still limited
number of circuits. When jurisdictional statutes place most
appeals in one court, as is true for the District of Columbia
Circuit hearing cases regarding environmental regulations, by
definition there can be no intercircuit conflict. And
interpretations of state law under federal diversity-of-citizenship
jurisdiction are often specific to a single circuit, although not
invariably so.
That the "problem" of unresolved intercircuit conflicts is
presently considered of diminished importance for national

15. See,e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity:Does
the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDICATURE 28 (1983); Arthur D. Hellman, The
Proposed IntercircuitTribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
375 (1984).
16. Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Judiciary as Organized Anarchy: Inter-Circuit
Conflicts in the Federal Appellate Courts 12-13 (April 2000) (paper presented to Midwest
Political Science Association) (on file with author).
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not control the merits of the appeal,. . . the judges might not
think it worthwhile to seek out guidance from out-of-circuit case
law." 22
However, instead of assuming that this "mutual
ignorance" occurs regularly, our working assumption should be
that judges are usually made aware of at least other circuits'
published opinions. Indeed, at times, judges are aware of cases
even prior to their being decided; they may know, for example,
that another court of appeals has heard argument in a case 23 or
24
that it has decided to take a case en banc.
The courts of appeals are provided with information and
also monitor each other so that each court is aware of other
courts' relevant rulings. Supporting evidence for this claim is
that the Supreme Court from time to time has noted that one
circuit was aware of other circuits' rulings, and may even have
taken them into account. 25 In its 1971 ruling in Rosenberg v. Yee
Chien Woo, the Court noted that the Second Circuit, having
"dealt at length with the Ninth Circuit opinion in this case," had
"expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit interpretation of
the statute." 26 And, in Aldinger v. Howard, an instance where
the lower court maintained an intercircuit conflict, Justice
Rehnquist commented that the Ninth Circuit, the source of the
case being reviewed, had said that it "was not unaware of the
widespread rejection of its position in almost all other Federal
Circuits ."27
Still another notation of one court being aware of the
contrary ruling by another court came in United States v.
Hughes Properties,Inc., where Justice Blackmun pointed to the
Claims Court's having noted conflict with a court of appeals:
22. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1063.
23. See, e.g., Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 574 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999) (On
December 1, 1998, the Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments in the appeal of Koenick v.
Felton,973 F.Supp. 522 (D.Md.1997) (holding that a state statute creating a public-school
holiday from the Friday before Easter through the Monday after Easter does not violate
the Establishment Clause.)).
24. For an instance in which the judges noted that the en banc might serve to
eliminate the intercircuit conflict, see Chandler v. United States Army, 125 F.3d 1296,
1302 (9th Cir. 1997)("It may be that the intercircuit conflict will be obviated, because the
Sixth Circuit is reconsidering a recent application of Murdock [the conflicting case] en
banc.").
25. To determine whether the Supreme Court grants review to resolve the conflicts
which the courts of appeals have discussed, one would have to trace cases from a court of
appeals in which intercircuit conflict was discussed to determine if the Supreme Court
accepted those cases and, if it did so, how it treated and perhaps resolved the conflict, a
task not undertaken in this article.
26. 402 U.S. 49, 52, n.2 (1971).
27. 427 U.S. 1, 3 (1976).
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The Claims Court further acknowledged that its ruling was
in conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Nightingale v. United States,28 having to do with
another Nevada casino, but it declined to follow that precedent
29
and specifically disavowed its reasoning.
While the Supreme Court does speak of the courts of
appeals' treatment of intercircuit conflicts, we have to keep in
mind Hellman's observation that "[w]hether the Court refers to
a conflict - or gives any reason for hearing the case - may depend
on how the opinion is written and which Justice writes it." He
notes that Justice Scalia "almost never explains why the Court
granted review," and "[iif he does allude to intercircuit conflict,
he almost invariably does so in the course of making an
30
argument on the merits."
Lawyers, also well aware of intercircuit conflicts as they
develop, bring them to the court's attention by using them while
arguing on their clients' behalf. And if judges considering a case
were not aware of another court's actions before issuing their
own ruling, a party's petition for rehearing will make them
aware. It is certainly possible, however, that the lawyers will not
catch such cases. Hellman notes that lawyers may have "framed
their arguments so single-mindedly around the law of the circuit
that they declined to research decisions of other circuits or
refrained from citing them even if they were closely on point." If
the judges "confined their analysis to the cases cited by the
31
parties," other circuits' work would not be addressed.
At least at the initial stages of the appellate process the
judges largely depend on lawyers to bring to their attention
relevant cases from other circuits, and to note possible or real
conflicts. Yet, case searches by law clerks may reduce that
dependence. A law clerk's search for "on point" cases often
provides additional or more-up-to-date citations. Even if
lawyers' citations were up-to-date when briefs were filed,
intercircuit conflicts may have been created subsequently, prior
to argument or decision in the case. While lawyers do file
supplemental letter briefs citing such cases, clerks' Insta-cite
searches to retrieve information during consideration of a case
not only bring the relevant cases to the judges' attention but also

28.
29.
30.
31.

684 F.2d 611 (1982).
476 U.S. 593, 598-599 (1986).
Hellman, supra note 20, at 80.
Hellman, supra note 1, at 1058.
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conflict between the Ninth Circuit and another court of appeals
was implicated in the case. On the basis of this comment, on
remand the Ninth Circuit sat en banc for further consideration
49
of the case.
One aspect of the intercircuit conflict - en banc relationship
is that an en banc ruling as part of an intercircuit conflict
situation would make the issue even more visible to the
Supreme Court. 50 There are judges who argue that, if the
Supreme Court is going to decide an issue regardless of whether
the lower court has sat en banc, resources should not be
expended on an en banc sitting. Likewise, judges may argue
that if an intercircuit conflict already exists, there is little need
for the court of appeals to consider the issue en banc because the
existence of the intercircuit conflict per se increases the
51
likelihood the Supreme Court will decide the issue.
It may also be the case that if the court of appeals chooses
not to give en banc treatment to a case, the Supreme Court may
have to take the case to clarify the law. In what amounted to a
plea to the Supreme Court to take the case, Judge Stephen
Reinhardt argued in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit's denial
of en banc rehearing in United States v. Koon, that "the Supreme
Court may yet provide Judge Davies with the guidance that our
own court has refused to offer.., perhaps the Supreme Court
will deem it important to clarify the extent of the authority that
sentencing judges possess to depart downwardly from the
[Sentencing] Guidelines. "52

49. The case is United States v. Jose, 519 U.S. 54, 56 (1996) (per curiam) ("We
express no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute. The matter, indeed, is one
that implicates an intercircuit conflict." Id. at 56.) On remand, Judge Hall, after noting
this language, wrote, "In light of this intercircuit conflict, we decided sua sponte to
consider the merits of this case en banc." United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th
Cir. 1997)(en banc). And, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit decided to agree with the
ruling of the court of appeals with which it had earlier disagreed: "Upon reconsideration,
we agree with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and holding," thus overruling earlier Ninth
Circuit cases that had relied on earlier (and later overruled) Fifth Circuit decisions. Id.
at 1329.
50. H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE, supra note 2, is the leading treatment of
the justices' consideration of factors used in granting certiorari. It fails to discuss
whether en banc rulings provide a "signal" used by the Supreme Court, so the discussion
here is speculative. A recent study finds that the granting of certiorari is definitely
related to the court of appeals having sat en banc. Tracey E. George and Michael E.
Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 196-197 (2001).
51. For further discussion of reasons why the court of appeals would or would not
sit en banc, see George and Solimine, supra note 50, passim.
52. United States v. Koon, 45 F.3d 1302, 1308 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J.,
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B. Circuit Conflict and the Supreme Court.
How judges deal with intercircuit conflict is also linked to
the court of appeals' relation to the Supreme Court. The
importance of intercircuit conflict as a criterion for the Supreme
Court's selection of cases has often been noted. If a court of
appeals creates an intercircuit conflict, the Supreme Court is
more likely to grant certiorari in the case. The fact that lower
court judges wish to avoid having their rulings reviewed may
serve as a pragmatic brake on creating intercircuit conflict. This
is over and above the norm that, in the interest of nationally
uniform law, such conflicts should not be created. Even if the
pressure of being the court to create a conflict is removed when
an intercircuit conflict already exists, by "weighing in" on the
issue and lining up on one side of the conflict or the other, the
court may increase the likelihood that the justices will perceive
that the conflict is of sufficient importance to warrant granting
certiorari. However, one must also keep in mind that there are
judges like the one who says he "always took the view that we
should not hesitate to create splits if we thoughtfully and
carefully concluded that [another] Circuit was wrong," doing so
to "hold the Supreme Court's toes to the fire," to force the
53
justices to deal with an issue.
In any event, when the justices decide a case regarding an
issue on which the circuits disagree, what the Supreme Court
meant becomes part of the intercircuit dispute, and intercircuit
conflict may turn on interpretations of the justices' statements.
This was the case when Ninth Circuit judges deciding Catholic
Soc. Servs. v. Thornburgh5 4 tried to determine which view from
the D.C. Circuit to adopt in interpreting McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center,55 and when Ninth Circuit Judge Harry

dissenting). The Supreme Court did grant review, affirming the Ninth Circuit in part,
reversing in part and remanding. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
53. With the Supreme Court's relatively light docket, he observed, "I was never
convinced . .. that we had a public duty to hold en bancs to lighten their burden." He
added, "some of our number actually found it intellectually stimulating to challenge the
Supreme Court from time to time," although, he added, they "usually were rewarded by
a Nine Zip reversal." E-mail from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, Circuit Judge, 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, to author (July 29, 1999) (on file with author); interview with Judge
Alfred T. Goodwin, Circuit Judge, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pasadena, Cal. (Oct.
10, 1999) (on file with author).
54. 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated by Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509
U.S. 43 (1993).
55. 498 U.S. 479 (1991). The Ninth Circuit's ruling was vacated by Reno v. Catholic
Social Services, 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
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Pregerson, in the 1993 Casey v. Lewis prison conditions case,
complained that the panel majority relied on two cases from
other circuits which "rely on mischaracterizations of Supreme
Court decisions" and also provided no basis for what he claimed
56
was the majority's departure from Ninth Circuit precedent. It
can also be seen in the District of Columbia Circuit's statement,
in the course of disagreeing with two other circuits that "[we
think our sister circuits have paid insufficient attention to [the]
57
Supreme Court's decision."
PART IV. MENTION AND DISCUSSION IN PUBLISHED
OPINIONS
In this part of the article, we turn to a detailed examination
of the judges' mention and discussion of cases from other
circuits. While in Part V, we will look at their discussion during
the decision-making leading up to the release of their published
opinions, in this part, we look at what the judges say in those
opinions. Here, we turn first to noncontentious citation of cases
from other circuits, including the tendency to go along with what
those other courts have said and to avoid intercircuit conflict.
We then treat how judges deal with intercircuit conflict, either
claimed or acknowledged, followed by a look at responses by the
majority to dissenters' claims of intercircuit conflict.
A. Noncontentious Citation.
When courts of appeals consider case law from other
circuits, most references to those rulings are without dispute or
contention. General citation practice leads a court to cite not
only to its own earlier cases, but also to cases from other courts
on various points of law. One such use is to provide an example
of a general point. Another is as part of a string citation of cases
supporting positions being taken. This illustrates that many
courts have taken the same position, as in the claim that "[a]ll
the circuits which have spoken on this point have agreed
that.. ." As Hellman notes, "When a judge chooses to cite outof-circuit authority, the precedent generally will be one that
58
supports the position taken in the opinion."
56. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
57. United States ex rel. -Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., 173 F.3d 870, 882
(D.C.Cir. 1999).
58. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1067.
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U.S. courts of appeals may engage in mutual citation, and
one circuit may even cite to another circuit's ruling that has
For example, Judge
cites to the initial circuit's decision.
Goodwin quoted a Third Circuit case which indicated the side of
a circuit split the Ninth Circuit had adopted, 59 and in another
case, he noted a Tenth Circuit case which had "agreed with the
Ninth Circuit's analysis." 60 Another example shows that judges
do not always draw on other circuits' majority opinions but may
instead utilize dissenting judges' views. In acknowledging a
conflict with the Fourth Circuit while refusing to change Ninth
Circuit precedent, Judge Leavy, in Rambo v. Director, referred
to the dissent in the Fourth Circuit which had pointed out the
direct conflict of the Fourth Circuit majority with the Ninth
61
Circuit.
If the issue before the court of appeals is one of first
impression nationally, by definition there will be no rulings from
other circuits with which to agree or disagree. However, an
issue is likely to have arisen elsewhere even if it is one of first
impression in the circuit. This will likely lead the judges
considering the matter to mention what other circuits have
done, even if those rulings do not become a major part of the
court's analysis. Where "no precedent of the home circuit proves
helpful in resolving" the question before the court, Hellman
says, "we would expect at least one of the participants to cast a
wider net in the hope of finding persuasive authority more
62
closely on point."
Thus, in an important ruling on sanctions against lawyers
under Rule 11, Judge Schroeder alluded to other circuits'
rulings, observing that, because the issue was a new one,
th
59. McGuire v. City of Portland, 91 F.3d 1293, 1294 (9 Cir. 1996) (citing
Balgowan v. N. J. Dept. of Trans., 84 F.3d 656 (3rd Cir. 1996)), op. withdrawn on reh'g,
108 F.3d 1182.
60. United States v. Jackson, 167 F.3d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing U.S. v.
Bush, 70 F.3d 557 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 975 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd 511 U.S. 350 (1994). This discussion produces the possibility
of a sort of autoregression, with a court citing another court citing the first court, which
had earlier cited the other court, etc.. See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294
(9th Cir. 1993), noting that the Fifth Circuit, in its Lopez ruling, had "considered and
rejected our reasoning in [United States v.] Evans," 928 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1991),
indicates what can happen.
61. Rambo v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 28 F.3d 86, 87-88 (9th
Cir.1994) (noting Fleetwood v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 776 F.2d
1225 (4th Cir. 1985) (Warriner, J., dissenting)), rev'd Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v.
Rambo, 515 U.S. 291 (1995).
62. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1061.

2002

INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS

143

"relatively few decisions have as yet percolated up to the courts
of appeals." She then characterized those "decisions to date" as
"reflect[ing] the drafters' stated intent to curb delay and expense
caused by the filing of unsupported pleadings and motions" and
noted "a dominant theme in the comments made by the Rules'
proponents at the time of its adoption and by its implementers
63
in the court decisions since its adoption."
In another decision, on application of Supreme Court
rulings on the filing of petitions for attorney's fees in Social
Security disability cases, Judge Schoeder also made
noncontentious mention of what other courts of appeals had
said. The Ninth Circuit, she said, "decline[d] to be the first
[circuit] to reach... [the] inequitable result" of denying
attorney's fees for a failure to file for them within thirty days of
a final judgment. On her way to that conclusion, she spoke of
"the federal courts' then prevailing practice," which the Supreme
Court had seemed to approve; what "a majority of the federal
courts of appeals" had held; and what "federal courts had
uniformly held" prior to a recent Supreme Court decision which
64
the Ninth Circuit declined to apply retroactively.
Even when there is no dispute about the validity of a point
for which an out-of-circuit case is cited, and no claim that the
circuits differ on the issue, use of out-of-circuit citations without
corresponding ones from within the judge's own court affects the
decision to publish the disposition. The absence of within-circuit
citations in a draft disposition suggests that (a) there is no law
of the circuit on point; (b) the circuit is deciding the question, no
matter how simple, small, or trivial, for the first time; and (c) by
adopting the out-of-circuit position, even if de facto and without
fanfare, the opinion is creating new circuit law. The rule is that
decisions creating new circuit law should be published. In such
situations, either the writing judge will note to fellow panel
members that publication is required under circuit rules, or
another member of the panel is likely to raise the issue,
suggesting either that missing in-circuit precedent be found or
that the ruling be published.
An example is provided by a deportation case, in which
Judge Goodwin sent his concurrence to the disposition author
while saying, "but I think it should be published even though it
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. 801 F.2d 1531,1537-1538 (9th
63.
Cir. 1986), rehearingen banc denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987).
64. Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 378-381 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Shalala v.
Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).
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wasn't argued. The reason for publication includes: ... citation
of a 5th Circuit case, and ...a 1st Circuit case." 65 In another
case, 66 however, the author, in a memo to other members of the
panel, argued that reliance on Sentencing Guidelines "(with
reference to other circuit decisions)" was "sufficient to justify not
publishing," particularly as he had "always been reluctant to
publish screening decisions on first impression issues for the
circuit." However, he was willing to publish saying, "I feel that
we have clear guidance from other circuits," a statement which
also illustrates the phenomenon of "going along" with other
circuits.
B. Going Along and the Norm of Avoidance.
What happens when another U.S. court of appeals has
decided a procedural or substantive issue? Does it have any
effect on the next panel from any circuit facing that issue? At a
minimum, those judges must decide at least that the other
circuit's position is acceptable so that they can go along with it.
And, as is implicit in Judge Schroeder's comments (noted above),
judges of one court of appeals often do go along with others'
rulings on the issue. As Hellman observes, "Circuit judges today
generally respect the decisions of other circuits." 67 And another
observer has remarked that "circuit court judges are influenced
68
to some degree by the 'weight' of authority on a given matter."
This can occur even when only one other circuit is cited,69 or
perhaps two. Thus, in Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., concerning
whether an alien's filing of a motion to reopen and reconsider
tolled the time for appealing a deportation order, the Ninth
Circuit panel observed, "The Circuit has not dealt with this
issue. The Second and Fifth Circuits, however, have dealt
directly with this issue," and had adopted the same rule. The
panel then adopted that rule while quoting an earlier case to
65. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, to 9th Circuit Panel (July 13,
1993) (on file with author) (regarding Yao v. I.N.S., 2 F.3d 317 (9th Cir. 1993)).
66. United States v. Beck, 992 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
67. Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to
Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 So. CAL. L. REV. 377, 383-384 (2000). See id. at 384 n.2
for examples.
68. Lindquist, supra note 16, at 12. This is like the situation in which state courts
look to the "majority position" on contract or tort law issues as indicated in the
Restatements.
69. See e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 143 (3rd Cir. 1999)
(agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that a plaintiffs unmedicated state was the basis for
determining whether the person was disabled).
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say, "Absent a strong reason to do so, we will not create a direct
70
conflict with other circuits."
One reason for "going along" may be simple agreement with
the other circuits' position. However, it is also possible that the
issue on which the court has been offered competing positions
falls within the judges' zone of indifference, that is, where it does
matter to them one way or another what they do. Given other
courts' prior, and consistent, rulings, there is little or no reason
for them to stake out a different position. This is related to the
fact that adopting other circuits' prior case law is also a matter
of convenience. Although the judges do not put it this way,
adopting the contrary position would require additional work to
justify doing so. Moreover, when many courts which have
considered the issue are in agreement, perhaps because each
followed the lead of the court(s) which "got there first," a sort of
hydraulic pressure to adhere to the existing consensus
develops. 71 This makes it even simpler for the court now facing
the issue to find the other circuits' position to be acceptable and
thus to follow it. Thus we see statements like "[flollowing the
analysis of our sister circuits," 72 and "Most of our sister Circuits
that have considered this question have also reached the
73
conclusion we reach here today."
This following-along could be seen as well when the Second
Circuit turned aside a litigant-proposed position that four other
courts of appeals had "expressly rejected," particularly when
that interpretation also "has been implicitly foreclosed by two of
our previous decisions." 74 One can see the strength of the
hydraulic pressure in Judge Guido Calabresi's statement that,
because "my views have found no adherence among the other
circuits," and had as well "been forcefully rejected in my own
court," he was "bound both by comity and the respect that I feel

70. Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing United
States v. Chavez-vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987)).
71. "Stare decisis and the norm of consistency may amplify the general tenor of
early published opinions interpreting a remedial statute if judges seek interpretations
that are consistent with the published decisions of their colleagues." Catherine Albiston,
The Rule of Law and the LitigationProcess: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 869, 899 (1999).
72. Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (where other
circuits were following Supreme Court precedent).
73.
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 162 (2nd Cir. 1999) (en banc). See also
Johnson v. Oregon Department of Human Resources, 141 F.3d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir.
1998).
74. Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 867, 875 (9th Cir.1992).
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for my siblings to give great weight" to that fact, although, in
this instance it did not prevent him from declaring that those
judges had decided the issue incorrectly. 75 Indeed, this indicates
that, while speaking of comity, judges may be disinclined to
follow where comity leads unless a case is within their zone of
indifference. Nonetheless, the hydraulic pressure from other
circuits' consistent interpretations also provides strong
ammunition for a prospective dissenter, or an off-panel judge
seeking an en banc rehearing, who argues against the creation
of a conflict.
The likelihood is that one court will go along with its sister
76
courts even when there is doubt about how to resolve the case.
When four courts of appeals had interpreted a statute one way,
while none had adopted a contrary interpretation, the Ninth
Circuit adopted the majority position although "the question is
close, and the statute could reasonably be construed either way."
Judge Kleinfeld for the panel did find "textual support for the
construction reached by the other circuits," but he also said that
"we have been much influenced in the construction we adopt by
the desire to avoid intercircuit conflict" and "there is virtue in
77
uniformity of federal law as construed by the federal circuits."
This introduces us to the norm of avoidance of intercircuit
conflict. This is essentially a default position that, other things
being equal, not only should intercircuit conflicts not be created,
but, more strongly, judges should seek to avoid creating or
perpetuating such conflicts. Most judges appear to accept this
norm that intercircuit conflict is to be avoided. They do not
always value cross-circuit uniformity simply for its own sake, as
they are willing to hold to their own position because they
believe the other courts were wrong. There is, however, no
question but that some judges, believing there ought to be
national uniformity in the law, are serious about avoiding
intercircuit conflict as a matter of principle. They will assert
that their own circuit should not intentionally create an
intercircuit conflict and should be careful to distinguish other
circuits' cases with which their own circuit's rulings are

75. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 189 (2nd Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Calabresi,
J., concurring in result).
76. See King v. United States, 152 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Though proper
resolution of the case is not without doubt"). Id at 1202. See also Portland 76
Auto/Truck Plaza v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 153 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[hlow to
construe the statutory language is difficult"). Id at 942.
77. James v. Sunrise Hosp., 86 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1996).
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creating an intercircuit split. In dealing with the requirement
that securities fraud be pleaded with particularity, the Glenfed
Securities Litigation en banc court, disagreeing with the panel's
reliance on two Second Circuit cases, immediately concluded
that the Ninth Circuit should not adopt the Second Circuit's
view of the matter. 138 On an important constitutional question,
before the Supreme Court ruled to the contrary, the Ninth
Circuit panel "recognize[d] that our decision upholding the
constitutionality" of the Gun Free School Zones Act "will create
an intercircuit conflict" with the Fifth Circuit's Lopez ruling but
pointed to the Ninth Circuit's prior case law as compelling its
decision. Otherwise, said the panel, it would have to ask for an
en banc hearing to deal with the intracircuit conflict that would
be created by following the Fifth Circuit would create. As the
panel disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's analysis, the judges
applied the court's earlier precedent "without recommending an
en banc hearing."'139 (As we know, it was the Fifth Circuit's
40
position the Supreme Court upheld. )
At other times, acknowledgment of intercircuit conflictcreation is relegated to a footnote. For example, Judge Canby,
in dealing with a statute underlying a Social Security disability
regulation, used a note to observe for the court, "Our holding
brings us into conflict with the Sixth Circuit," which had found
the statute ambiguous. "With all respect to the majority of the
Sixth Circuit panel," he stated, "we simply find no ambiguity in
that statute's direction to the Commissioner."' 4 ' Likewise, a
panel in a Sentencing Guidelines case said in a footnote, "We
note that our reading of § 3A1.1 places us in conflict with several
other circuits." 142 This illustrates the point that because court of
appeals judges must deal with many cases, they have little
surplus time in which to engage in intensive analysis of relevant
cases if they do not feel it essential. Thus, "If a judge, after
studying the decisions of his own circuit and of the Supreme
Court, concludes that the outcome of a case should be x, the
judge may see no reason to closely analyze the decision of

138. In re Glenfed Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
139. United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
141. Newman v. Chater, 87 F.3d 358, 361 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996).
142. United States v. O'Brien, 50 F.3d 751, 755 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995). It is interesting
that the West note for this case made note of the intercircuit disagreement: "The Court
of Appeals, Tang, Senior Circuit Judge, disagreeing with the First Circuit, held that. .
Id. at 751.
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3
another circuit that appears to reach a contrary outcome." 14
Nonetheless, there is a normative expectation that
conscientious judges will explain why they depart from, or do
not join, other circuits. An example occurs in Zimmerman v.
Oregon Department of Justice.14 4 In ruling that Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act did not apply to employment,
Judge Graber explained at some length why, "mindful that most
courts have held that Title II applies to employment," the court
did not agree with other circuits' interpretation. Only when her
analysis of their rulings led to the conclusion that "we simply do
not find them persuasive" did she state, "We realize that our
decision creates an inter-circuit split of authority," adding that
"Although we are hesitant to create such a split, and we do so
only after the most painstaking inquiry, we must follow the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. "145
When the majority ruled in the 1993 Stanton Road
Associates case that the Superfund statute did not authorize
attorney's fees to private litigants as part of response costs in
cleaning up contaminated property, it spent considerable time
examining the Eighth Circuit's analysis, by which the judges
were "unpersuaded. " 14 6
The importance of providing
explanations can also be seen in a case on the timing of transfers
between individuals, where Judge Hall, having examined other
courts' rulings, commented in a footnote, "We believe that the
reasons we have cited in the text of our opinion are sufficiently
strong to justify our departure from the course plotted by our
47
sister Circuit."
One circuit may draw on other circuits' writings not so
much to support its own position as to reject the contrary
position.
This of course increases rather than reduces or
eliminates contention between the circuits. In a relatively small
number of cases in Hellman's sample, "The opinion
acknowledged out-of-circuit authority that was contrary to its

position and explicitly rejected

it."148

One occurred when the

143. Hellman, supranote 1, at 1086-1087.
144. 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999).
145. Id. at 1183-1184.
146. Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1993).
147. In re Roosevelt, 87 F.3d 311, 318 n. 14 (9th Cir. 1996). For an example from
another circuit, see United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207 (2nd Cir. 2000), in which Judge
Cabranes, presenting several reasons, analyzed why the Fourth Circuit's position was
being rejected. Id., at 214-215.
148. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1078.
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Judges' sensitivity to the position the Supreme Court takes
on matters from their court can be seen when they demonstrate
awareness that the Justices might overturn the Ninth Circuit's
position. For example, commenting on a case that was central to
resolution of the matter before the court, the Ninth Circuit
observed in a footnote, "The viability of our holding in [U.S. v.]
Phelps may be in question. The District of Columbia and
Eleventh Circuits have disagreed with our holding on identical
facts, and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to the
Eleventh Circuit to resolve the conflict. 1 24 In another instance,
Ninth circuit judges had been concerned that the Justices'
resolution might go in the other direction. The Supreme Court
had granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded in Brock v. Shirk.
The Ninth Circuit panel members, on remand, noted that in
their initial ruling, which had "followed the controlling
precedent of this circuit," they had "observed prophetically," in a
footnote, "that other circuits have questioned [its] definition of
willful, and that the Supreme Court will likely resolve the
existing conflict." Observed the judges on remand, "The Court
has indeed resolved the matter in McLaughlin v. Richard Shoe
Co. 1

25

There are also times when the lower courts' attention is
attracted by the Supreme Court's not having resolved conflicts.
One instance came when Ninth Circuit judges observed that
"the Supreme Court's failure to resolve the circuit split has been
the subject of much discussion and speculation in recent cases"
in several courts. 126 The Supreme Court's inaction concerning a
conflict means that the court of appeals are faced with the task
Pitrat v. Garlikov, 992 F.2d 224, 225 (9th Cir. 1993); see Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S.
753 (1992).
124. United States v. Garcia and Hambrick, 997 F.2d 1273, 1283 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993).
The Supreme Court did indeed adopt the Eleventh Circuit's position, Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)(trading gun for drugs is "use" of firearm in relation to drugtrafficking crime).
125. The initial panel ruling was Brock v. Shirk, 833 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1987); the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded, Shirk v. McLaughlin, 488 U.S. 806 (1988), in
light of McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988). The ruling on remand is
Brock v. Shirk, 860 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Tanner v. Sivley, 76 F.3d 302,
303 (9 th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court's decision.. . disposes of the issue in the case."),
where the Supreme Court granted cert. to resolve an intercircuit conflict on whether a
convicted defendant was entitled to credit against his sentence for pretrial time spent in
a community treatment center.
126. State of Washington v. East Columbia Basin Irrigation District, 105 F.3d 517,
519 (9th Cir. 1997). For another indication of the Supreme Court's not having resolved a
question implicating an intercircuit conflict, see Judge Fernandez's dissent in Windham
v. Merkle,16 F.3d 1092, 1108 and n.4 (9th Cir. 1998).
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of resolving the conflict, although they do not invariably carry it
out. Thus, in dealing with a question under revisions to the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, the Ninth Circuit observed
that "[tihe Supreme Court has not as yet resolved the intercircuit conflict" concerning whether Congress had violated the
prohibition on suspending habeas corpus- but then found that to
be "irrelevant to our consideration" because the Ninth Circuit's
127
earlier ruling was binding on the panel.
Even worse from the courts of appeals' perspective is that
the justices can create intercircuit conflict, as when a Supreme
Court ruling results in varying positions across the circuits. For
example, in a case in which the justices affirmed the Ninth
Circuit, the appeals court panel noted, "In the wake of Reliable
Transfer, the circuits have considered with sometimes
conflicting results the issue of whether superseding cause may
128
still be used to attribute fault in admiralty cases."
4. Choosing Sides in a Conflict.
In judges' eyes, there is a difference between creating an
intercircuit conflict and joining a pre-existing position in a
conflict that has already developed. The latter is considered less
serious, as one can see in seemingly routine mentions that a
conflict exists. However, this does put the court in a much more
difficult position than when several courts all are on one side of
an issue. This difference between finding and creating an
intercircuit conflict can be seen in responses to dissenting judges
who argue that an intercircuit conflict is being created. In
saying that the intercircuit conflict predated the panel's ruling,
the panel majority is saying that even if the ruling is part of
such a conflict, the panel did not create it; others did.
The Ninth Circuit was stepping into a pre-existing conflict
rather than creating one when, in holding that a district court
ruling on "inevitable discovery" was to be reviewed for clear
error, it stated, "Our holding is in accord with the Eleventh
Circuit ....
However, it puts us in conflict with the Sixth
Circuit."1 29 It also joined a pre-existing conflict in Chandler v.
127. Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 152 F.3d 1213, 1217 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998).
128. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, 54 F.3d 570, 573-574 (9th Cir. 1995), affid 517 U.S. 830
(1996). The panel affirmed the Ninth Circuit's previous position, finding it "not necessary
to resolve here whether the Eighth Circuit has proscribed the use of superceding
cause..." Id., at 574. The earlier Supreme Court case is United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
129. United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).
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conflict? Of particular interest
is the situation in which
intercircuit conflicts lead to disagreement among the appellate
judges facing them. In about fifty cases of the 260 in Hellman's
study, "the judges who disagreed as to the outcome of the
appeal before them also disagreed as to the import or authority
of the out-of-circuit precedent."8 4 In the typical case of this sort,
both majority and dissenter "treat the same out-of-circuit
decision as squarely on point," with one "embrac[ing] the other
circuit's precedent, while the other would reject it."85
1. Distinguishingof Cases.
How to deal with intercircuit conflict is often a matter of
contention. Judges are often able to avoid involvement in a
conflict by disputing parties' claims that a conflict exists, as
when they say that "[tihe cases cited ... from other circuits are
not in conflict."8 6 Closely related is the rejection of an argument
in part because of the party's failure to call attention to any
conflicting cases from other circuits;8 7 there it is the fact of the
presence (or absence) of intercircuit conflict which is important,
not its substance. Judges may also reject the position of a
colleague which, if adopted, might pose the existence of a
conflict.
When the dissenting judge on a panel opposes adoption of
the position of another court of appeals but does not persuade
his colleagues, intercircuit conflict has not been created, at least
for the time being.8 8 An example of this situation from the Ninth
Circuit is United States v. Petty.8 9 In that case, the majority
followed the seven courts of appeals to have considered the
application of the Confrontation Clause in Guidelines
sentencing, all of which had ruled against its application. In
dissent, Judge Noonan spoke of his colleagues' "admirable desire
for harmony with other circuits and understandable
unwillingness to challenge the conventional wisdom suggested

84. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1073.
85. Id. at 1075.
86. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996).
87. See United States v. Adler, 152 F.3d 929 (Table), 1998 WL 382702 (9th Cir.
1998).
88. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 1076, providing as an example, Stanton Road
Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1983). The conflict in that
case, which is discussed below, was ultimately resolved in Key Tronic Corp v. United
States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
89. 982 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1993).
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by their decisions" but thought that other principles override
such comity. 90
Just as lawyers regularly avoid the effect of cases by
distinguishing them, a strategy for judges is to distinguish the
cases which are alleged to create a conflict. Conceding a
conflict's pre-existence is a potential response by a panel
majority to a colleague's claim that the majority's position will
create one. However, it is a response that does little to avoid the
need to choose one side over another. That helps explain why,
when faced with a claim that an intercircuit conflict exists or is
about to be created, one response is to deny that the claimed
conflict exists, primarily because the allegedly conflicting cases
can be distinguished. When litigants or a colleague claim that
adoption of a certain position would create an intercircuit
conflict, 9 1 the panel majority may respond by distinguishing the
proffered cases. An example is a dissenting judge's rejection of a
case from another circuit, in which the judge characterized the
case as having rejected the Ninth Circuit panel majority's
position. In response the majority said "we don't see how" the
other case could be so viewed because plaintiffs in the other
circuit were in a different posture with respect to administrative
92
agency action from those in the present case.
At times, there is not a direct disagreement or conflict over
the basic holding or rule of law, but there is disagreement with
another circuit's approach or its reasoning, as when the Fifth
Circuit said that an analogy drawn by the Second Circuit, "while
conceptually clear, is flawed." 93 The D.C. Circuit provided
another example. Applying a Supreme Court ruling, the court
"agree[d] with the Second Circuit's conclusion but not with all of
its reasoning."94 However, at other times, distinguishing another
circuit's work can be equivalent, or at least close, to rejecting it.
This occurred when an Eleventh Circuit panel set aside cases

90. Id. at 1370 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
91. As to a litigant's claim of conflict, see Chandler v. United States Army, 125
F.3d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997) (although in this case the court found itself "unable to
avoid an intercircuit conflict" on another element of the case.) Id. at 1302.
92. American Ass'n of Cosmetology Schs v. Riley, 170 F.3d 1250, 1254 n. 4 (9th Cir.
1999). See also Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 175 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999)
(particularly Judge Pregerson's response for the majority, at 701 n.4, to Judge Kleinfeld's
separate concurrence, at 703).
93. United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 291 n.18 (5th
Cir. 1999).
94. Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (applying County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)).
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arguably in conflict. Thus disagreement over application of cases
from other circuits, whether on the basis that some can be
distinguished, may occur without the judges engaging in a
debate over an intercircuit conflict.7 8 Instead of being dismissive
of what other circuits have done even while disagreeing with
them, the judges instead devote serious, extended attention to
the competing positions in other courts' opinions.
The norm gives a claim of intercircuit conflict considerable
weight. It prompts those said by their colleagues to have
created such conflicts to treat those claims seriously and to give
them due attention. Thus, a judge may make a claim of
intercircuit conflict to prod colleagues into a response about a
case because the claim places on them the burden of defending
their position.
The strength of the norm may be seen in the oft-stated
position that intercircuit conflict should be created only in
extreme circumstances. That leaves the question, "What is
'extreme'? However, the view is prevalent that "[w]e do not
lightly create a conflict with other circuits" 79 and "we avoid
unnecessary conflicts with other circuits"8 0 -although the latter
likewise begs the question of what is "unnecessary." The norm
is also particularly evident when a judge goes out of his or her
way to note that a conflict is not being created - that one should
not read the court's opinion as if it did conflict with another
8
circuit's position. '
C. Responses to Claimed and Actual Conflict.
We begin by noting that there is some noncontentious
78. See e.g., United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998), in which both
Judge Fletcher, for the majority, and Judge Fernandez, in dissent, discuss cases from the
Fourth and Tenth Circuits. Judge Fletcher agrees with those courts' approach. See id. at
1085. Judge Fernandez finds that the Fourth Circuit's analysis does not conflict with
other circuits' cases. See id. at 1089.
79. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995).
80. Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The
panel in this case noted, "As Judge Rymer reminds us, we are to avoid creating
intercircuit conflict when possible." (quoting Gilbreath, 931 F.2d 1320, 1328 n. 1 (9th Cir.
1991) (Rymer, J., concurring)). See also United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1388
n. 4 (9th Cir. 1986) (in responding to a judge's dissent, the majority wrote, "Unnecessary
conflicts among the circuits are to be avoided.") A case a year later than Gwaltney often
cited for the same proposition is United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir.
1987). Both Gwaltney and Larm are cited in United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d
1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987).
81. See Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 592 (9th Cir.
1992) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
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mention of intercircuit conflict and then turn to judges' attempts
to deal with claims of conflicts. If the fact of an intercircuit
conflict may be case-determinative, or at least relevant to case
outcome, the intercircuit conflict may simply be mentioned in
passing, when judges state the relevant case law as background.
Where previous conflicts have been resolved by the Supreme
Court or by others, 'conflict as fact' will be mentioned, as when
the Sentencing Commission has resolved disputes over
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, or when Congress
has stepped in to resolve an intercircuit dispute. Failure to
resolve an intercircuit dispute -particularly when the Supreme
Court has not done so- will also be mentioned as a fact.
Although court of appeals judges may wish that the Supreme
Court had resolved intercircuit disputes, mention of such failure
is not usually contentious.
There are also instances where a difference between circuits
in interpretation of the law is not a matter to be resolved but
instead is taken as constituting a legal fact relevant to the
disposition of the present case. For example, in seeking to
determine if a defendant official should be granted qualified
immunity from suit, intercircuit conflict has been taken as
evidence of the lack of clarity in the law which provides a basis
for such immunity; for immunity to be denied, the law must be
so clear that an official could know his acts violated someone's
rights. If the U.S. courts of appeals cannot agree on the law,
how can one expect it to be sufficiently clear for an official to
know it?82 Conversely, the fact of the absence of an intercircuit
conflict may be relevant. For example, a Ninth Circuit panel
used that fact, among others, in denying an injunction sought by
those who would have set aside California's Proposition 209.83
Often, however, there is a definite disagreement among the
judges as to whether there is a conflict, or there is a clear
intercircuit conflict, with which the judges must contend. What
do court of appeals judges do in that situation? What do they do
upon finding themselves faced with a conflict, or a claim of a
82. See Schroeder v. Kaplan, 60 F.3d 834 (Table), 1995 WL 398878 n.2 (9th Cir.
1995) (dissenting judge, citing conflicts between Seventh Circuit and another circuit:
"there was sufficient conflict among the circuits regarding the right to be free from
exposure to ETS during this time to prevent a reasonable government official from
understanding that there was a clearly established right"). See also McClure v. City of
Long Beach, 104 F.3d 365 (Table), 1996 WL 740816 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Lume v.
Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1989) (presence of intercircuit conflict taken as evidence
that a right has not been fully established).
83. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1997).
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from three other circuits permitting transfer of successive
habeas petitions to the court of appeals because those courts
"did not analyze §1631 or explain why it was appropriate
95
authority for the transfer."
In a Ninth Circuit instance, a panel majority, which noted
that the Ninth Circuit had "not yet decided this issue," first said
that "our sister circuits have reached conflicting results" and
then found all cases "denying Constitutional status to allocation"
to be "factually distinguishable"; the panel also added that the
reasoning of those cases was "unpersuasive" and their rule had
not been adopted. 96 Likewise, when agreeing with the Seventh
Circuit to hold that application of an amendment to the
supervised release statute to defendants violated the Ex Post
Facto clause, the Ninth Circuit distinguished a Third Circuit
ruling that "appears to conflict with the Seventh Circuit's
decision." The court went on to state that the Third Circuit
ruling differed in not addressing a key matter, and "[flor that
reason, we elect, with all due respect, to follow the Seventh
Circuit rather than the Third Circuit on this issue."97
2. Acknowledging the Conflict.
Although joining conflict is often unavoidable, at times
judges only acknowledge a conflict by mentioning it and moving
on without further discussion to decide the case. While, as we
have noted, judges may assert the nonexistence of a conflict,
many times they do acknowledge its existence. In a study of the
Supreme Court's 1989-1991 Terms, Lindquist found that in
almost three-fourths of the cases she examined, "the majority
opinion recognized the conflict in one form or another."9 8 As
Hellman observes, "Acknowledgment of conflict can take a
variety of forms": through explicit rejection of another court's
precedent, declining to follow it, by "respectfully disagreeing", by
"reading the law differently", or, ultimately, by choosing one side
over another."99 Although acknowledgment without action can
occur even when the court's own ruling is part of the intercircuit
conflict, it appears to be more likely when only out-of circuit
cases conflict with each other.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1330 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999).
Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1528-1529 (9th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Collins, 118 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997).
Lindquist, supra note 16, at 14.
Hellman, supra note 20, at 29.
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In examples of judges acknowledging an intercircuit conflict
without doing more, one panel noted simply, "There is a conflict
of authority in other circuits whether Younger abstention may
be applied to §1983 claims for monetary damages." 10 0 In a case
on a sentencing enhancement for a defendant's leadership role
in a crime, the judges only stated, "There is a conflict among the
circuits" on that issue. 10 1 And the judges dealing with whether
Indian tribes could sue states or whether such suits were barred
by Eleventh Amendment stated, "There is an existing circuit
conflict on this issue."1 0 2 In this instance, one of the cases cited
was the Eleventh Circuit's Seminole Tribe ruling, which the
Supreme Court accepted and affirmed. 10 3 Likewise, in dealing
with the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Protection
Act (CPPA), the Fourth Circuit mentioned initially, "The federal
courts of appeals that have considered this issue are split on its
proper resolution." It then identified the circuits taking the
respective sides. Having again stated this division and noting
that they were "[mlindful of the conflicting views that have
emerged,"'0 4 the judges then moved on to their own discussion of
the matter.
In still another case, the Ninth Circuit pointed to a circuit
split by saying, "As the Third Circuit has noted." Then it moved
on to further discussion of Ninth Circuit law. What makes this
case interesting is that one of the judges, concurring separately,
first said concerning Eighth and Eleventh Circuit decisions that
"Our circuit law clearly conflicts with these rulings," and then
offered an explanation for the "conflict in circuits." He thought
it "likely due to the fact that the Department of Labor
05
regulations are not easily applied to public employees."
When acknowledging the existence of a conflict, judges may
explicitly state that they are not resolving it. Thus, after noting
that "[tihe circuits are divided about whether bankruptcy courts
are 'courts of the United States' so that they could award
attorney's fees under certain statutes, Ninth Circuit Judge
Cynthia Hall sidestepped the issue by writing for the court, "We
express no opinion on the issue" - because it was not the
100. Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 781 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997).
101. United States v. Neal, 33 F.3d 60 (9th Cir. 1994) (Table).
102. Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1994).
103. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
104. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 917 (4th Cir. 2000).
105. McGuire v. City of Portland, 91 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996).
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drawing on out-of-circuit cases to support a different outcome or
to assert that the majority is creating an intercircuit conflict are
quite likely to have been known to the other panel members
through a memorandum from the judge raising the matter, as
we will see in Part V. The panel members will also usually have
exchanged views about the matter, and the majority judges and
their clerks will have reviewed the proposed dissent and perhaps
modified their opinion in response to it.
1. Absence of Response.
Dialogue over putative intercircuit conflicts does not always
occur. Indeed, we must first ask whether the majority responds
to the dissenter at all. Given the importance of intercircuit
conflict, we might expect a dissenter's claim to be taken
seriously and thus to receive a public response. Yet often there is
no response from the panel majority, leaving numerous cases in
which an intercircuit conflict is discussed only by the dissenter
who claimed it.
This occurred, for example, when Judge
Kozinski, saying that the majority's view conflicted with an
earlier Ninth Circuit ruling "as well as the opinions of two other
circuits," dissented to a holding that a subcontractor had a due
process interest in moneys withheld for failure to comply with
prevailing wage rates. 159 The majority, although refering to
cases from other circuits to support its position on attorney fees,
did not discuss the possible circuit conflict which Judge Kozinski
said existed over the principal issue.
Of course, the majority's mention of cases to which the
dissenter refers does not necessarily equal a response. This can
be seen in a Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA)
case involving whether a putative officer was "responsibly
connected" to a company. The majority, speaking through Judge
Schroeder, relied on District of Columbia Circuit case law but
did not speak to whether, as Judge Kozinski claimed, it was
thereby "creating a circuit conflict" because, as he claimed,
60
"those cases do not support the majority's conclusion."1
In another case, involving the method of calculating weekly
wages for an injured seaman, Judge Reed (of the District of
159. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 136 F.3d 587, 602 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), amended, 156 F.3d 893, 907 (9th Cir. 1998). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded, 526 U.S. 1061 (1999), in light of
American Mfr's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
160. Maldonado v. Dep't. of Agric., 154 F.3d 1086, 1089 and n.1 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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Nevada, sitting by designation) pointed to a Seventh Circuit
case and said the Ninth Circuit majority, by presumptively
applying a statute, "has consciously created an inter-Circuit
conflict." 16' The majority opinion, however, contains no mention
of the Seventh Circuit case, much less of the purported conflict.
Likewise, in a case about the application of the expedited review
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), when the panel majority held a prisoners' suit within
the Ex parte Young exception to states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, 16 2 the panel made no response to Judge Beezer's
comment in dissent that he "would avoid the intercircuit conflict
of decision in a matter of national concern that is created by the
rejection of the [Fourth Circuit's] holding in our court's
63
opinion."1
There was also no response when Judge Norris, who found
the case of a Ninth Circuit plaintiff "on all fours with" a Fifth
Circuit's en banc ruling, claimed "the majority has created as
intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit" over Airline
Deregulation Act preemption of state law claims.1 64 (Later, the
165
court, en banc, overruled the position the panel had taken. )
Nor was there one in a case where the majority ruled that a
retroactive amendment to a tax statute would violate due
process; when he claimed, in a dissent, "The majority, in
reaching a different conclusion [from other courts], creates a
split among the circuits, as well as a conflict with our own, older
66
precedent."
Why doesn't a majority respond? The press of business from
other cases is one important consideration. The judges may
already have considered the dissenter's claims, and, having
perhaps made accommodations to the dissenter and reworked its
opinion several times, decide to stand by it, they see no reason to
161. Matulic v. Director, Office of Workers Compen. Programs, 154 F.3d 1052, 1061
(9th Cir. 1998) (Reed, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
162. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
163. Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997) (Beezer, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
164. Harris v. Am. Airlines, 55 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J.,
dissenting).
165. Charas v. Trans World Airlines, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
166. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 1992) (Norris, J.,
dissenting); see also United States v. Spencer, 981 F.2d 1083, 1092 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), where Judge Reinhardt suggested that his colleagues had
engaged in an "unnecessary and perhaps unwitting creation of an inter-circuit conflict"
in holding there was no error in excluding an arrest report with information helpful to
the defendant."
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the majority, but his claims were not discussed.173
After the fact, an implicit dialogue of sorts may be said to
have occurred if the majority, even though not providing a direct
response, discusses the elements of the conflict about which the
dissenter complains. For example, both sides spoke about same
cases in the Proa-Tovar case. 174 The majority held that a
deportation order could, be challenged collaterally, and ruled
that an appointed counsel's decision to forego an appeal was not
a knowing waiver by the alien, who did not have to show
prejudice. Acknowledging that three circuits had interpreted the
Supreme Court's Mendoza-Lopez ruling 175 "to require a showing
of prejudice in [a] collateral challenge," the majority stated that
it was "a better reading of Mendoza-Lopez to read it as a brightline rule and to the INS to make certain that every person
deported as the result of an administrative hearing was
adequately apprized, on the record, of his right to appeal." 176 In
dissent,
Judge
Farris,
after
noting
the
majority's
acknowledgment of other circuits' position, argued, "We should
not create a conflict among the circuits to salvage the dicta" in a
Ninth Circuit case." 77
A case several years later, on whether an administrator's
failure to adjust an equity limit for inflation was unreasonable,
provides another example. Judge Pregerson for the majority
cited, and also discussed, cases from several circuits. He agreed
that the dollar figure "was valid when first established" but
disagreed with its continuing validity in the face of inflation. His
further discussion dealt with those cases extensively. Dissenting
173. Another en banc case in which dissenters received no response also illustrates
how intercircuit variation in legal interpretation can affect financial transactions which
reach across circuit boundaries, yet one circuit is faced with having to rule on some
aspect of those transactions. The case is In re Robert L. Helms Construction and
Development Co., 139 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). A bankruptcy court had applied
the law of its own circuit, but a contested transaction involved in the bankruptcy had
taken place in another circuit which had different law. Judges Thomas and Hawkins
complained that the Ninth Circuit, "[bly imposing our view of how option contracts
should be treated... on a Fifth Circuit bankruptcy, . . unnecessarily intrudes upon the
law of another circuit," and had created an intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit but
also "resolved the conflict by declaring Fifth Circuit authority inapplicable to a Texas
bankruptcy," counter to the demands of '[clomity and simple respect for our colleagues
in another circuit." Id. at 707-708 (Thomas, J., concurring part, dissenting in part).
Despite the strength with which this claim was made, the majority did not mention the
case the dissenters had pressed.
174. See United States v. Proa-Tovar, 945 F.2d 1450, 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
175. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
176. 945 F.2d at 1453.
177. Id. at 1455 (Farris, J., dissenting).
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Judge Kozinski, in claiming that the majority "raises a direct
conflict with every other circuit that has considered the issue,"
178
discussed the same cases.
The same sort of implicit dialogue between the panel and
off-panel judges took place in a case involving the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The panel disagreed with the
Second Circuit's use of legislative history but agreed with its
result, and thus did not see an intercircuit conflict. 179 On the
other hand, four judges who dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc thought the panel had decided the issue at
hand "incorrectly, in a manner that conflicts with the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the same statutory language." The
Second Circuit, these judges said, had "arriv[ed] at a conclusion
precisely opposite" to that reached by the Ninth Circuit panel;
they did acknowledge that the Second Circuit's "approach is
supported by the Eighth Circuit" but thought the Second Circuit
had "much the better overview of IRGA." i8 0
2. Types of Response.
Despite these instances of non-response or of only implicit
dialogue without explicit discussion, there are many instances
where the majority does address the matter openly. Here we
look at the types of responses the majority does make.
Although the dissenter usually says more about intercircuit
conflicts than does the majority, there are instances in which
there is extensive majority treatment of the cases which the
dissenter only briefly claims cause an intercircuit conflict. For
example, in Craft v. Campbell Soup, on whether the Federal
Arbitration Act applies to labor or employment contracts, the
majority noted early in its per curiam opinion, "Courts have
developed two interpretations of these [statutory] provisions."
The judges then discussed the positions of the "majority of
178. Gamboa v. Rubin, 80 F.3d 1338, 1351-1352 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 1343-1344, 1347 (Pregerson, J.). Judge Kozinski went beyond
claiming an intercircuit conflict when he said with respect to the other circuits' cases
that the majority "actually overrules them by precluding the agency from applying the
regulation even where the regional circuit has upheld it." Id. at 1351. Although the
court did take this case en banc, it did not reach the merits, dismissing it for lack of a
final judgment-a ruling in which Judge Kozinski joined. Gamboa v. Chandler, 101 F.3d
90 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
179. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1259 n. 5
(9th Cir. 1994)
180. Id. at 1252-1253 and 1253 n.1 (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
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more narrowly.'

92

These are numerous cases in which a majority distinguishes
cases mentioned in the dissent. One instance related to Judge
Ferguson's claim that "the court today unnecessarily creates a
conflict with the only other circuit to have considered" the issue
of whether a district court should accept a foreign expert's
declaration as to the proper application of foreign law. 1 93 For
the majority, Judge Brunetti directly stated the dissent's
contention and then said, "To the contrary, that case is easily
distinguished;" he followed that assertion with a paragraph
drawing such a distinction. 194 Several years before, when Judge
Ferguson had likewise dissented on the basis that the majority
in an ERISA case had created a conflict with three circuits, the
majority both explained why a party's reliance on one of the
cases he cited was "misplaced" and then pointed to "significant
differences" between an Eighth Circuit case he cited and the
195
present case.
Another example is a case which implicated Supreme Court
law as well as rulings of another circuit. It concerned to whom a
ship's seller owed a duty of protection from a dangerous
defective condition, and for what items compensation could be
recovered. Judge Noonan claimed the panel "abandon[ed]" the
leading Supreme Court case "and puts this circuit in conflict
with another major maritime circuit."1 96 The majority, however,
while noting that "[Tihe Fifth Circuit has developed some
principles in this area," concluded, "We are faced here with a
slightly different situation" from the one addressed by the Fifth
Circuit. Moreover, it said a later Fifth Circuit decision
mentioned by Judge Noonan was "not in conflict with [the]
97
principle" the panel had adopted.
The next year, when the majority held unconstitutionally
vague the "decency and respect" standard Congress had required
the National Endowment for the Arts to apply, Judge Kleinfeld
192. Executive Software N. Am. v. U.S. District Court, Central District of
California, 24 F.3d 1545, 1564 (9th Cir. 1994)(Leavy, J., dissenting); id. at 1550.
193. Universe Sales Co. v. Silver Castle, 182 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1038-39.
195. Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust v. Buster, 24 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th
Cir. 1994). For Judge Ferguson's dissent, see id. at 1121.
196. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1447 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Noonan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
197. Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1444. The case was reversed, Saratoga
Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
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asserted, "Our decision today creates a conflict with the only
other circuits to have confronted a similar issue." 198 The
majority did not address other circuits' cases but talked about
Supreme Court doctrine, it also addressed the dissent briefly by
asserting that the two cases on which it relied "are
distinguishable" and were decided before a recent Supreme
Court ruling, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia,199 which had changed the legal landscape. 20 0 Judge
Kleinfeld in turn dealt with that brief effort by saying, "The
majority tries to distinguish" two circuits' cases because of their
timing in relation to the Supreme Court's decision, an attempt
20 1
he obviously found unsatisfactory.
Despite these numerous instances of the majority
distinguishing the dissenter's proffered cases, as one might
expect, there are instances when majority and dissenters do
"engage" over the latter's claim of an intercircuit conflict. Blazak
v. Ricketts provides an example. 20 2 There the per curiam
majority of Judges Tang and Brunetti held that an order
granting habeas corpus was a final order and thus appealable
even though the habeas court had not addressed punishment
issues. Dissenting, Judge Beezer pointed to a recent Eleventh
Circuit case to contrary, which he said "effectively reversed a
conflict with the Eighth Circuit referred to by Justice White, so
that both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits held a position
contrary to that of the Ninth Circuit. 20 3 The majority responded,
first stating Judge Beezer's position,"The dissent insists that the
recent case of Clisby v. Jones. . . 'clearly undermined' the
[Eleventh Circuit] decision in Blake (and, by virtue of its citation
to Blake, the [Fifth Circuit] decision in Young)" on which the
majority had relied. Saying, with respect to the dissenter's
198. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 685 (1996)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). When several judges (including Judge Kleinfeld) later
dissented from the court's denial to rehear the case en banc, their language was even
stronger: "The majority's opinion does far more than give a hostile construction to a
Congressional enactment in order to create a conflict with other circuits and Supreme
Court precedent, and overturn a law." Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 112
F.3d 1015, 1016 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1997)(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc). The Supreme Court did reverse. See, National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
199. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
200. Finley, 100 F.3d, at 682 n. 21.
201. Id. at 686 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
202. 971 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1992).
203. Id. at 1417. See also Kemp v. Blake, 474 U.S. 998 (1985)(White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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171

circuits" and of the "few courts" which had adopted the opposite
position,181 and closely examined the analysis in the conflicting
cases. Dissenting Judge Brunetti, on the other hand, observed
only that "[Tloday, the majority goes against the great weight of
circuit authority" and attached a footnote, "As the majority
concedes, almost every circuit to have considered this question
directly has held that the employment exclusion clause of §1
18 2
should be interpreted narrowly."
At times, the majority discusses the cases cited by the
dissenter but does not discuss the claimed intercircuit conflict
per se. An example, involving a claim that existing conflict had
83
been made worse rather than created, is the Butros en banc.'
This case involved the point at which an alien's status is "finally
determined" with respect to eligibility for discretionary relief
from deportation. Writing one of two dissents, Judge Trott
(joined by Judge Brunetti) spoke of the majority's position as one
that "aggravate[s] what is already a sorry state of inter-circuit
conflicts." He then noted the circuits in which "the current rule
is that lawful status is terminated in connection with a petition
for §212(c) relief when a deportation order becomes
administrative final," and those in which, by contrast, "the cutoff
date of the accrual of the time needed for §212(c) eligibility is
neither the date the deportation order becomes administratively
final, nor the date the Board may not longer reconsider or
reopen the case, but the date 'upon which the INS commences
the deportation proceedings';" in the states of the Second Circuit,
he added, "it is unclear what the rule on eligibility is."184 The
majority said "we have no quarrel with" the relevant Board of
Immigration Appeals ruling "as it was affirmed and interpreted"
by the Second Circuit, nor with the Ninth Circuit's earlier
85
position, but did not discuss circuit conflict per se.
When the majority does respond to a dissenter's intercircuit
conflict claim, it does not necessarily do so extensively. Thus,
although the majority explicitly notes the conflict claim, its
response concerning may be minimal. One such instance was
the Meinhold case, in which the majority affirmed a district

181. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085-86 and n. 6 (9th Cir. 1998);
see also id., at 1091-1093.
182. Id. at 1094, n. 1 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
183. Butros v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1993)(en banc).
184. Id. at 1151 (Trott, J., dissenting).
185. Id., 1145-46.
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court ruling that the government's legal position on discharging
homosexuals from the military was not substantially justified. 8 6
Judge Kozinski, dissenting, thought that the majority's
disposition "causes a conflict with four other circuits that have
held the government may discharge members of the armed
forces for saying they are homosexuals" and claimed that his
colleagues did "not acknowledge these conflicts."18 7 The majority
did not run up the "Conflict!" flag. However, counter to Judge
Kozinski, it did acknowledge the conflict without the use of the
term when it discussed two of the cases Judge Kozinski cited; it
treated one in a long sentence and noted that another did
1 88
support the government's position.
Another instance of limited response came in a case
applying the Higher Education Act's anti-injunction provision.
Judge Reinhardt, dissenting, asserted that "the only other
circuit to have considered the precise question presented by the
instant litigation concluded that §1082(a)(2) does not bar
declaratory relief,"and also said that in "analogous contexts," the
First Circuit had read an identical provision in another statute
not to bar injunctive relief.1 8 9 The majority's response was
limited to a footnote on the First Circuit case, saying "we don't
see how," given the posture of that case, Judge Reinhardt could
so characterize it.190
This case also illustrates that, just as a panel may deal with
other circuits' cases cited by the parties by distinguishing them,
so a panel majority may respond to a dissenter by distinguishing
the cases supposedly creating a conflict. At times the majority's
distinguishing of a case is not direct and might better be called
finessing the case to which the dissenter has called attention.
Thus, when Judge Leavy, dissenting, claimed that the majority's
ruling that a district court had committed clear error in not
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law
claims without giving written reasons "puts us in conflict with
other circuits," the majority did not explicitly distinguish, but
it' 9' did address those decisions, saying "other circuits construe
the collateral order doctrine in this context more broadly ...and
186.
Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 123 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1997).
187. Id. at 1281 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1279.
189. Am. Ass'n of Cosmetology Sch. v. Riley, 170 F.3d 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1254.
191. Id. at 1254, n. 4.
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claim, "This is not true," the majority proceeded to explain the
20 4
Eleventh Circuit's position.
PART V. DISCUSSION DURING DECISION-MAKING
judges' treatment of intercircuit
We have discussed
conflicts in their published opinions. We also need to examine
whether and how the judges have dealt with claims of
intercircuit conflicts prior to these written manifestations of
their views, and it is to that we now turn. In some ways, judges'
treatment of out-of-circuit cases and claims about them is not
much different prior to the release of an opinion and after its
release than in the opinion itself, but because we know so little
about the internal processes of courts of appeals, it is important
to give this our attention. Within-panel discussion cannot be
matched with published outcomes for the many cases for which
the former is not available, but we do have both within-panel
exchange and the resulting opinion for some cases.
A. Within the Panel:Before Disposition.
Often, before judges release their opinions, their discussion
of other circuits' rulings and of possible and actual intercircuit
conflicts is simply a noncontentious mention of what other
courts have done. During this time, one judge might suggest to
another that use of an out-of-circuit case be revised. For
example, Judge Goodwin, concurring generally in the author's
draft opinion, said he "would prefer... to modify our discussion"
of an Eighth Circuit case on which the district court had relied,
and the ultimate opinion mentioned the case only to distinguish
it. 20 5 A somewhat atypical reason for mentioning a case, which
illustrates an effect of court of appeals judges sitting in different
circuits, came when a judge, scheduled to sit elsewhere the
following month on a case involving the same bankruptcy issue
as the one before him in the Ninth Circuit, suggested that the
panel's draft opinion "fails to discuss the reasons set forth" in
the latter circuit's case.20 6 The resulting opinion discussed both
204. 971 F.2d, at 1411.
205. Erdman v. Cochise County, Ariz., 926 F.2d 877, 881 and n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991).
Memoradum from Judge Alfred Goodwin to 9th Circuit panel (Jan. 22 1991)(regarding
the Erdman case)(on file with author); see also also Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d
397 (8th Cir. 1988).
206. The reader is reminded that unattributed quotations are taken from internal
court communications.
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that case and a Third Circuit case. 20 7
In a 1992 case concerning Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) efforts to remove a case to federal court, 208 a
judge wrote before argument to the other panel members about
"a very recent Fifth Circuit case" concerning FDIC removal
while a case was on state appeal. 20 9 He did so to convey the view
that "the dissenters in that case may have the better of the
argument" so counsel should address that case during oral
argument. After a conference discussion in which another
member of the panel seemed to agree with the Fifth Circuit
majority, the court decided that, given the posture of the case as
it came to the court, the appeal should be dismissed. The opinion
cited the Fifth Circuit case as well as one from the Eleventh
Circuit 210 and noted that "[i]ssues of district court jurisdiction
have recently been considered by other circuits," but that in the
present case, "we cannot address such questions at this time
because there is no appeal before us from an appealable
211
judgment or order."
At times judges talk of other circuits' rulings to suggest or
urge their use. In a case on the tax consequences of liquidated
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 212 one judge wrote to his colleagues, "I think we should
join the Second and Eleventh Circuits" in holding such damages
punitive in nature, while another panel member noted, "I am in
substantial agreement with the Federal Circuit's opinion" that
the government had submitted. All three of the cases were
among the many the court cited in its opinion. 213 In another
case, where the Consumer Products Safety Commission was said
to have improperly made paint a banned hazardous substance,
the presiding judge's post-conference memo called a Fourth
Circuit ruling "the leading case." The opinion called it "the only
circuit decision dealing with similar issues of enforcement under
207. In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993). See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co.,
944 F.2d 164, 168 (3rd Cir. 1991); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad
Co., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
208. F.D.I.C. v. Letterman Brothers, 980 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1992).
209. Matter of Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1992)(en banc).
210. In re Savers Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 872 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1989).
211. 980 F.2d, at 1300.
212. Schmitz and Schmitz v. C.I.R., 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
213. See Riechman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta, P.C., 818 F.2d 278 (2nd Cir.
1987) (cited at 34 F.3d 795 n. 7); Lindsay v. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir.
1987) (cited at 34 F.3d at 795 n. 7); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed Cir. 1994)
(cited at 34 F.3d at 794).

2002

INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS

especially the asserted conflicts with other circuits"; he sent his
colleagues a lengthy memo, saying he found other circuits' cases
"to be distinguishable on their facts," with one "actually
223
support[ing] Judge Hug's proposed opinion."
Disagreement with other members of the court was also
obvious in a case in which two panels dealing with the same
issue were communicating about their differing positions. Judge
Goodwin, writing to other members of the panel on which he sat,
found "not persuasive" the citation by the other panel's author of
a Fourth Circuit case. He further observed that the Fourth
Circuit had "expressed discomfort with its holding and reached
its result only because it had to follow prior Fourth Circuit
precedent." At the same time, he said, "We believe Second
Circuit precedent is in accord with our decision," and that
224
Second Circuit ruling became the basis for the panel's opinion.
The absence of further mention of the Fourth Circuit case
illustrates that a case may be discussed within a panel but
never appear in the opinion. Likewise, after Judge Goodwin
mentioned to his colleagues that an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling
had "explicitly adopted the Seventh Circuit standard" of a
particular case, that out-of-circuit basis for the Ninth Circuit's
225
position is not again mentioned.
B. After the Opinion is Filed.
What happens after a panel files its disposition? While for
many cases, this is the last of the matter, in a significant
number of instances, there is further activity. Not only may the
parties seek rehearing or suggest rehearing en banc, but the
court's other judges may raise questions about the panel's
opinion without necessarily waiting for the parties to act. In this
post-opinion period, the matter of intercircuit conflicts is quite
223. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Mar. 9,
1994) (on file with author) and memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th
Circuit Panel (Mar. 25, 1999) (on file with author) (regarding Thomas, Head & Griesen
Employees Trust v. Buster, 24 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1994)).
224. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Aug. 24,
1993) (on file with author) (regarding United States v. Schram, 9 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.
1993); see also, Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1990).
225. Likewise, in discussion leading to Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993),
after Judge Goodwin mentioned to his colleagues that an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling
had "explicitly adopted a Seventh Circuit standard" of a particular case, that out-ofcircuit basis for the Ninth Circuit's position is not again mentioned. Memorandum from
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Nov. 18, 1992) (on file with author)
(regarding Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993).
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likely to be raised, either as part of the request that the panel
reconsider its opinion or in the call for an en banc rehearing.
That may take place even when the judge making the call does
not subsequently dissent from denial of such rehearing.
We first look extensively at several individual cases to see
how, with the panel opinion as the starting point, judges use
cases from other circuits and the possibility of intercircuit
conflict in their exchanges as to whether to rehear a case en
banc. Then we discuss the judges' modes of reacting when faced
with an intercircuit conflict; we end this section with some
observations on judges' use of other circuits' work.
1. Some Individual Cases.
The first case which we examine extensively involved an
appeal by Canadian citizens from a district court ruling
upholding a summons issued by the IRS at the request of
Revenue Canada under the tax treaty, for records held by their
U.S. bank. The majority of the divided panel, concluding that "it
was clear error to find the affidavits [supporting the summons]
made a prima facie showing of legitimate purpose," reversed and
remanded. 226 Early in his opinion, Judge Boochever noted that
one court (the Second Circuit 227) "has suggested that the
international character of treaty requests counsels against
judicial intervention," but ruled the "political question" doctrine
did not apply, so that the court would decide the case. He then
noted that the government had urged the court to adopt the
Second Circuit's position that, when a treaty partner requests a
summons, the "legitimate purpose" notion should not apply.
Distinguishing the Second Circuit case on the grounds that,
after the summons there, Congress had changed the law, 228 the
panel "decline[d] the government's request" and held that "the
good faith doctrine applies to summonses issued under the
2 29
treaty."
Judge Wright raised the issue of intercircuit conflict in his
dissent. He said the panel had created a conflict by rejecting the
Second Circuit position without "sound bases" to do so. The

226. Stuart v. United States, 813 F.2d 243, 250 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd., United States
v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
227. United States v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 703 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir. 1983).
228. Interestingly, it did so by adopting the position of the dissenting justices in
United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
229. Stuart, 813 F.2d at 249.
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Second Circuit's ruling, he said, was "not undercut by the fact
that TEFRA eliminated the requirement that one requesting
information from the IRS not abandon the civil investigation
intent," "was consistent with current law," and also "shows a
healthy respect for the United States' responsibilities under an
international treaty. "230
Not surprisingly, later discussion within the court of
appeals pivoted on the Second Circuit case and Judge Wright's
dissent became the basis for others' support for rehearing en
banc. Among the reasons offered by one of the panel judges for
such rehearing was that "the majority needlessly creates an
intercircuit split." This judge found "unavailing" the panel
majority's "attempt to distinguish the Second Circuit case by
23 1
reference to minor intervening change wrought by TEFRA."
Responding to a number of his colleagues, the author of the
panel's opinion asserted, "There. .. is no Conflict between the
majority's opinion and the Second Circuit's." This was because
the latter dealt only with a "judicial gloss" on a case with
international ramifications, while here Congress had imposed "a
mandate of the legislature" which courts were not free to ignore
and which the Second Circuit had not had to confront. Given his
conclusion that the case did not create an intercircuit conflict
(nor an intracircuit one, as had also been argued), he said it was
not "of sufficient importance for rehearing en banc." The case did
not in fact receive a requisite vote to be heard en banc.
The second case involved a district judge's sentencing
provision that a defendant, a state trooper found guilty of rape
and murder, was not eligible for parole for 30 years. The panel
majority affirmed, but Judge Norris disagreed about the
limitation on parole eligibility. He claimed that the majority,
instead of following Congress' intent, had followed a Tenth
Circuit case which "did not interpret section 4205; it amended
it."232

Illustrating that off-panel judges often draw on a panel

dissenter's views in calling for en banc rehearing, one judge
made such a call, saying "Judge Norris's partial dissent makes

230. Id. at 253 (Wright, J., dissenting).
231. Agreeing with Judge Wright, Judge Goodwin's law clerk wrote that "[Tihe
majority attempts, vainly, to distinguish this case from a 2nd Cir. case coming down the
other way. We're creating an intercircuit conflict for no good reason." Memorandum
from Miriam Reed to Judge Alfred T. Goodwin (May 19, 1987) (on file with author).
232. United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986) (Norris, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). See United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589
(10th Cir. 1985).
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the point better than I could."
During the extended debate within the court on whether to
go en banc, another judge, also referring to "Judge Norris'
powerful dissent," argued against an en banc rehearing by
pointing out that both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits had
reached the same conclusion on the issue at hand, while "[n]o
court appears to have reached the contrary result." With
"[fIorceful dissents" in both the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, this
judge thought the Supreme Court, if it "wishes to consider the
issue,.... certainly has enough grist for the mill," so he didn't
"think much would be added to the debate by generating a
circuit conflict." That would happen were the Ninth Circuit to
rehear the case en banc and to adopt Judge Norris's position.
Responding, Judge Norris commented that the recent
Eighth Circuit case agreed with both the Tenth Circuit case and
Ninth Circuit panel majority, which he conceded all on the panel
had missed. Turning to the dissent by the Eighth Circuit's chief
judge agreeing with his own interpretation of the statute, he
quoted from that opinion at length. He recognized that an en
banc court might "ultimately agree with the Lay and Norris
dissents, thereby creating a conflict in the circuits. But that is
not a sin," he said. He also called attention to an earlier case 233
in which, during consideration of whether to take the case en
banc, a judge had been critical of "the supposed vice of
unnecessarily creating a conflict in the circuits;" there where,
despite the creation of a conflict with several other circuits, the
Supreme Court had affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling.
Continuing debate over whether to rehear the case
contained further discussion of whether the other circuits were
correct and references to the dissents there. Judge Norris could
not find a case adopting the interpretation of the relevant
legislation advocated by his adversary on the court; he thought a
Supreme Court ruling, 234 an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, and
an Eighth Circuit case were "to the contrary," with the Ninth
Circuit panel majority, the Tenth Circuit, and the more recent
Eighth Circuit case "unsound innovations that find little support
in statutory language, legislative history, or common sense."
Responding, the other judge was "not sure what Judge Norris
finds . .. supporting his view" in those cases and found three

233.
(1985).
234.

Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983), affd, 469 U.S. 131
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
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the Consumer Product Safety Act" and quoted from it at two
places, saying at one of them that "Our reading of the statute
comports with that of the Fourth Circuit." 214 Later, another
member of the panel noted that the response to the petition for
rehearing found the Fourth Circuit case and a cited Supreme
Court case to be "directly analogous and 'on all fours' to the
instant case" but noted that the former did not apply the
Administrative Procedures Act, which petitioner felt should be
addressed.
Potential dissenters may also turn to other circuits for case
law favoring their position. Thus, the judge who was to dissent
from the majority's interpretation of the firearms statute in a
case on enhanced penalties for multiple convictions from the
same indictment, pointed for support to a Tenth Circuit en banc
ruling on the subject. 215 In a later memorandum supporting the
dissenter's position, an off-panel judge pointed to the same case,
saying, "You will see that the interpretation that [the judge] and
I, and seven judges of the Tenth Circuit, believe to be a plausible
one is indeed a plausible one." That communication from an offpanel judge prompted the author "to reexamine our opinion."
However, having done so, he wished to retain the same result,
but on the basis of the view propounded by another circuit.
As this suggests, when cases from more than one circuit are
available for use, one may be chosen over the other based on its
rationale. Thus, a conference memo in a RICO drug case 2 16 noted
that on one of the issues, one of the judges "prefers the Tenth
Circuit's point of view ... rather than the Second's." In the
opinion in this case, a footnote indicated that the issue need not
be addressed; 21 7 both cases were cited, 218 while the panel relied
21 9
on the Third Circuit's position on another issue.
While judges most often turn to other circuits' majority
opinions, they are also attracted to dissents elsewhere. However,
they may shy away from choosing between the competing
positions in other courts, as when Judge Goodwin observed that

214. X-Tra Art v. Consumer Product Safety Com., 969 F.2d 793, 795-796 (9th Cir.
1992); see also United States v. Articles of Hazardous Substance, 588 F.2d 39 (4th Cir.
1978).
215. United States v. Neal, 976 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1992).
216. United States v. Saccoccia, 18 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 1994).
217. Id. at 799, n. 3.
218. United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437 (2nd Cir. 1993); United States v.
Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991).
219. United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 65 (3nd Cir. 1990).
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he "hesitate[d] to get involved in the D.C. Circuit's debate" on
whether a statute provided for a cause of action. He added,
moreover, that getting involved in that debate was also
unnecessary to resolve the Ninth Circuit's case. 22 0
Any such qualms did not seem to affect the judges in the
Catholic Social Services immigration case, however.
In
developing the majority opinion, the author found that Chief
Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit had written a dissent
which "effectively refutes" the majority opinion to which she was
responding; the other panel members and judges from another
panel agreed with this view. 221 The author, however, did
exercise some caution when he told his colleagues that his
opinion would hold that the courts had jurisdiction; he wanted to
check with them on that point because "this is a threshold issue
and we would be disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit." Here one
sees acknowledgment that a conflict with other circuits will be
created with a choice being made to do so.
Likewise, a Tenth Circuit judge, using that circuit's opinioncirculation procedures, informed not only fellow panel members
but all the court's judges that "the result reached in this
proposed opinion splits us from the Third Circuit." The panel
adhered to this position, but not before Judge Goodwin (sitting
by designation) suggested in his concurrence to the proposed
opinion "that we deal directly with the [Third and Fourth
Circuit] cases that appear to go against us" 222 - an illustration of
the felt need to deal seriously with cases that create conflicts.
Disagreement among judges may also arise. Illustrating the
dialogue that can be provoked, a judge's claim in a proposed
dissent that the majority was creating an intercircuit conflict
caused Judge Goodwin, who had already concurred in Judge
Hug's majority opinion, "to want to study the matter further 220. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Apr. 5,
1994) (on file with author) (regarding In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467
(9th Cir. 1994)).
221. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburg, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1992). See
Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Feb. 23, 1990) (on file
with author) (indicating that another panel member also agreed). Judge Goodwin's law
clerk, Mary Rose Alexander, in a memorandum to Judge Goodwin (Sept. 5 1990)(on file
with author) advised the judge that "Judge Wald's dissent appears to have the better
argument on both the legislative history and the plain meaning of the statute," and that
the Wald dissent "compellingly refutes" cases from other circuits "as inconsistent with
Supreme Court jurisprudence".
222. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Feb. 11,
1994) (on file with author) (regarding Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
17 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 1994)).
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revise it further to respond directly to the dissent. When the
dissent is to a denial of rehearing en banc, one would not expect
the panel to respond in public; a concurrence in a denial of en
banc rehearing is extremely rare. As any response from the
panel would have taken place in the intra-court discussion of the
en banc call, one would not expect to see a published response.
One can see this in the lack of response to Judge Norris' dissent
from denial of en banc rehearing in Act Up! /Portland v. Bagley.
He first claimed that the majority "repudiates the settled law of
several circuits, including our own," and then said that the
majority has cited "as the villain" in "inflicting such damage on
the fabric of qualified immunity law" a Supreme Court summary
reversal, which he said cannot bring about change in the law. A
more cynical view for the lack of response is that the calls for
rehearing en banc have been heard regularly, and frequently,
from the same judges, leading to a "Cry Wolf' reaction.
Even when dealing directly with cases raised by the
dissenter's intercircuit conflict claim, the majority may treat
them much more briefly than does the dissenter. This may be
because the latter, having already failed to persuade panel
colleagues, may be attempting to catch the attention of other
colleagues who monitor slip opinions; here the dissent paves the
way for an en banc call just as a dissenter from the court's
failure to grant en banc rehearing may be seeking to attract the
Supreme Court's attention.
One might expect that, because ofthe importance of an en
banc decision, claims of intercircuit conflict made by dissenters
to an en banc opinion would receive a response. However, even
in those situations, such claims by the dissenter may go
unanswered. This was true with Roy v. Gomez. 167 There the
Ninth Circuit en banc majority held it was not harmless error to
omit, from instructions on aiding and abetting, the requirement
that the jury find that the defendant intended to encourage or
facilitate the principal's offense. Although devoting much of his
discussion to what he believed was the majority's improper
application of Supreme Court opinions, Judge Wallace, in
dissent, added his assertion that the majority had created
intercircuit conflict by refusing to apply one Supreme Court
ruling rather than a Scalia concurrence to which he said it had
168
improperly looked.

167.
168.

81 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Id. at 870 (9th Cir. 1996)(en banc) (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Another en banc case in which dissenters received no
response also illustrates how intercircuit variation in legal
interpretation can affect financial transactions which reach
across circuit boundaries yet one circuit is face with having to
rule on some aspect of those transactions. A bankruptcy court
had applied the law of its own circuit but a contested transaction
involved in the bankruptcy had taken place in another circuit
which had different law. Claiming an intercircuit conflict,
Judges Thomas and Hawkins complained that the Ninth
Circuit, "[bly imposing our view of how option contracts should
be treated.., on a Fifth Circuit bankruptcy,.. .unnecessarily
intrudes upon the law of another circuit," and had created an
intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit but also "resolved the
conflict by declaring Fifth Circuit authority inapplicable to a
Texas bankruptcy," counter to the demands of "[clomity and
simple respect for our colleagues in another circuit." 169 Despite
the strength with which this claim was made, the majority did
not mention the case the dissenters had pressed.
There was also no response from the en banc majority which
ruled on a district court's power to hear a case without
addressing sua sponte whether the appeals court should decline
jurisdiction. 170 In addition to criticizing the majority for not
having considered a Seventh Circuit ruling that came after an
earlier Ninth Circuit en banc, 171 Judge Alarcon, in dissent, felt
that the majority "creates an intercircuit conflict with those
circuits that have addressed the question whether Brilihart
abstention can be raised sua sponte." His "research ha[d]
revealed," he said, "that every court that has addressed the
question whether an appellate court can raise abstention sua
sponte where the case involves the doctrines of federalism has
answered in the affirmative. " 172 One might have thought that
Judge Alarcon's extensive discussion would have been met by

Judge Wallace thought his colleagues misapplied Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619
(1993), and O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), and should not have looked to
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989). The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded with directions, California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996), the
equivalent of a reversal.
169. In re Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., 139 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
170. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1233-34 (9th Cir.
1998) (en banc) (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
171. Meyers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 1994); Acri v. Varian Assocs.,
114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
172. 133 F.3d at 1223-34 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
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Ninth Circuit dealt with the district court's designation of a
defendant as a career offender, which depended on whether the
person was "incarcerated" at a certain time. Here the judges
"rejected a Sixth Circuit decision that reached 'the opposite
conclusion." 1 49 In most cases of this type, the dissenter used the
other circuit's ruling for support. 150 In most cases Lindquist
examined, in which the majority opinion recognized conflict, "the
deviating circuits acknowledged that their decisions would
create a conflict but did not spend extensive time agonizing over
that fact." Nonetheless, it is clear that conflict was created
51
"knowingly" rather than through ignorance.'
An example of such explicit disagreement came in a case
dealing with a statute of limitations question concerning RICO
conspiracy. Here Judge Hall stated clearly why she disagreed
with the Second Circuit's position interpreting a relevant
Supreme Court case and explained the basis for her
disagreement. 52
A slightly more cautiously-stated, but
nonetheless direct, disagreement came in a case where Seventh
Circuit judges, while claiming their "highest regard for our Sixth
Circuit colleagues and the concerns that motivated them to
adopt the Justice Department's view" concerning the stay
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act," could not agree
153
that the statutory language "can be pushed this far."
Dissenters may also part company with other circuit's
doctrine. For example, in responding to a claim that a video
conference sentencing hearing violated the Federal Rules, Fifth
Circuit Judge Henry Politz rejected reliance on a Ninth Circuit
opinion for the proposition such sentencing was prohibited.
Quoting from that opinion, he said, "I appreciate our sister
circuit colleagues' concerns, but decline to accept their
conclusion" because it "fails to recognize" an alternative
1 54
meaning of the defendant's "presence."
The presence of a dissent in another circuit's case certainly
provides a basis for departing from the intercircuit consensus. It

149. United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993).
150. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1077.
151. Lindquist, supra note 16, at 14, 18.
152. Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 517 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissed as
improvidently granted, see 519 U.S. 233 (1977)).
153. French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd and remanded,
see Miller v. French, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (2000)).
154. United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 1999) (Politz, J.,
dissenting).
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gives support to a panel that chooses to create an intercircuit
conflict. Thus, dealing with the question of whether the statute
outlawing movement of firearms in interstate commerce applied
to items that were stolen after they had traveled in interstate
commerce, the Ninth Circuit panel engaged in ritual deference
to another circuit ("While we hesitate to part company"), but
found the Sixth Circuit's dissenting judge's "reasoning more
Drawing on a
persuasive" and adopted his position. 155
conflicting circuit's dissenter in this fashion not only serves to
legitimate one's own position but shows that someone within the
conflicting circuit believes that circuit "got it wrong," even if that
is not the specific language used in citing the dissent. Likewise,
a dissenting judge may turn for support to the opinion of a
fellow-dissenter in another circuit.
D. Responses to Dissenters' Claims.
Particularly important are cases in which a dissenter-to
the panel opinion or the denial of rehearing en banc--claims
that the court is, creating an intercircuit conflict. An example is
Judge Graber's claim that the Ninth Circuit majority in United
States v. Fuchs "creates but does not acknowledge a split with
two of our sister circuits" on the issue of plain error as to
omitted jury instructions. 156 Another, in a case concerning
providing aid to a disabled parochial school student, is Judge
Kleinfeld's assertion that several other circuits (and the
Supreme Court) "have all held to the contrary" of the Ninth
Circuit's position with one court doing so "in a case materially
identical to this one." Not only was it the case that "[t]he
majority puts us at odds with three other circuits to have
considered analogous issues," but also "[t]he majority fails to
adequately distinguish" the rulings of the other courts of
15 7
appeals.
Because of the importance of such claims, we now examine
responses to them. Faced with such claims, how does the
majority respond? Does it do so? And if so, minimally or with
extended discussion? 5 8 The claims made in a dissenting opinion
155. United States v. Cruz, 50 F.3d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1995).
156. 218 F.3d 957, 967, 969-970 (9th Cir. 2000) (Graber, J., dissenting). Judge
Graber's claim of intercircuit inconsistency was joined with a number of other claimed
errors in the majority's position. Id., at 967.
157. KDM ex rel. WJM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1052-53, 1055 (9th
Cir. 1999)(Kleinfeld, J.,dissenting).
158. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 1065-75.
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bankruptcy court but the district court that had awarded the
fees.' 06 In another instance, a panel dealt with whether the socalled "cause and prejudice" requirement was to be applied when
a defendant challenged his guilty plea. The judges first noted
"that a conflict exists in the circuits" and then observed that
Ninth Circuit cases "appear to be more consistent with the
answers reached by the Second and Third Circuits" than the
Seventh Circuit." However, the court still managed to sidestep
the court, that
resolution of the conflict because, said
requirement did not prevent review of a defendant's
10 7
jurisdictional claim.
The stance of acknowledging-without-resolving does not
mean the court will not later revisit the conflict issue and
resolve it. One can see this with respect to the question of
whether bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction to award attorney's
fees. The Ninth Circuit first noted that "[e]xistence of both an
intra- and inter-circuit split was previously recognized by this
Circuit" in a ruling which "did not address the issue." Then,
providing an extensive discussion and giving six reasons, the
court adopted the Fourth Circuit's view and rejected that of the
Eleventh Circuit. 0 8 In a 1999 case, the panel noted that the
court had earlier "noted a conflict among the other circuits on
[the] question of whether, under the provision of Rule 60(b) that
a judge may vacate a judgment "on motion," there must be a
motion from a party or whether the judge may do so sua sponte,
but that the court "did not resolve" it. Now, however, the court
would "conclude that the Fourth and Fifth Circuit position"
allowing a judge to act on his or her own "makes better practical
sense."109

106. In re Cascade Roads, 34 F.3d 756, 767 n.12 (9th Cir. 1994).
107. Chambers v. United States, 22 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The
court even added, in a note, 'Our analysis has been consistent with the approach the
Second Circuit took." Id., at 945 n. 11. In a later case, the court cited to Chambers as
having noted an intercircuit conflict but not resolved it. See Gonzalez v. United States,
33 F.3d 1047, 1949 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 188
n.28 (2nd Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Calabresi, J., concurring). Second Circuit Judge Guido
Calabresi, in a separate concurring opinion, suggested that a disagreement between the
circuits was one between "conflicting obiters" and thus his court should not decide the
issue until it was fully presented. Id. at 188 n.28.
108. In re Yochum, 89 F.3d 661, 666 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996).
109. Kingvision Pay-Per-View v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347 (9th Cir. 1999); the
earlier case noted was Clifton v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 997 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1993).
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3. Resolved Conflicts.
Related to responding to a claim of conflict by saying there
is none, because cases can be distinguished, is to say that the
conflict has been resolved. Here judges acknowledge that an
intercircuit conflict exists but go on to argue that an intervening
Supreme Court ruling has disposed of it. For example, in Chan
v. Society Expeditions,110 the Ninth Circuit noted the Supreme
Court's resolution of a conflict in Conrail v. Gottschall."'
Because the Supreme Court takes some cases to resolve
intercircuit conflicts, it is not surprising that courts of appeals
judges talk of whether the justices have resolved such conflicts,
even if such mention at times seems to be fairly routine.
Even when the justices do not rule directly on an
intercircuit conflict, one of their decisions addressing an issue on
which several courts of appeals have ruled prompts attention
because it affects the work of those courts of appeals which then
come to the issue. Thus, in a case on whether liquidated
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) were excludable from taxable income, the Ninth Circuit
panel first indicated that "[u]ntil recently" the case law had
"firmly established." It then noted that this prior analysis was
changed by a Supreme Court ruling, although the author
observed that courts had continued to reach the same result
"even under the Supreme Court's more restrictive test."112
Congress' resolution of intercircuit conflicts is also
mentioned from time to time. In one such instance, the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc to review the criminal conviction of
Judge Robert Aguilar, noted that Congress had obviated a
conflict the Ninth Circuit had earlier created with the Second
Circuit over the witness-tampering statute "by amending section
1512 to cover specifically non-coercive witness tampering." As
Judge Hug observed for the court, "in removing the conflict...,
Congress indicated what type of noncoercive conduct was meant

to be proscribed.

..

113

In another case, after noting that there

110. Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
111. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottschall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
112. See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 792-793 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
back pay and liquidated damages excludable from gross income). The Supreme Court
case is United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
113. United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1485 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en banc. The
earlier Ninth Circuit case was United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1984) (in
conflict with United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895 (2nd Cir. 1984)). See also the
discussion of this conflict, and of the resolution by Congress, in the subsequently-vacated
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had been intercircuit conflict over the application of Rule 35(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Ninth Circuit
held that as a result of Congress' amendment of the Rule, "it is
now clear that a district court is divested of jurisdiction once a
114
notice of appeal has been filed from the original sentence."
Congress is not the only non-judicial policy-making body
providing resolution of intercircuit conflicts that the courts then
mention in passing. The courts have noted the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's resolution of some conflicts when it amends the
15
Sentencing Guidelines.
Court of appeals judges have a particular interest in
instances in which a Supreme Court ruling has undercut the
cases which have created a circuit split, as this eases the task of
those courts of appeals which might otherwise have to choose
one position over another. For example, a district court relied on
a Third Circuit case but the Supreme Court resolved a conflict
between the Third and Fourth Circuits and impliedly overruled
the Third Circuit case. As a result, the Ninth Circuit felt
required to reverse the district court. 1 6 A case on sentencing for
conspiracy also illustrates this point. Judge Goodwin noted that
the defendant "points to an apparent conflict among circuits"
and an earlier Ninth Circuit case supposedly supporting her
position, and cases from other circuits "which she contends
support [its] logic." However, he said, "recent Supreme Court
precedent appears to defeat" defendant's argument, with the
Edwards v. United States "holding undercut[ting] the vitality" of
117
the cases on which defendant had relied.
Supreme Court resolution of an intercircuit conflict is
particularly likely to receive attention by the court whose earlier

panel opinion, United States v. Aguilar, 994 F.2d 609, 639 (9th Cir. 1993).
114. United States v. Ortega-Lopez, 988 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1993). The Federal
Rules are developed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, promulgated by the
Supreme Court, and go into effect if Congress does not disturb them. Thus, one could
argue that the judiciary, although not the Supreme Court itself, had been the prime
actor resolving this intercircuit conflict.
115. See the acknowledgment of Amendment 484, which "addresses an inter-circuit
conflict regarding the meaning of the term 'mixture or substance'" in Section 2D1.1 of the
Guidelines. U.S.S.G.App.C, Amend. 84, referred to in United States v. Innie, 77 F.3d
1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Millican, 68 F.3d 482 (9th Cir.
1995)(Table), 1195 WL 623436.
116. Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1992);
see also Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 899 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1989); and Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.1990), affd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
117. United States v. Jackson, 167 F.3d 1280, 1284-1285 (9th Cir. 1999); see
Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
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disposition the justices considered. We see this in the Ninth
Circuit's mention in Wilson v. Drake that the Supreme Court
had resolved an intercircuit conflict in reversing one of the court
of appeals rulings in United States v. Smith.118 There was also
a mention in a subsequent immigration case of the Supreme
Court's resolution of a conflict that the Ninth Circuit had
created with the D.C. Circuit. 1 9
At times the Ninth Circuit's reference to Supreme Court
action on intercircuit conflicts occurs when its position has been
vindicated, as when, after the Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 120 the Ninth
2
Circuit applied that ruling to Clean Water Act regulations.' '
However, Ninth Circuit judges are particularly likely to
comment on Supreme Court action when the justices have dealt
adversely with a position taken by the Ninth Circuit itself. In a
sentencing case where the Supreme Court had undercut the
Ninth Circuit, Judge Rea (of the Central District of California,
sitting by designation) observed that United States v. Niven, 22 a
Ninth Circuit ruling on concurrent or consecutive sentences for
aggregate losses from separate offenses, had "been criticized by
at least one other circuit" and a "number of circuits... have not
adopted the Niven rationale." He then observed "that the law
has undergone a significant change since our decision in Niven,"
with "the precedential force of our holding in Niven ... severely
undercut, if not eliminated, by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Witte v. United States," which resolved the
intercircuit conflict, as well as by post-Witte Ninth Circuit
23
decisions.

118. Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Smith,
499 U.S. 160 (1991)).
119.
See Naranjo-Aguilera v. I.N.S., 30 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1994), referring to
Catholic Social Services v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1992) and Ayuda v.
Thornburgh, 948 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1991), resolved by Reno v. Catholic Social Services,
509 U.S. 43 (1993).
120. 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (60-day notice requirement mandatory).
121. Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, 45 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1995).
122. 952 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1991).
123. United States v. Scarano, 76 F.3d 1471, 1474-1475 (9th Cir. 1996). See Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
In another sentencing case, as to whether a convicted defendant was entitled to
credit against his sentence for pretrial time spent in a community treatment center, the
Ninth Circuit position that such credit should be granted had been "in conflict with those
of other circuits." A later panel so observed in noting that the Supreme Court "granted
certiorari on a Third Circuit case.., in order to resolve this circuit split" and had then
held the time was not in "official detention" and so credit for it should not be received.
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United States Army, when the judges observed, "We are unable
to avoid an intercircuit conflict, because the Sixth Circuit has
rejected the First Circuit's position."130
Despite the apparent need to choose, the court may still be
able to avoid doing so. It did so, for example, in a case on
exclusion of a defendant's confession because of deliberate delay
between arrest and arraignment. The Ninth Circuit noted it
had "never expressly chosen between an approach that requires
suppression of non-safe harbor confessions if the court
determines the delay to have been unreasonable (McNabbMallory) and an approach that allows admission of some nonsafe harbor confessions given during an unreasonable delay in
arraignment if the court believes that, on balance, suppression
is not warranted," but the panel found that either way the
confession should be excluded. However, it reached this result
only after extensive discussion of other circuits' competing
positions and after coming close to choosing between the
standards when it observed that "most of our cases are more
consistent with the Seventh Circuit balancing test than131with the
Second Circuit McNabb-Mallory bright line approach.'
When an intercircuit conflict cannot be finessed in some
way, a court must choose one competing position over another.
However, the presence of even one court on each side provides
the panel with material to support either position. 132 When faced
with another question which the Ninth Circuit had not
previously addressed-"whether the Coast Guard has 'exercised'
statutory authority over the 'working conditions' on board
uninspected vessels"-a panel said it "must turn to sources
outside of our circuit law to answer the question." Yet, when it
found that one circuit went one way, two the other, with another
"less clear," it had to choose. The outcome was that "[w]e agree
with the Secretary, the Commission and the Second and
Eleventh Circuits" that the Secretary had the requisite
authority and providing a reason for not adopting the reasoning

130. 125 F.3d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). In the same case, the court rejected the
Army's claim that a certain construction "would set up an intercircuit conflict with a
Fifth Circuit case," explaining why the claim was "incorrect." Id. at 1301.
131. United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 975 F.2d 1396, 1396-1404 (9th Cir. 1992).
132. For an instance of a dissenting judge agreeing that "[t]he creation of a conflict
is justified" while disagreeing with colleagues over the majority's invalidation of the
statutory provision at issue because a Sixth Circuit judge's separate opinion properly
found the relevant statute constitutional. See French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 448
(7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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of two other circuits. 133
When a conflict exists and more courts of appeals have
adopted one of the competing positions, there may be a pull from
the majority position. This is like the situation discussed earlier
in which a court, rather than creating a conflict, goes along with
circuits that had already decided an issue. At times, the court
simply notes that its own view is "in accord with the majority
view" 134 or that its caselaw "has been adopted by most of the
circuits that have addressed the issue. ' 135 In deciding to follow
the prevailing view, the judges may nonetheless take the time to
demonstrate the weakness of the minority position. A Tenth
Circuit majority did this when it criticized the one circuit that
had adopted a higher standard than "reasonable belief' as to
whether a prospective arrestee lived in a residence, saying the
Ninth Circuit "provided no rationale for adopting" its
1 36
standard.
5. Creatinga Conflict.
If joining one side or the other in a pre-existing conflict is
not easy, creating a conflict (being the "bad guy") is far more
difficult. Yet at times court of appeals judges are willing to "take
the bull by the horns," they do so because they believe their
position "is the better one." As a Ninth Circuit judge, who said,
"I never felt intercircuit conflict should be avoided," observed
recently, "If three conscientious judges after full consideration
decide that if the rule from another circuit is not a good rule for
the Ninth Circuit, they have their own duty and intellectual
1 37
responsibility to decide the case."
Judges are often quite direct in acknowledging that they are

133. Herman v. Tidewater Pacific, Inc., 160 F.3d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998). This
case also contained an instance of an acknowledgment that the court was creating a
circuit split on another, subsidiary question - whether "the waters at issue here are
within the boundaries of Alaska." Id., at 1243. For another example, where a court
"respectfully disagree[d] with one circuit's position" and "instead align[ed] with another
circuit," see Drew v. United States, 217 F.3d 193, 202-203 (4th Cir. 2000).
134. United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 156 (3rd Cir.
2000)(en banc) ("The majority of courts of appeals to consider the fate of a prior forfeiture
proceeding that violated notice requirements agree that a judgment issued without
proper notice to a potential claimant is void.").
135. United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000) (standard in
Rule 11 cases; also noting agreement with Rules and advisory committee notes).
136. Valdez v. McPheeters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1999). The court also
noted, "The actual status of law in the Ninth Circuit is open to question." Id. at 1225 n. 1.
137. Interview with Senior Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, Pasadena, Cal. (Jan. 25 2000).
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cases (from the Tenth Circuit, the more recent Eighth Circuit
case, and the panel majority) "reaching the same result semiindependently." The last communication before the vote on
rehearing en banc (which did not succeed) pointed to "a series of
judicial and administrative pronouncements" which shared
Judge Norris's view of the statute. It concluded, "Most recently,
Chief Judge Lay or the Eighth Circuit and Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit have explicitly stated the apparent purpose of
§4205 'is to allow release on parole before the earliest date
allowed by subsection (a).'"
A somewhat later case, FederalLabor Relations Authority v.
U.S. Department of the Navy, 235 illustrates extensive use of other
circuits' rulings and the effect of action by the Supreme Court
during the pendency of a case. Under federal labor law and the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a divided Ninth Circuit
panel had enforced a Federal Labor Relations Authority order
that government employees' home addresses should be revealed.
After a petition for rehearing which claimed an intercircuit
conflict, two off-panel judges who were members of another
panel with a similar issue "stopped the clock." They argued that
the panel majority had misapplied the FOIA as recently
interpreted by the Supreme Court and that the majority was
also in conflict with a Second Circuit decision which had
"intelligently disposed" of an argument made by the Ninth
Circuit panel.
The panel majority responded to explain that "the split
existed before our decision was filed," with "divided panels and
en banc reconsiderations ....common" on the issue." Thus, they
argued, taking the case en banc "will not create national
uniformity," something "[o]nly the Supreme Court or Congress
can do... now," with it "likely that the Supreme Court will
grant certiorari in one or more of the cases," which they said "it
certainly should." In their extensive discussion of the merits, the
two judges noted their agreement with the Third Circuit's en
banc opinion on the subject.
A judge who had earlier called for en banc reconsideration
was "not convinced that a circuit split currently exists" and thus
did "not find.., persuasive" the argument that en banc
rehearing would not create national uniformity. This judge
found the Third Circuit case on which the panel majority had
relied to be based on a different FOIA exemption from the one

235.

958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992).
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used in the current case, so "there is currently uniformity on the
issue of disclosure of federal employees' mailing addresses."
Arguing that the possibility of Supreme Court consideration
should not preclude further court of appeals examination of the
issue, the judge said not taking this case en banc "will disrupt
this uniformity" and "will result in a split within this circuit and
among all the circuits." 236 This memorandum resulted in a
further response from the majority. While acknowledging what
had taken place in the Third Circuit, they noted agreement with
their position by the Fifth Circuit -a decision they examined
extensively, quoting from it at lengthand indicated that
several other circuits had the issue at various stages of
consideration, with a Fourth Circuit en banc opinion to be
issued.
Another judge, who had also made an en banc call in this
case, provided additional consideration of the Fifth Circuit case.
He felt it was "most useful because it serves both to sharpen and
narrow the points of disagreement" he had with the position
taken by the panel opinion's author. He drew heavily on that
case in a comparison with the panel opinion, and he argued that
the Ninth Circuit's ruling should be based on it. He also argued
that the multi-factor test used by the Ninth Circuit "should be
replaced by the approach followed in the Second, Seventh, and
D.C. Circuits."
Prompted by this analysis, some time later the panel author
agreed that "the Fifth Circuit analysis is principled and
completely sustainable and one that I could embrace," which
would allow avoidance of the problems the judge's colleagues
had raised. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to the Fifth Circuit case, and, after some intracourt
communication, the decision was made to await the Supreme
Court's ruling. "Ultimately," argued the author of the panel
opinion, "the Supreme Court's guidance will resolve the issue for
the many cases which have been litigated in every circuit in the
country," but withdrawing the panel's already-filed opinion was
said to be "inappropriate because the Fifth Circuit relied, to
some extent, on our opinion in its decision." (The Supreme
Court, ruling that the names and addresses should not be made
available, reversed the Fifth Circuit's ruling.)237
236. 'Moreover, even if the Supreme Court does grant certiorari, this should not
prevent us from giving this issue the type of consideration that it deserves and that the
other circuits have afforded it."
237. See U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
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In a case dealing with whether an incarcerated prisoner
who had committed an offense leading to deportation was
entitled to a prompt deportation hearing, discussion of other
circuits' cases also included exchanges both within the panel and
throughout the larger court. Although deciding that the alien
had stated statutory causes of action, the panel itself was
initially unsure of the direction to take. Both before and after
requested supplementary briefing, it was "inclined to follow the
Eighth Circuit" and "tentatively inclined to affirm on the basis
of the 8th Circuit's holding" that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service could not be required to hold such
hearings on an alien's request. However, on the basis of other
statutes, the majority upheld the alien's claim. 238 This led Judge
Rymer, citing the Eighth Circuit case without suggesting an
intercircuit conflict, to dissent on the ground that the
immigration statute was intended to benefit federal prisoners.
The government's suggestion for rehearing en banc claimed
The
conflict with both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits.
implied
had
not
decided
on
an
responded
that
they
majority
right of action (the possible basis for an intercircuit conflict) but
instead had used a statutory basis "consistent with Eighth
Circuit precedent in an analogous situation." That did not
satisfy an off-panel judge who first asked the panel to reconsider
its opinion and then called for en banc rehearing. Asserting an
intercircuit conflict, that judge said, "the result conflicts with
decisions of four other circuits;" those courts "unanimously
agreed" of the relevant statute and none had "allowed an
incarcerated alien to maintain such an action." The judge did
concede, however, "that none of these conflicting decisions
explicitly addressed the issue of standing under the APA or the
Mandamus Act," on which the panel majority had relied.
The response reiterated the assertion that there was no
conflict with other circuits. However, the judges also argued
that the case was not worthy of en banc rehearing, and that the
Supreme Court could take the case if it felt the panel had
misinterpreted its recent rulings on standing under the APA.
The off-panel judge then further urged a positive vote on
rehearing en banc. That led the panel author to assert that the
238. Soler v. Scott, 942 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1991). One judge's clerk had
recommended reversing the district court's judgment for the INS, the position ultimately
adopted, but Judge Goodwin's law clerk, finding the Eighth Circuit's "reading... is
sound," had recommended affirmance. Memorandum from Ira Daves to Judge Alfred T.
Goodwin (Sep. 25, 1990) (on file with author).
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opinion in the case, which did
involve "interesting legal
questions upon which reasonable judges could differ," "does not
conflict with any decision in any other circuit ....
does not
conflict with any decision from this circuit .... [and] is based
upon a reasonable reading of current Supreme Court precedent."
Thus, en banc rehearing was not warranted. (After en banc
rehearing was voted down, the case went to the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded with directions
239
to dismiss as moot.)
Still another case further illustrates the situation in which
there is no public evidence that a possible conflict was
examined, but where intercircuit conflict has been raised only
after the panel has issued its opinion, and, with an off-panel
judge involved, the matter is examined and the opinion stands.
The case, under the Sentencing Guidelines, concerned the time
240
from which a term of supervised release should be measured.
After receiving the government's PFR, the panel author
suggested that, "because there is an apparent conflict between
our opinion and the Eighth Circuit, we call for a response to the
petition." 241 Another member of the panel, while saying, "I am
not sure there is a conflict with the Eighth Circuit because the
issues were presented differently," nonetheless agreed that a
response should be obtained. After the response was filed, he
continued in that view: "I don't think there is a true conflict with
the Eighth Circuit."
At this point, with the panel having denied rehearing, an
off-panel judge "stopped the clock" to inquire, "before the
mandate issues, whether the panel has considered the conflict
its opinion seems to create with the Eighth Circuit." The panel
author responded, assuring his colleague "that the panel
carefully considered the Eighth Circuit's decision and made a

studied and calculated decision to reject

it.

' 242

The off-panel

judge responded, indicating his understanding why the case did
not appear in the panel's opinion; it was, after all, "decided just
weeks before our opinion issued;" however, he argued that the
government "persuasively points out the conflict." He now
wished to know "and I suspect future defendants in analogous
239. Sivley v. Soler, 506 U.S. 969 (1993).
240. United States v. Blake, 88 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1996).
241. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Aug. 26,
1996) (on file with author).
242. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to Active 9th Circuit Judges (Oct.
25 1996) (on file with author).
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situations may like to know" whether the panel had found the
Eighth Circuit ruling "distinguishable, or just flat out rejected
[its] analysis of the legal issue." He also raised the question of
whether litigants should know the panel's basis for rejecting the
out-of-circuit ruling. The author's response to the off-panel
judges and the remainder of the court suggested that the panel
had followed an earlier circuit ruling rather than the Eighth
Circuit.243 Declining to place an explanation of the reasoning in
the opinion, he said, "We have already published our opinion
along with our reasoning in the case. I assume that our
differences with the Eighth Circuit are apparent to all readers."
The off-panel judge then withdrew his stopclock, concluding the
matter.
2. Modes of Reacting.
We now turn to look more specifically at particular aspects
of judges' dealing with other circuits' cases and intercircuit
conflict. At times the judge claiming an intercircuit conflict is a
dissenter on the panel initially deciding the case; perhaps more
frequently, off-panel judges make the claim of intercircuit
conflict. The panel itself may even seek en banc hearing in
connection with a matter implicating intercircuit conflict, as
when a panel made an en banc call because the judges wished to
overrule a part of an earlier case "that is in conflict with our
sister circuits"; that case was heard en banc.
2
The United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez case, 4
commenting on the standard for a defendant's appropriate
waiver of the right to appeal a sentence, provides an example of
a judge raising the issue of intercircuit conflict in support of
calling for an en banc court subsequent to his dissent from the
panel. Saying that the panel majority's holding "has been
explicitly disapproved of by one of our sister circuits," he
examined the Eleventh Circuit's case on the subject and also
noted the Fourth Circuit's adoption of a rule like that of the
Eleventh Circuit. When the panel majority responded that the
Eleventh Circuit had responded to the panel's earlier, rather
than later amended, opinion which contained additional
information, an off-panel judge insisted "there is an intercircuit
243. "We decided to follow the lead of our own court instead of that of another
circuit on a petition for rehearing." Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to
Associates on 9th Circuit (November 5 1996) (on file with author).
244. United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 980 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1992).
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conflict."
United States v. Vea-Gonzales245 is an example of an offpanel judge claiming intercircuit conflict. That judge felt that
the panel's opinion, with its holding that a defendant sentenced
as a career offender could challenge prior convictions at
sentencing, "puts us at odds with every other circuit which has
considered the [relevant Sentencing Guidelines] amendment."
Joining that judge and recognizing that the Ninth Circuit might
yet be right, a colleague said "If all the other circuits are wrong,
then we should stand our ground," but concluded, "[I]n this case,
they are not wrong." Another example, with the claimant saying
the panel had opted for the "wrong" position, was Reynolds v.
Martin.246 There, in calling for en banc rehearing, a judge said
that the court had once again done just that in applying the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 retroactively, and, "Once again, the
justification for a holding [was] contrary to six other circuits."
(Having failed to persuade his colleagues to go en banc, this
judge and three others dissented from the denial of rehearing en
247
banc. )
In a case on upward departures from the Sentencing
Guidelines, 248 debate within the court about cases from other
circuits began early because the panel circulated its opinion
before filing. The principal problem in the case was one of
intracircuit conflict, but the work of other circuits was
implicated because, as one off-panel judge put, the issue was
said to have "caused problems in other circuits," and the panel
author was said to have relied on a Second Circuit case that had
been undercut by later cases there. The mention of cases from
other circuits continued without mention of "intercircuit conflict"
for over a year until another off-panel judge raised the issue
after the panel had amended its opinion. 249 The amendment,
which noted a conflict with the Second and Tenth Circuits and
rejected the position of those courts, prompted an ultimately
inconclusive dispute over the panel's duty to inform the court of
creation of the conflict, and the panel's amended opinion stood.

245. 968 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1993).
246. 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1993).
247. Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 994 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1993)(dissent from denial
of rehearing en banc).
248. United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 911 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1990), amended, 927
F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1991).
249. United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1991)(amending
911 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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Another instance came in a criminal case where the
disputing judge made the panel's treatment of sufficiency of the
evidence his principal concern. In addition to saying that the
panel's action was "inconsistent with the precedents of the
Supreme Court and this court," the judge asserted that "the
panel's maverick approach is inconsistent with that of every
other circuit." He argued, "I see no reason for us to be the first
court to create a circuit split over what until now was thought to
be such a clear-cut rule." The panel responded after another
judge had chimed in by saying "the new standard puts us out of
step with the rest of the country" and there was some further
communication. Saying that "The so-called intra- and intercircuit conflicts identified... are based on an extravagant
misinterpretation of our opinion," the panel judges believed that
the off-panel judge's principal concern was his disagreement
with the panel's result; they did not think that warranted en
banc reconsideration.
Further
discussing the claimed
intercircuit conflicts, they defended their action by saying that
their formulation of the rule "is consistent with the law in all
circuits, and has been explicitly employed in at least one other
circuit." As a result, they said, "Thus, far from ameliorating an
inter-circuit conflict, [the] en banc call, if successful, may well
create one."
Other instances of off-panel judges claiming a circuit split
appear in several of the calls for en banc rehearings by one of
the circuit's more liberal judges. These also serve to illustrate
the relation between intercircuit conflicts, en banc rehearings,
and the Supreme Court; they also illustrate the fact that a judge
may appear to be seeking en banc rehearing not because of
opposition to intercircuit conflict in principle but because of the
results the judge seeks. Among the judge's efforts were a call for
en banc rehearing of two Sentencing Guidelines cases, which he
felt "create a split between our circuit and the only other circuit
to have decided the issue," and his call for review of two
Superfund cases concerning legal fees as part of clean-up costs
because the panel's rulings in both cases 250 "create a circuit
split" with the Eighth and Sixth Circuits. In the latter instance,
the judge called for en banc "in the hopes of sparing the
Supreme Court some unnecessary work...
resolving the

250. See United States v. Sanchez, 967 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1992).
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conflict with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits." 251
This judge could, however, also seek such conflicts out of the
belief that the correct position was the one stated elsewhere.
25 2
The Wong Sentencing Guidelines case is one such instance.
This judge said that the Ninth Circuit ruling "brings the Ninth
Circuit into line with four other circuits, two of which...
decided the issue en banc" so that "I cannot as yet claim a
conflict in the circuits as a reason for taking Wong en banc," the
judge wished to join "a number of impassioned dissents" in those
other cases. He stated that he was "not hesitant to create an
intercircuit conflict," instead of trying to avoid work for the
Supreme Court. Instead, the judge said directly, "Because of the
exceptional importance of this issue, I have no reluctance to put
pressure on the Supreme Court by creating a conflict in the
circuits" because the matter "has 'percolated' in the circuits long
enough [and] it is time for the Supreme Court to resolve it once
and for all." Illustrative of the position that judges of the courts
of appeals have to make choices concerning intercircuit conflicts,
he declared, "the Ninth Circuit should step up to the plate and
take our cuts at playing a leadership role."25 3
Still another instance of an off-panel judge raising the issue
of an intercircuit conflict came in a case concerning a Christmas
display held by the panel not to be a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 254 Here a judge, drawing on the panel
dissent, contended that the panel majority "creates a split
among the circuits on the question of whether or not the
guarantee of free expression can trump the Establishment
Clause,"as "[t]wo other circuits have addressed this precise
question and have reached the opposite conclusion." Then, in the
middle of the Ninth Circuit's debate over whether to rehear the
case en banc, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
the Lamb's Chapel case. 255 The dissenter believed that case "if
anything, reinforces my dissent." However, the two judges in
the panel majority asserted that the Supreme Court decision
"resolves the inter-circuit conflict that long preceded it" and they

251. Cf. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 30 F. 3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1993); Stanton
Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
252. United States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927, 929 (9th Cir. 1993).
253. In a footnote, he added, "While I agree that we should generally be cautious
about creating conflicts in the circuits, we should avoid being overly cautious."
254. Kreisner v. San Diego, 988 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1993).
255. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 383
(1993).
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further contradicted the claim by the off-panel judges that the
panel had created a circuit split by saying, "The split by saying
it existed before our decision."
As this last rejoinder indicates, instead of claims that the
panel has created an intercircuit conflict, there are assertions
that the panel has continued such a conflict. In a case on
qualified immunity, a judge claiming an intercircuit conflict said
that in misreading a Supreme Court decision, the panel had
gone against both earlier Ninth Circuit precedent and "the law
of at least seven other circuits." However, he also noted several
circuits that had taken a contrary position. It was to those three
256
circuits that the panel turned for support in responding.
There was at least implicit agreement in this last case that
an intercircuit conflict already existed. However, the judges may
dispute whether a split exists or would, or might, be created and
thus should be avoided. In asking the panel to rethink its
opinion in a sentencing guidelines case, 257 a judge stated "there
is already a conflict in the circuits" caused by a Third Circuit
case which "[t]he parties apparently failed to cite to the panel."
With a circuit split already present, the judge argued that the
panel "should amend its opinion and discuss the Third Circuit
case and base its choice between that approach and the Second
Circuit's on the merits of the respective alternatives rather than
upon a no longer applicable need to avoid an already existing
inter-circuit conflict."
In a case on the availability of injunctions in labor cases,
which the court did hear en banc, 258 when a judge "stopped the
clock" to tell the panel that its ruling "appears to conflict
squarely with... other circuit courts of appeals," the panel
opinion's author responded both that "The circuit split over this
issue pre-dated our opinion" and that the conflict "aligns the
Ninth Circuit with the majority of other circuits to consider this
issue." And we have already seen discussion of the question of
the existence of an intercircuit conflict arising in the extended
debate over whether to give en banc rehearing in Federal Labor
Relations Authority v. United States Department of the Navy
259
decision.
256. ActUp!/Portland v. Bagley, 971 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 988 F.2d
868, 880 (9th Cir. 1993).
257. United States v. Warren, 980 F.2d i300 (9th Cir. 1992).
258. Miller ex rel. NLRB v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 991 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1993), rev'd en banc, 19 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
259. 958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992).
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3. Using Other Circuits'Work
Determining whether an intercircuit conflict exists is, of
course, only preliminary to deciding whether to adhere to the
new position that is alleged to create the conflict or to join the
other circuits' case law. Where there is a preexisting conflict, the
question becomes which available position to adopt; here withincircuit disagreements are likely to overlay positions that differ
among other courts of appeals. An example of this latter
situation can be found in the FederalLabor Relations Authority
case. Faced with what they claimed was disagreement among
the circuits, the Ninth Circuit panel majority replied to another
panel working on a similar case by drawing on cases from other
courts of appeals, particularly the Third and Fifth Circuits, to
support positions in its own opinion. However, its arguments
were met in turn with claims that the Third Circuit case was
based on a different FOIA exemption and that the proposed
opinion went beyond the Fifth Circuit's ruling.
An instance in which judges suggested that the Ninth
Circuit should adopt the position of other circuits was the
Gaudin case, on whether the materiality of false statements was
a jury question or a matter of law. 260 The situation in this case
was somewhat complex because two judges who had signed onto
the panel opinion made the argument that other circuits' law
should be adopted; despite their initial vote, they voted to accept
the parties' en banc suggestion, and who, and after an off-panel
judge's en banc call, argued that "Every other circuit with an
opinion on the issue has disagreed with Valdez," the pre-existing
Ninth Circuit precedent. 261 They also pointed to an important
subsequent Supreme Court ruling on the matter, 262 which they
said made Valdez "no longer good law" and which required that
the Gaudin panel ruling be reheard en banc "so that we may
overrule Valdez and bring our law in line with that of every
other circuit, the Court, our own precedent in analogous areas,
and common sense." In fact, the court did grant en banc
rehearing; the en banc court adopted the same position as the
panel, and the Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the
263
en banc court. )
260.
261.
262.
263.
U.S. 506

United States v. Gaudin, 997 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1979).
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
United States v. Gaudin, 997 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc), affd, 515
(1995).
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If judges can urge the adoption of other circuits' positions
they can also argue against using out-of-circuit caselaw. Thus,
when an off-panel judge, alleging the creation of a circuit split,
sought en banc review of two Superfund cases, 264 the author of
the panel's rulings argued to his court colleagues that the
conflict was "unavoidable." This he said was because the ruling
of one circuit was contained in only one paragraph and the
majority was "unable to accept the Eighth Circuit's shallow
analysis of this statutory interpretation."
In another case, an off-panel judge, agreeing with the panel
dissenter, implicitly argued for adoption of the Second Circuit's
position. He said that the majority had created a circuit split
and that its "attempt to distinguish the Second Circuit case by
minor intervening changes" produced by a statute "is
unavailing." The response by the panel opinion's author was
that there was "no conflict between the majority's opinion and
the Second Circuit's" because the Congress had mandated a
change and thus the Ninth Circuit faced a different situation.
And where a Ninth Circuit judge argues for adopting the
position of another circuit's dissenter, by definition the
argument is that the majority position there should not be
adopted. Thus, during the debate on whether the Gwaltney
sentencing case 265 should be reheard en banc, the dissenter from
the panel opinion argued for adopting the position of dissenting
Judge Lay in an Eighth Circuit case the panel had missed and
not to adopt the position of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits.
PART VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This article adopts the perspective of judges of the U.S.
courts of appeals rather than a perspective focused on the U.S.
Supreme Court to present an initial picture of how judges of the
U.S. courts of appeals treat cases from other circuits, and
particularly how they deal, or fail to deal, with claimed or actual
intercircuit conflicts; this includes whether they acknowledge
the existence of such conflicts and, if they do, how they confront
them.
Examination of opinions primarily from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and of communication among the
judges prior to release of opinions demonstrates several things.
264. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1993); Stanton Road
Assoc's v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
265. United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
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One is that, in the absence of an existing intercircuit conflict,
courts of appeals judges will often go along with existing rulings
on an issue, although at times they are willing to create a
conflict. When an intercircuit conflict is claimed to exist, the
judges respond in several ways. They may do no more than
acknowledge the conflict. However, at times they do more. They
distinguish cases claimed to conflict; they suggest that the
conflict has been displaced by a Supreme Court ruling or
congressional action; and, most directly, they take sides in the
dispute. When a dissenter claims the presence of such a conflict,
the majority at times makes no response. Yet there are
numerous instances in which majority and dissenter, meeting
normative expectations that judges will address each other's
concerns, engage in an explicit discussion of the purported
comments. And there are still other cases containing an implicit
dialogue in which a "conflict" as such is not addressed but both
sides discuss the same cases.
Intercircuit conflicts, real or perceived, are seldom the only
issue in a case, and quite often they are far from being the core
matter under discussion. Most frequently, circuit splits are often
discussed in a case along with intracircuit conflicts and with
conflicts that arise between court of appeals rulings and the
Supreme Court. In short, it appears that seldom does a stopclock or en banc call appear to rest on an intercircuit conflict
alone. The varied elements in the mixture include claims that
the panel has misread prior circuit precedent, created a withincircuit conflict, created an intercircuit conflict, and has decided
a case contrary to ruling Supreme Court precedent. Indeed,
intracircuit conflicts and alleged conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent appear to receive higher levels of priority, and
perhaps more attention, than intercircuit conflicts.
Not only are questions of intercircuit conflict piled atop
claims concerning intracircuit conflict and about tension
between Supreme Court precedent and court of appeals rulings.
At other times, these matters are linked. There is, for example, a
clear linkage between the presence of intercircuit conflict and
taking cases en banc, as some judges feel that intercircuit
conflicts are sufficiently important to make a case "en bancworthy." This connection is related to the more general question
of whether a court of appeals should sit en banc to deal with
issues before they go on their way to the Supreme Court or
should avoid expending resources because the cases will to go to
the Supreme Court in any event and will reach the justices
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faster without an en banc hearing. 266 If other circuits have
decided cases in such a way that intercircuit conflict exists and
those cases have been brought to the Supreme Court, the
conflict-with-Supreme Court and intercircuit conflict claims may
be intermixed.
While intercircuit conflict claims may become mixed with
other issues, it is clear from this examination that potential and
actual intercircuit conflicts do receive the attention of the courts
of appeals. They do not either wantonly manufacture them or
pass them on willy-nilly to the Supreme Court. While some
individuals or panels of judges are not faint of heart with respect
to creating such conflicts, for the most part the judges go along
with other circuits' views rather than create conflict, and efforts
are made to minimize the extent of intercircuit conflict.
The picture presented here, while extensive, is nonetheless
preliminary. More attention to the perspective of court of
appeals judges is needed. One could, for example, focus on how
courts of appeals have dealt with the cases the Supreme Court
cites when it grants review to resolve intercircuit conflicts, and
how the justices deal with cases in which intercircuit conflict has
already been discussed.
One could further add to our store of information by using
any specific circuit as the focal point to examine questions like
the following:
(1) How does the Supreme Court treat intercircuit conflict in
those cases where the possibility of a conflict has been raised by
a lower court judge and perhaps debated in that judge's court?
Does the Supreme Court grant review to resolve those conflicts
which have been discussed by the court of appeals?
(2) When the Supreme Court accepts a case from a court of
appeals to resolve an intercircuit conflict, or, while taking
another circuit's case, mentions ruling from the former court,
are the cases the lower court considered when it dealt with a
claim of real or putative intercircuit conflict the same cases the
Supreme Court cites or do the justices refer to cases that the
lower court has not discussed? The latter may be the situation if
there is a lag between the lower court ruling and the granting of
review, or if the court of appeals ruling to which cert is granted
has simply applied earlier circuit precedent where intercircuit

266. This matter is explored in Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals En Bancs, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming), originally presented to the
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. (2000).
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differences were discussed. Timing is important. At times, most
or all of the cases creating a purported conflict are decided
within a short span of time and are brought to the Supreme
Court almost simultaneously, 267 while other cases involved in
the conflict are much older, with certiorari having perhaps been
denied in those cases.
(3) Conversely, did the lower court consider the cases the
Supreme Court cited as creating an intercircuit conflict, and, if
so, how did the lower court deal with those cases? How does
that treatment compare with the Supreme Court's treatment?
Whether the lower court did deal with the cases cited by the
justices will be a function of timing-of when those cases were
decided in relation to when the court of appeals being studied
created circuit precedent on the issue.
The data and analysis that such studies would provide
would add immeasurably to our knowledge of the operation of
the federal court system. In particular, it would help redress the
disproportionate attention to how the Supreme Court treats
intercircuit conflicts. More important, it would serve to minimize
the portray of the Supreme Court as always acting on the lower
courts and would better demonstrate the continuing reciprocal
interaction between the courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court.

267.

Compare the "cert. pending" status for some cases cited as part of a conflict.

NOTE

SEARCHING FOR THE MONTANA OPEN RANGE: A
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE TO
BALANCE TRADITION AND MODERNIZATION IN
AN EVOLVING WEST
Ryan M. Archer*

INTRODUCTION

On January 16, 2001, the Montana House of
Representatives Committee on Agriculture convened to hear
testimony on a bill proposing to clarify the reach of the Montana
open range. On the table was House Bill 246, which sought to
exempt livestock owners from any liability for damages caused
by motor vehicle accidents with livestock wandering public
roads.1
Ultimately, amended legislation provided that a
livestock owner is not liable for livestock-vehicle collisions
unless "grossly negligent or engaging in intentional
misconduct." 2 On March 1, 2001, House Bill 246 was signed into
law, and later codified under Title 27, Chapter 1, Section 7 of the
*
B.A. Montana State University, 1998; expected J.D. University of Montana,
2003. Special thanks to Montana rancher Jim Brady for asking the questions that
started this project - sorry it took so long to answer.
1.
Initial draft of H.B. 246, 57th Leg. Sess. (Mont. 2001) (Introduced Bill,
authorized print version LC 999).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-724 (2001).
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Montana Code Annotated.
This legislation was a rapid and direct response to the
holding of the Montana Supreme Court in Larson Murphy v.
Steiner, and significantly lessened the impact of the court's
broad scale re-interpretation of Montana's open range law. 3 The
legislation, however, had a limited scope that only addressed the
civil liability statutes imposed on livestock owner-motorist
relationships by Larson-Murphy.4 Much broader in scope,
Larson-Murphy focused on clarifying the intent and purposes of
the Open Range Doctrine embodied in the "no duty rule" of the
open range, and its application to herding districts and the legal
fence statute. 5 Thus, although the Legislature altered the
court's ultimate holding, its interpretation of open range law
remains pertinent to Montana practitioners dealing with
modern range issues. For these reasons, this note is divided into
two sections: the first section covers the facts, background,
holding, reasoning and analysis of the Larson-Murphy decision;
the second section focuses on the legislative reaction to the
decision, comments on its possible implementation through a
series of hypotheticals, and compares the outcome with other
western states.
I. LARSON-MURPHY V. STEINER

In Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, the Montana Supreme Court
overturned a 33-year-old precedent and redefined the meaning
of the "open range doctrine" embodied in the Montana
"Containment of Livestock" statutes. 6 The court held that while
7
the law of the open range doctrine remains the law of this state,
the "no duty rule" described by the doctrine does not apply to the
relationship between livestock owners and motorists traveling
Montana highways used by the public. 8 Weaving a web of
seeming contradiction and refined interpretation, the Montana
3. See Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, 2000 MT 334, 303 Mont. 96, 15 P.3d 1205; See
also Clarify Liability for Damages to Property Caused by Livestock on Highways: Hearing
on H.B. 246 Before House Comm. on Agric., 57th Leg. Sess. 3 (2001) (statement of Rep.
Keith Bales, "the reason for addressing HB 246 is the recent Montana Supreme Court
decision which reversed some long standing precedence of the open range law").
4. Larson-Murphy, IT 92-93, 98.
5. Id. 1 25-26.
6. Id.
79.
See generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-101 to -621 (2001)
(comprising the Montana containment of livestock statutes).
7. Larson-Murphy, 27 (citing State ex. rel. Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 245,
738 P.2d 497, 499 (1987)).
8. Id. 26.
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court unraveled a legal history characterized by confusion,
emotion and mythical western stereotypes. In its struggle to
rectify past errors, the court uncovered inherent weaknesses in
the twenty-first century application of nineteenth century law,
but ultimately created a rule of law that was significantly
altered by subsequent legislation, and would have been difficult
to implement consistently throughout the state.
A. Facts
Just after 11:30 p.m. May 8, 1993, Plaintiff Mary LarsonMurphy (Larson-Murphy) was traveling southbound on Hoskin
Road outside Billings, Montana. As she crested a small rise
created by a culvert, Larson-Murphy struck a bull in the middle
of the paved, two-lane county road.9 The bull rolled onto the
hood of Larson-Murphy's car and through the windshield,
causing her life threatening injuries that required an immediate
tracheotomy due to swelling and multiple fractures.
The
accident broke significant portions of Larson-Murphy's mid-face
and mandible, and caused permanent damage to her eyesight,
sense of taste and smell. 10
At the time of the accident, it is unquestionable that
Larson-Murphy had been driving in a lawful manner, and a
highway patrolman estimated her speed at just over 34 miles
per hour.
The patrol officer indicated that under the
circumstances, the accident was unavoidable and any driver on
the road at that time would have struck the bull."
On the evening of the accident, the bull was in a triangular
fenced pasture located within a larger fenced pasture, and
escaped through two fences to access the county road. The
pastures were within a statutory herd district leased by
Defendants Edwin and Violet Steiner (Steiner) from Defendant
Dr. August Zancanella. In their lease agreement, the Steiners
assumed responsibility for fence maintenance and carried
liability insurance for damages caused by escaped livestock. The
highway patrolman and Defendant Darin Steiner, the bull's
owner, inspected the fence the night of the accident and the
2
following morning, but found no signs of damage.'
At trial, Larson-Murphy suggested the bull escaped through
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. It 5, 8.
Appellant's Brief at 5, Larson-Murphy (No. 98-441).
Larson-Murphy, 917.
Id. [ 9-10.
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a gap between the fence and an irrigation ditch adjacent to
Hoskin Road.
She claimed the Steiners and Zancanellas
negligently failed to uphold their duty to control livestock within
a herd district and maintain the fence in accord with statutory
requirements. 13 Larson-Murphy also argued the open range
doctrine is "anachronistic," and the Montana court should seize
the opportunity to overrule its application to motorist and
livestock owner relationships. 14 Although the Steiners admitted
the bull was capable of jumping the fence, 15 they asserted that
Montana remains an open range state and livestock owners owe
no duty to motorists to prevent livestock from accessing or
16
wandering county roads.
Before trial both Zancanella and Steiner were denied
summary judgment, but upon request for reconsideration the
district court granted Zancanella's motion. Nearly one year
after their initial motion, the court denied the Steiners' second
motion for summary judgment. The district court determined
an issue of fact remained as to whether a county road in a herd
district constitutes open range.' 7 Subsequently, the Montana
Supreme Court denied the Steiners' motion for a writ of
supervisory control. At the close of Larson-Murphy's case, the
court denied the Steiners' request for a directed verdict.
However, after four witnesses testified on behalf of the Steiners,
and Larson-Murphy moved for a mistrial, the court reversed its
prior order and granted a directed verdict in favor of the
Steiners. The court issued no opinion explaining its reasoning.'8
B. Holding
The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the "no duty"
rule under the open range doctrine does not apply to the legal
relationship between livestock owners and motorists traveling
Montana highways.' 9
However, the court subsequently
13. Id.
11, 13-14 . See MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-101 (2001) (defining a legal
fence).
14. Appellant's brief at 54, Larson-Murphy (No. 98-441).
15. Larson-Murphy, 12.
16. Response Brief of Respondents/Cross-Appellants Steiner at 7, Larson-Murphy
(No. 98-441) (citing Martin, 227 Mont. at 244, 738 P.2d at 498, which held that Montana
has been an open range state since before entrance into the Union).
17. Larson-Murphy I 15-17. See also Appellant's Brief at 3, Larson-Murphy (No.
98-441).
18. Appellant's Brief at 4, Larson-Murphy (No. 98-441). See also Larson-Murphy,
18.
19. Larson-Murphy, 26.
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determined that "the law of the open range remains the law of
all highways outside private
this state," and open range includes
20
enclosures and used by the public.
To arrive at this rule, the court concluded the open range
doctrine has little or nothing to do with the legal relationship
between livestock owners and motorists under a theory of
negligence. 21 Instead, the open range doctrine purely expresses
that livestock owners owe no legal duty to other landowners to
22
prevent accidental livestock trespass on unfenced property.
The main thrust of Larson-Murphy thus concludes that the open
range doctrine was never about controlling conflict between
livestock owners and motorists, but was a burden-shifting
statute concerning who was required to fence property to protect
23
it from wandering livestock.
According to this decision, both a livestock owner and a
motorist have a legal right to occupy a highway in the open
range, but each owes the other "a legal duty to use such roads
24
so as not to injuriously interfere with the other's right of use."
Thus, both the motorist and livestock owner must act in a
"reasonable manner" when lawfully using a public highwayfailing to do so may impose liability for negligence. 25 In this
way, the law of the open range remains the law of this state, and
cattle may lawfully wander public roadways in the open range.
Livestock owners, however, are subject to a subsequent standard
of reasonable care toward motorists and other lawful occupants
of the highway. 26 Whether such a duty is imposed is a fact
27 (quoting Martin, 227 Mont. at 245, 738 P.2d at 499). See also MONT.
20. Id.
CODE ANN. § 81-4-203 (2001) (stating "all highways outside of private enclosures and
used by the public whether or not the same have been formally dedicated to the public"
are part of the open range). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-306 (2001) (stating an
exception to Section 81-4-203 of the Montana Code Annotated when a herd district has
been implemented); MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-201 (2001) (stating an exception to Section
81-4-203 of the Montana Code Annotated concerning highways designated part of the
national system of interstate and defense highways and federal-aid primary system).
21. Larson-Murphy, % 28.
22. Id. 29.
23. Personal Interview with Justice James C. Nelson, Montana Supreme Court, in
Missoula, Mont. (Feb. 9, 2001).
24. Larson-Murphy, 96. But see exceptions cited supra note 20.
25. Larson-Murphy, 98.
26. Larson-Murphy 11 79, 96-98 (in reaching this conclusion, the court overruled
Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302 (1967); Williams v. Selstad, 235 Mont.
137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988); Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont. 453, 853 P.2d 1214 (1993); Martin,
227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497; Siegfried v. Atchison, 219 Mont. 14, 709 P.2d 1006 (1985);
Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013 (1982); Jenkins v. Valley Garden
Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753 (1968), to the extent they held that a livestock
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driven question unique to the circumstances of the particular
incident. 27 This duty is governed by Section 27-1-701 of the
Montana Code Annotated which states everyone is responsible
for using "ordinary care or skill in the management of his
'28
property or person.
Ultimately the court arrived at this holding to remedy the
problematic history of Montana's interpretation of the
Containment of Livestock statutes so it could address the issues
specific to this case. 29 In addressing case specific issues, the
court additionally held: highways within a herd district are not
open range, and livestock owners may not allow their animals to
"run at large" on any public roadways in the district; 30 and the
legal fence statute does not create a statutory duty for livestock
owners to "fence in" their cattle, but only applies to landowners
establishing an action for trespass by fencing cattle out.31 Thus,
the court constructed a consistent foundation from which it
developed a more finite structure pertinent to the specific issues
in Larson-Murphy.
C. Background
"The inroad from the east was a new and sudden
32
outbreaking of a people" celebrated James Fennimore Cooper
and his fellow romantics when they discovered the vast open
spaces of the North American great plains and ignited a cultural
migration toward the West. So intense was this migration that
historian Walter Prescott Webb declared that men, cattle, and
horses "held almost undisputed possession of the region"
constituting an "empire of grass" by the 1860s and 1870s. 33 The
exodus toward cattle country led Montana Senator Mike
Mansfield to reflect that "[w]hile some dug into Montana's earth
owner owes no duty to motorists driving public highways in open range areas).
27. Larson-Murphy, 96.
28.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-701 (2001).

29. Larson-Murphy, 1 29, 32-33.
30. Id. 9161. Here the court overruled Williams, 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247, to
the extent it held the "no duty" rule applied to livestock owners and motorists within a
herd district.
31. Larson-Murphy, 85. Here the court overruled Indendi v. Workman, 272
Mont. 64, 899 P.2d 1085 (1995), to the extent it held failure to comply with the legal
fence statute may provide a basis to find negligence. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-101
(2001) (defining a legal fence).
32. See JAMEs FENNIMORE COOPER, THE PRAIRIE 10 (Airmont Publ'g Co. 1964)
(1827).
33. WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 225 (1959).
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for wealth, others sought it from what grew out of the earth.
Stockmen filled the rolling grass-covered High Plains of central
and eastern Montana with cattle and sheep."34 Like all western
booms, the enthusiasm for Montana rangeland brought the
cattlemen in force with their belief that "to be downright honest
about it, Montana's a hell of a lot better stock country... Y'see
35
you got more grass, more everything."
To fairly govern such a massive influx of cattlemen,
Montana and other western territories were forced to address
legal relationships between ranchers, their neighbors, and the
lawful use of public lands. 36 Traditionally, English common law
imposed a duty upon livestock owners to prevent their cattle
from running at large and held owners strictly liable for trespass
on private land whether fenced or not.37 Most jurisdictions
throughout the eastern United States implemented this common
law tradition. 38
The arid western landscape, however,
demanded a much larger area to graze cattle than eastern
states, and vast tracts of public land combined with sparse
population to make the western ranching ideal incompatible
39
with common law traditions.
Recognizing
these
unique
circumstances,
Congress
commissioned Major John Wesley Powell to survey western
lands, and he published his report in 1879.40 To create better
land division practices, Powell suggested a method of dividing
34. Mike Mansfield, special collection 1237, ts., Montana Historical Society,
Helena, Mont.
35. J.K. Ralston, oral history #49, "Montana History," Montana Historical Society,
Helena, Mont.
36. See, eg., Valerie Weeks Scott, The Range Cattle Industry: Its Effect on Western
Land Law, 28 MONT.L.REv. 155, 178-181 (1967).
37.
See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *211

(stating a cattle owner is liable for damages resulting from trespass when he negligently
allows cattle to stray "and they tread down his neighbors herbage"). See also, e.g., 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1197 n.22 (William D.

Lewis ed., Rees Welsh & Co. 1900) (stating "At common law, the owner of cattle is
required to take care of them. If they trespass on a neighbors land, he is responsible,
though there is no fence"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 76, at 539 (5th ed. 1984) (stating "itremains the common law in most
jurisdictions that the keeper of animals of a kind likely to roam and do damage is strictly
liable for their trespasses").
38. See Roy H. Andes, A Triumph of Myth Over Principle:The Saga of the Montana
Open-Range, 56 MONT.L.REV 485, 486 (1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
504 cmt. f(1977)). See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 1197 n.22.
39. See, e.g., Andes, supra note 38, at 486. See generally JOHN WESLEY POWELL,
REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES (Harv. Univ. Press
1962) (1879).
40.
See generally WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN (1992).
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land according to topographical districts surrounding river
drainages. 41 Congress did not act upon these suggestions, 42 and
the general belief was that open spaces should be freely used to
support the livestock industry since "[tihe commons are now
owned principally by the State and by the general government,
and if the grasses which grow thereon are not depastured, they
will waste and decay."43 Thus, the open range doctrine was born
in the West.
The open range doctrine was not statutorily codified until
after it had been practiced in the West as a matter of custom
and culture. In 1890, the United States Supreme Court first
recognized the existence of the open range doctrine and stated:
[There is an implied license, growing out of the custom of nearly a
hundred years, that the public lands of the United States,
especially those in which the native grasses are adapted to the
growth and fattening of domestic animals shall be free to the
people who seek to use them where they are left open and
unenclosed, and no act of government forbids this use. 44
In 1865, Montana's First Territorial Legislature at Bannack
codified the custom of the open range doctrine. 45 In this statute,
the Territorial Legislature provided double damages for
livestock trespassing on another's land, but only if a "lawful
fence" enclosed the property. 46 Thus, the Legislature statutorily
immunized livestock owners from liability for stock wandering
on another's land unless there was a "legal fence" around it.
This immunization established the rule that a livestock owner
has "no duty" to fence livestock in or prevent them from
wandering the range.
Although the Legislature has
implemented many additions to the "Containment of Livestock
Statutes" over the years, the essence of this statute remains
47
preserved in the current Montana Code Annotated.
Significantly, the Legislature never specifically included public
roadways or byways as a part of the open range doctrine "no
41.
42.
43.

See POWELL, supra note 39.
See STEGNER, supra note 40, at 334-338.
Morris v. Fraker, 5 Colo. 425, 429 (1880), quoted in Scott, supra note 36, at

179.
44.

Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).

45.

ACTS RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA §

1, at 351-

352 (Bannack 1864) [hereinafter ACTS].
46. Id.
47. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (2001) with ACTS, supra note 45.
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duty" rule. Thus, the Montana Legislature never addressed the
common law rule of mutual forbearance between livestock and
48
highway occupants in the Containment of Livestock statutes.
As the West grew, both the courts and Legislature
recognized the need to further limit the application of the open
range doctrine. The United States Supreme Court began the
evolution of the open range doctrine when it limited its
49
application to strictly accidental trespass in Lazarus v. Phelps.
Subsequently, in 1897 Congress passed legislation requiring
grazing leases on federal forest preserves. Fourteen years later,
the United States Supreme Court held the open range doctrine
had no application to land within these preserves. 50 By 1900,
every western state except Colorado, Montana and Wyoming
had passed legislation enabling herd districts to exempt
designated areas from the open range. 5 1 As western society
continued to develop, many states were faced with increasing
conflicts between highway users and livestock owners. As a
result, legislation barring livestock from wandering certain
highways further restricted the open range. 52 If livestock
wandered restricted highways, courts occasionally imposed
53
ordinary negligence standards on livestock owners.
Initially, the Montana judiciary embraced the statutory
open range doctrine and provided for its fullest application. In
Smith v. Williams, the Montana Supreme Court concluded a
plaintiff was required to completely enclose land with a legal
fence in order to bring a trespass action. 54 Subsequently, the
court upheld a jury instruction immunizing a livestock owner
from herding cattle on another's land unless done with malice. 55
Like other areas around the country, Montana also felt the
48. Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, 2000 MT 334,
88, 303 Mont. 96,
88, 15 P.3d
1205, 88 (2000).
49. 152 U.S. 81, 85 (1894).
50. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 525, 537 (1911). This was a precursor to the
Taylor Grazing Act passed in 1934. See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE
NEXT MERIDIAN, 93 (1992) (describing the history of the Taylor Grazing Act).
51. Scott, supra note 36, at 180.
52. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 607.505-607.527 (1999) (limiting open range on
certain local and federal-aid highways); COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-46-111 (2001) (requiring
fencing adjacent to federal-aid highways in agricultural zones); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1124-108 (Michie 2001) (prohibiting wandering livestock on fenced highways).
53. See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Liability of Owner of
Animal for Damage to Motor Vehicle or Injury to Person Riding Therein Resulting From
Collision with Domestic Animal at Large in Street or Highway, 29 A.L.R. 4th 431 (1984).
54. 2 Mont. 195, 201 (1874).
55. Fant v. Lyman, 9 Mont. 61, 22 P. 120 (1889).
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changing western landscape. In 1900, Montana was the first
state court to follow Lazarus and limit the open range doctrine
to accidental trespass. 56 Further, the Montana Legislature
adopted herd district statutes in 1917, 57 and restricted certain
animals from "running at large.158
Additional limitations
removed municipal areas59 and state and federal highway right60
of-ways from the open range.
From 1900 to 1967, the Montana Supreme Court developed
a consistent open range jurisprudence specifically limiting its
scope to cases involving accidental trespass.6 1 This changed in
1967 when the court first applied the "no duty" rule to livestock
wandering public highways in Bartsch v. Irvine Co. 62 The court
built upon this precedent 63 and ultimately found the open range
doctrine no duty rule applicable to motorists using highways
within herd districts in Williams v. Selstad.64 Finally, in
Indendi v. Workman, the court analyzed the primary state and
federal highway exclusion and expanded application of the legal
fence statute to require stock owners to fence stock off
highways .65
Thus, the open range doctrine grew from the unique custom
and culture of the American West, and evolved by judicial
interpretation and legislative initiative throughout the
56. See Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 316, 61 P. 863 (1900).
57.
1917 Mont. Laws 102 (current version at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-304 to 328 (2001)).
58. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-201, 202, 204, 210 (2001) (limiting swine, sheep,
llamas, alpacas, bison, ostriches, rheas, emus, goats, male equine and non-purebred bulls
from wandering the public range).
59. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-401 (2001).
60. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-201 (2001). The precursor to this statute was enacted
in 1951.
61. See, e.g., Thompson v. Mattuschek, 134 Mont. 500, 333 P.2d 1022 (1959); Hill v.
Chappel Bros. Inc., 93 Mont. 92, 18 P.2d 1106 (1932); Herness v. McCann, 90 Mont. 95,
300 P. 257 (1931); Long v. Davis, 68 Mont. 85, 217 P. 667 (1923); Dorman v. Erie, 63
Mont. 579, 208 P. 908 (1922); Chilcott v. Rea, 52 Mont. 134, 155 P. 1114 (1916); Herrin v.
Sieben, 46 Mont. 226, 127 P. 323 (1912); Musselshell Cattle Co. v. Woolfolk, 34 Mont.
126, 85 P. 874 (1906); Beinhorn v. Griswold, 27 Mont. 79, 69 P. 557 (1902); Monroe, 24
Mont. 316, 61 P. 863.
62. 149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302 (1967).
63. Williams, 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247; Indendi v. Workman, 272 Mont. 64,
899 P.2d 1085 (1994); Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont. 453, 853 P.2d 1214 (1993); State ex rel.
Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497 (1987); Siegfried v. Atchison, 219 Mont.
14, 709 P.2d 1006 (1985); Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013 (1982);
Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972); Jenkins v.
Valley Garden Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753 (1968).
64. 235 Mont. at 141, 766 P.2d at 249.
65. 272 Mont. at 73, 899 P.2d at 1090.
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twentieth century. Although the present statutory open range
doctrine retains basic language passed down from the 1865
statute, legislative amendments and case law greatly altered its
application.
Bartsch and Williams judicially expanded the
modern application of the open range doctrine, while the
Legislature restricted it in legally defined areas. Additionally,
Indendi broadened the legal fence statute as it relates to the
open range doctrine. In Larson-Murphy the court explicitly
overturned each of these judicial expansions.
D. Reasoning
Much like the background of the open range doctrine
described in this discussion, Larson-Murphy traced the origins
of the doctrine in order to interpret its present day application.
Based on this history, the court concluded the original purpose
of the open range doctrine was "to determine the rights and
remedies arising from the relationship of livestock owners and
landowners in actions involving the accidental trespass on
private property of livestock lawfully occupying the open
range." 66 The court found this interpretation of the open range
doctrine received consistent application from its origin in the
67
1874 Smith decision until the 1967 Bartsch decision.
A case of first impression in Montana, Bartsch initiated a
new era in the application of the open range doctrine "no duty"
rule. Specifically, Bartsch concluded Montana is open range
country, and since a livestock owner has no duty to prevent
stock from wandering open range "he cannot be said to be
negligent if the livestock do wander-even if such wandering
takes them onto a highway right of way... ."68 Larson-Murphy
rejected this reasoning as inconsistent with the historically
narrow application of the open range doctrine, and criticized
Bartsch for broadcasting the doctrine's scope beyond statutory
69
authority.
In support of its reasoning, the Montana Supreme Court
examined the extensive case history of the open range doctrine's
application and its limitation to trespass actions on "another's

66. Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, 2000 MT 334,
69, 303 Mont. 96,
69, 15 P.3d
1205, 69 (2000).
67. Id. See also, Andes, supra note 38.
68. Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 409, 427 P.2d 302, 305 (1967).
69. Larson-Murphy,
74-78.
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unenclosed land."7 0
The court reasoned that this limited
application should remain the extent of the open range doctrine
because the Legislature has not addressed the common law duty
between livestock owners and highway users. 7 1 The court was
unmoved by the argument that Section 60-7-201 of the Montana
Code Annotated, or any other modification to the open range
doctrine statutes, were enacted to "balance the costs of imposing
a duty on livestock owners with the damages suffered others due
72
to wandering livestock."
Based on this historical analysis and a strict interpretation
of the open range doctrine, the court concluded that any
assertion of legal duties arising from the relationship between
livestock owners and motorists is beyond the scope of Montana's
statutory open range doctrine. 73 This reasoning rejects the
argument that the Larson-Murphy holding modifies current
statutory law. Instead, it places the interpretive error on
Bartsch for "ignoring the fundamental purpose of Montana's
open range doctrine by taking a statutory body of law that
pertains to one particular legal relationship and applying it to
74
another."
Upon reaching this conclusion, the court refocused its
analysis on rights bestowed motorists and livestock owners
lawfully occupying Montana highways. Once again the court
found the historical evolution of English common law
throughout the West determinative of the rights and duties
owed to highway users. Specifically, the court inspected the
common law rule that unless an animal was of "unruly
disposition" the "mutual respect and forbearance rule" should
apply; thus, "[t]he motorists must put up with the farmer's
75
cattle: the farmer must endure the motorist."
Contrary to other western states, the court found Montana
has not statutorily affirmed or modified the common law rule

70. Id.
34-45, 74 (citing Montgomery v. Gehring, 145 Mont. 278, 400 P.2d 403
(1965); Thompson, 134 Mont. 500, 333 P.2d 1022; Shreiner v. Deep Creek Stock Ass'n, 68
Mont. 104, 217 P. 663 (1923); Beinhorn, 27 Mont. 79, 69 P. 557; Smith, 2 Mont. 195).
71. Larson-Murphy, 69.
72. Amicus Curiae Brief of David Baum, Barbara Baum, and Baum Ranch, LLC at
10, Larson-Murphy (No. 98-441). See also Larson-Murphy,
132-133 (Gray, J.,
dissenting).
73. Larson-Murphy, 70 (overruling Bartsch, 149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302, and
following cases, see supra note 29).
74. Id.
78.
75. Id.
86 (quoting Searle v. Wallbank, 1 L.R.App.Cas 341, 361 (1947) (L. du
Parq, concurring)).
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governing the legal relationship between livestock owners and
motorists as equal, lawful users of the highway. 76 Instead,
Montana's only limitation on the common law prohibits certain
types of animals from "running at large" on the roadways, and
exempts certain roadways and herd districts from common law
application. 77
Thus, in the absence of specific statutory
guidelines determining the rights and duties of highway users
and livestock owners, the Montana court implemented Sections
27-1-701 and 28-1-201 of the Montana Code to govern such
78
relationships.
Once the court laid the foundation determining rights and
duties of highway users and the limitations of the open range
doctrine, the door was open to address case specific issues
interpreting herd district and legal fence statutes. The court
began its reasoning by implementing the historic definition of
the open range doctrine and finding the "no-duty" rule cannot
79
apply to livestock owners and motorists within a herd district.
The court further defined a herd district as an area that
restricts any application of the open range doctrine. As such,
livestock may not run at large, and livestock owners may not
intentionally allow cattle to wander highways within a district.
This essentially creates a duty for livestock owners to contain
their cattle within a herd district, and rejects any application of
the open range doctrine therein.8 0
Similarly, the court relied on the open range doctrine's
traditional definition to determine the extent of the legal fence
statute. Because livestock owners owe no duty to keep cattle
from wandering the open range, the legal fence statute defines

76. Id.
88. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 25-2118 (Michie 2000) (stating that "no
person owning.. .any domestic animal running on open range, shall have the duty to
keep such animal off any highway... and shall not be liable for damage to any vehicle or
for any injury to any person riding therein, caused by the collision between the vehicle
and the animal"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 568.360(1) (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-363(C)
(Michie 2000).
77. See supra note 58; see also supra note 20.
78. Larson-Murphy,
92-93, 98. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-701 (2001);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-201 (2001) (stating everyone is bound to refrain from injuring
another's person or property).
79. Larson-Murphy, 61.
80. Id. (overruling Williams v. Selstad, 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988); see
supra note 26). Significantly, the herd district statutes make no mention of fencing, so
court does not impose a duty to fence cattle in. However, House Bill 418 was passed by
the 2001 Montana Legislature and places an affirmative duty on herd district members
to fence property according to the legal fence statute. The H.B. 418 amendment to the
herd district statute is now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-310 to -311 (2001).
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the standard required by a landowner to sustain an action
against trespassing cattle by fencing them out.8 1 The legal fence
statute never applied to confining livestock, and cannot be used
to define a standard of reasonable care required to fence
livestock off a public highway.8 2 Rather, standards of reasonable
care are fact-specific questions,8 3 not measured by conformance
to the legal fence statute.
E. Analysis
Adeptly unraveling the confusion surrounding the open
range doctrine, the Montana court accurately delineated its
limited historical application as a burden shifting statute
between landowners and fencing responsibilities.8 4 Likewise,
the court necessarily concluded the legal fence statutes do not
create a duty to fence in cattle, but only apply to landowners
striving to establish a condition precedent for a trespass action
by fencing cattle out.8 5
However, the court prematurely
dismissed legislative modifications that manifest an effort to
address livestock owner-motorist relationships. Additionally,
the court's reasoning failed to address a conundrum latent
within a practical application of its holding. As a result, LarsonMurphy toppled a house of cards constructed on decades of semistable legislation and precedent, but created a rule of law that
would have been difficult to implement.
The inherent problem within a twenty-first century
application of an open range doctrine retaining nineteenth
century characteristics stems from a legal lineage both pre- and
post-Bartsch. Specifically, all cases regarding the open range
preceding Bartsch were strictly landowner trespass actions.8 6
Thus, Bartsch first attempted to balance two competing
doctrines: (1) the legal mandate that every person is responsible
81. Larson-Murphy, [ 42-43, 84.
82. Id.
85 (overruling Indendi v. Workman, 272 Mont. 64, 899 P.2d 1085 (1995);
see supra note 31).
83. Id.
96.
84. See Fant v. Lyman, 9 Mont. 61, 62, 22 P. 120, 121 (1889) (holding an early
statutory provision to immunize livestock owners when their animals "stray on
unenclosed lands in quest of food or pasturage").
85. See Beinhorn v. Griswold, 27 Mont. 79, 89, 69 P. 557, 558 (1902) (stating that a
livestock owner did not owe a landowner "the duty to fence his cattle in").
86. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Montana Trial Lawyers Ass'n at 10, LarsonMurphy (No. 98-441) (stating that "[b]efore Bartsch, all cases of this Court interpreting
the open range doctrine involved disputes between owners of livestock and neighboring
property owners").
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to act with reasonable care in the management of his or her
property, and (2) the rule that livestock owners have no duty to
prevent livestock from wandering open range including public
highways. To choose the former over the latter would seemingly
reduce the latter to mere words since a livestock owner would
perceivably have a duty to keep stock off the road in certain
circumstances.
To choose the latter over the former would
reduce the former to mere words when relating to livestock
owners and motorists. Lacking legislative direction, Bartsch
protected the livestock owner's privilege to allow stock to
wander the open range.8 7 It should be noted that Justice
Harrison specially concurred in the opinion and concluded that
this matter "warrants the utmost consideration by our
Legislature."8 8
This concurrence indicates that the court
realized the conundrum between competing principles, but
lacked the appropriate legislative direction to restrict the
application of the statutory open range doctrine.
After the Bartsch opinion, the Montana Legislature was not
silent about the legal relationship between motorist and
livestock owner, and enacted Sections 60-7-101 through 103 of

the Montana Code Annotated in

1974.89

In fact, as stated in

Justice Gray's dissent in Larson-Murphy, the next legislative
session immediately following Bartsch enacted statutes relating
to the conundrum faced by the court. 90 Although the Legislature
has not specifically addressed or modified the statutory open
range doctrine itself, Section 60-7-101 of the Code provides that:
"It is the purpose of 60-7-101 through 103 to balance the
tradition of the open range and the economic and geographic
problems of raising livestock with the need for safer
highways." 9 1
In all respects, Sections 60-7-101 through 103 of the Code
appear to be a legislative attempt to balance the two competing
doctrines first addressed in.Bartsch.92 However, Larson-Murphy
simply refused to speculate about whether the Legislature
87. Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 409, 427 P.2d 302, 305 (1967).
88. Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 410, 427 P.2d at 305.
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-103 (2001) provides fencing requirements for state
highways.
90. Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, 2000 MT 334,
133, 303 Mont. 96, 133, 15 P.3d
1205, 133 (2000). (Gray, J., dissenting) (citing 1969 Mont. Laws Ch.311, Sec.1).
91.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-101 (2001).

92. See Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 245, 738 P.2d 497, 499 (1987) (stating
"[t] he law of the open range remains the law of this state. The exceptions enacted by the
Legislature have been carefully crafted").
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intended this statute as a potential modification to the open
range doctrine. Instead, the court strictly relied upon the
historical origin of the open range doctrine and the failure of the
Legislature to explicitly modify language within its statutory
93
construction.
To avoid the Bartsch conundrum, the court shrewdly
granted the motorist and livestock owner equal rights to
highway use, but imposed a subsequent duty on each. 94 Thus,
the seeming conflict between a general duty of care and a
livestock owner's right to run cattle at large on the open range is
balanced by requiring each user to "exercise a degree of care
commensurate with the danger of the agency that he himself is
using,"9 5 measured on a "case-to-case basis." 96 This conclusion
works well in theory because it balances the rights of each party
by applying the open range doctrine as it was initially intended,
and maintaining a cause of action for an injured motorist.
This conclusion, however, will be much more difficult to
implement in rural Montana courts where the open range
doctrine is most applicable. According to Larson-Murphy, the
rancher has no statutory duty to fence livestock in or keep them
off the road, and the motorist has no other duty than to be a
conscientious, lawful driver. Instead, liability for damages is a
factual question addressed by a jury of peers. To answer this
question, the jury may look to many factors to give form to an
otherwise nebulous legal guideline. Such factors may include
the population, habits and culture of the area, prior behavior
and/or warnings to the rancher, or the reasonableness of fencing
otherwise open range.
Based on these factors, different
standards would likely apply to different areas of the state.
Perhaps juries would require more diligent fence maintenance in
urban-interface rangeland than rural Montana where such a
duty would be unreasonable and overly burdensome.
Development of such a rule could make liability commensurate
with the threat of injury. Although this may be an appropriate
way to apportion liability, the inconsistent method by which it
will be attained leaves both ranchers and motorists wondering

93. See Larson-Murphy, 69.
94. Id.
96.
95. Id.
93. Traditionally, the court was reluctant to implement a foreign statute
bearing on the open range doctrine, see Martin, 227 Mont. at 245, 738 P.2d at 499
(commenting that "[tihe use of a statute, external from the statutory livestock chapter, to
impose an additional duty upon livestock owners is suspect").
96. Larson-Murphy, $ 30.
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what their rights and duties really are.
Twenty three of Montana's fifty six counties, nearly half
Montana's total geographic area, are designated "frontier" with
less than two persons per square mile. 97 This defines a large
portion of Montana that will face an identical hypothetical: a
conscientious motorist lawfully driving a rural county road
through a private open range pasture, cresting a hill and
sustaining injuries from impact with a cow lawfully grazing the
range. These competing rights to the roadway will ultimately
reach an impasse, and the individual juror will be left to decide
whose is the greater right. Even if judicial theory evades the
conundrum of competing rights, it will lurk in the shadows of
Larson-Murphy'sapplication.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO LARSON-MURPHY
A. House Bill 246
The December 15, 2000, Larson-Murphy decision became an
item of first priority for the House of Representatives Committee
on Agriculture when the 57th Legislature convened in January
2001. During Conference, Representative Keith Bales stated
that "this supreme court decision has caused much turmoil and
concern."9 8
The committee received letters from ranchers,
county commissioners, insurance agents and stock growing
organizations around the state expressing concern over the court
ruling. Concerns addressed issues of increased insurance rates
unduly burdening ranching operations, and the excessive costs
required to fence miles of remote open range county roads.
Further apprehension related to the infinite number of ways
fences can be damaged, the impossibility of diligent fence repair
before cattle escape, and the need to keep roads unfenced to
allow stock to graze and water efficiently. 99
In response to these concerns, the initial draft of House Bill
246 sought to "put back into effect what the court history
97. Brief of Amicus Curiae Montana Stock Growers Ass'n at 8, Larson-Murphy
(No. 98-441) (citing data from Montana Department of Commerce, Census and Economic
Information Center).
98. See Clarify Liability for Damages to Property Caused by Livestock on
Highways: Hearingon H.B. 246 Before House Comm. on Agric., 57th Leg. Sess. 3 (Mont.
2001) [hereinafter House Hearing].
99. Id. at 3-8. See also Clarify Liability for Damages to Property Caused by
Livestock on Highways: Exhibits on H.B. 246 Before House Comm. on Agric., 57th Leg.
Sess. 1-6 (Mont. 2001) [hereinafter Exhibits].
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was.. ." before the Larson-Murphy decision. 10 0
This draft
completely immunized livestock owners from any liability to
motorists colliding with livestock on the roadway in open range
and herd districts. The draft also extended the no duty rule to
livestock and motorist relationships excepting federal aid and
state primary highways under Section 60-7-201 of the Montana
Code Annotated.
This proposal was significant because it
sought to directly amend and expand the definition of open
range in the Containment of Livestock Statutes. 101 However,
during the committee meeting, several concerns were raised
regarding such broad immunity. These concerns focused mainly
on the immunity of irresponsible livestock owners and the need
for a balance protecting lawful motorists and responsible
livestock owners, while allowing liability for unsafe and
irresponsible ranching practices. 10 2 Striving to achieve this
compromise, the House Committee on Agriculture amended the
bill to "raise the bar from [the] standard of ordinary negligence,"
10 3
to gross negligence and intentional behavior.
On March 1, 2001, House Bill 246 was signed into law to be
codified under Title 27, Chapter 1, part 7 of the Montana Code
Annotated. Unlike its initial draft, the bill did not make any
direct amendment to the open range doctrine as codified in the
Containment of Livestock Statutes. Instead, the bill clarified
the duty owed between livestock owners and motorists, and
altered the common law duties between highway users and
livestock owners relied on by Larson-Murphy.10 4 Specifically,
the statute provided that unless the road qualifies as a highway
per Section 60-7-201, a livestock owner has:
no duty to keep livestock from wandering on highways and is not
subject to liability for damages to any property or for injury to a
person caused by an accident involving a motor vehicle and
livestock unless the owner of the livestock... was grossly negligent

100. House Hearing,supra note 98, at 15.
101.
Initial draft of H.B. 246, 57th Leg. Sess. (Mont. 2001) (Introduced Bill,
authorized print version LC 999).
102. House Hearing,supra note 98, at 8-10; see also Exhibits, supra note 99, at 7-8.
103. House Hearing, supra note 98, at 13; see also Clarify Liability for Damages to
Property Caused by Livestock on Highways: Executive Action on H.B. 246 Before House
Comm. on Agric., 57th Leg. Sess. 3 (Mont. 2001) [hereinafter Executive Action].
104. See MONT. CODE ANN § 27-1-724 (2001); see also Larson-Murphy v. Steiner,
2000 MT 334, If 86-88, 303 Mont. 96,
86-88, 15 P.3d 1205,
86-88 (2000)
(explaining the common law duties).
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10 5
or engaged in intentional misconduct.

B. Application of House Bill 246
As amended and signed by the governor, House Bill 246
does not change either the open range or herd district statutes
codified in the Containment of Livestock provisions. Instead,
the bill creates a new limited liability under Montana's Title 27
liability statutes. 10 6 The practical effect of this legislation leaves
the reasoning and interpretation of the Larson-Murphy decision
untouched as it relates to the open range, herd district and legal
fence statutes. The bill does, however, change the result of the
court's decision by defining the relationship between livestock
owner and motorist, and by imposing liability only if there is
intentional misconduct or gross negligence.
While this legislative standard further defines the rights
and duties between livestock owners and motorists, it remains
unclear what exactly constitutes "gross negligence." As passed
by the House Committee on Agriculture, the term was
understood to be "not exercising even slight care," whereas
negligence is a simple lack of ordinary care. As an example, the
House Committee analogized gross negligence to that of a
property owner's liability for a fallen tree: if a property owner
was aware that a tree was in a weakened condition, had been
told the tree was going to fall down and did not act, gross
negligence may apply if the tree fell and was struck by a
motorist. 1 07 Similarly, the Senate Committee understood that

gross negligence may apply to a situation where livestock
occupied the road seven times in three months after being
warned by police and neighbors to keep them off the roadway. 08
Although this provides no judicial or statutory guideline as to
when gross negligence may impose liability upon a rancher, it
illustrates how the Legislature understood the term upon
referring the bill to the Governor.
Although the gross negligent standard is liberally scattered
throughout the Montana Code Annotated limited liability

105. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-724 (2001).
106. See, e.g., Executive Action, supra note 103, at 2.
107. See Executive Action, supra note 103, at 3.
108. Clarify Liability for Damages to Property Caused by Livestock on Highways:
Hearingon H.B. 246 Before Senate Comm. on Agric., Livestock and Irrigation,57th Leg.
Sess. 4 (Mont. 2001) (statement in response to a question by Senator John Tester)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing].
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statutes, 10 9 it remains unclear what exactly constitutes gross
negligence in a limited liability setting. The Montana court has
addressed this heightened negligence standard many times, but
has failed to clarify its meaning beyond a vague test determined
on a case by case factual analysis. 110 In Rusk v. Skillman, the
court acknowledged scholarly criticism of the difficulties
involved in the attempt to create "degrees" of negligence. The
court eventually held the proper standard for gross negligence is
"failure to use slight care," and "something more than
negligence.""' The court noted, however, that distinguishing
ordinary from gross negligence "places the task upon the courts
to define the indefinable."1 2 Defined by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, gross negligence used in statutes may be
"construed as equivalent to reckless disregard."1 3 Prosser and
Keeton acknowledge that gross negligence is "somewhat
nebulous in concept." They note that some courts have equated
gross negligence with reckless disregard, but most courts
traditionally hold it "short of a reckless disregard for
consequences... [differing]... from ordinary negligence only in
degree, not in kind." Prosser and Keeton conclude that there is
no ultimate definition of the term, but that it may be considered
"more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention."114
None of these definitions help establish a clear guideline
determining when liability may be imposed upon a livestock
owner for managing livestock in a grossly negligent manner.
Perhaps the best direction afforded is the legislative intent
indicating that a rancher must know of some inherent or
repeated problem with livestock on the roadway and fail to
remedy that problem before a collision." 5 However, even this
109. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714(1) (2001) (limiting good Samaritan
liability in the care for others to damages caused only by gross negligence); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-721 (2001) (hunter safety instructors are not liable for conduct, acts or
omissions of a student handling firearms unless exhibiting gross negligence giving rise to
causation of damages); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-736 (2001) (limiting liability of health
care providers and dental hygienists to damages caused by gross negligence in specified
situations when providing services without compensation and the patient has been
notified of the limited liability).
110. See, e.g., Ratzburg v. Foster, 144 Mont. 521, 525-526, 398 P.2d 458, 460-461
(1965); Nangle v. Northern Pac. R.R., 96 Mont. 512, 521-522, 32 P.2d 11, 13 (1934).
111.
Rusk v. Skillman, 162 Mont. 436, 440-441, 514 P.2d 587, 589-590 (1973).
112. Id.
113.
114.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282e(5) (1965).
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§§

34, 212

(5th ed. 1984).
115. See Executive Action, supra note 103, at 3; see also Senate Hearing, supra note
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standard fails to address the many situations where a public
road runs through private unfenced open range pastures. Thus,
although the Legislature developed a more discernable line
guiding the livestock owner and motorist relationship, the
extent of the rights and duties of both parties will depend on the
facts and circumstances surrounding each incident. In essence,
this standard provides no clearer view of the rights and duties of
livestock owners and motorists than Larson-Murphy's
application of an ordinary negligence standard.
C. Applying the Gross Negligence Standard
When analyzing a dispute between a motorist and a
livestock owner in open range country, the first step should be to
determine the type of road upon which the incident occurred.
Such a determination can establish duties between the parties,
and the standard of culpability required. If the collision giving
rise to the conflict occurred on a state highway designated as
part of the national system of interstate and defense highways,
or on a state highway designated as part of the federal-aid
primary system, a general negligence standard will apply. 116
Note that highways defined by Title 60, Chapter 7, Part 2 are
the only specific exception from the gross negligence standard
established in Section 27-1-724.
Another significant consideration is the date when the road
was constructed or reconstructed. If constructed before 1969,
and designated as an area where livestock present a hazard to
motorists, the state may have a statutory duty to fence the
roadway. 117 Other factors of consideration include whether the
incident occurred in a herd district or a municipal area pursuant
to the Containment of Livestock statutes."18 While, presumably,
none of these classifications will change the gross negligent
standard of liability, 119 they will be important in considering
108, at 4.
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-201 (2001). See also Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont.
111, 121, 642 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1982) (stating that a cattle owner has a legal duty to
exercise due care to prevent livestock from wandering onto a highway falling under the
statutory definition of Title 60, Chapter 7, Section 201). See also Larson-Murphy, 65.
117. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-103 (2001). See alsoAmbrogini, 197 Mont. at 117, 642
P.2d at 1017.
118. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-401 to -410 (2001) (statutory limitations on
livestock in municipal areas); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-301 to -328 (2001) (Montana
herd district statutes).
119. Only MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 60-7-201 to -204 (2001) is excepted from the limited
liability enunciated in MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-724 (2001).
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whether there is a duty to fence livestock in. As a result, such
classifications will be an important factor in the overall factual
analysis determining whether gross negligence exists.
To begin a gross negligence analysis once the roadway is
properly classified, remember that gross negligence differs from
ordinary negligence only by degree and not kind. 120 Thus, an
ordinary negligence analysis, including the elements of duty,
breach, causation, scope of liability and damages, should be
relevant to determine gross negligence. In ordinary negligence,
each person has a duty to exercise "ordinary skill in the
management of his property or person. '121 Duty is breached if
the tortfeasor's act creates both a foreseeable and unreasonable
risk of harm. An unreasonable risk of harm can be measured by
weighing the "likelihood of harm, the seriousness of injury and
the value of the interest to be sacrificed." 122 Additional factors
taken into account when determining whether a risk of harm is
unreasonable include "the customs of the community, or of
1 23
others under like circumstances."
Section 27-1-724 of the Montana Code Annotated explicitly
exempts livestock owners from a duty to exercise "ordinary skill"
to keep livestock from wandering highways. By imposing a
gross negligence standard, however, there is an inferred duty
that a livestock owner cannot act with intentional misconduct or
gross negligence when allowing livestock to wander.
Determining whether such a duty is breached perceivably
creates a stepped up analysis requiring the tortfeasor's act to
create both a foreseeable and grossly unreasonable risk of harm.
Presumably, the likelihood of harm, seriousness of injury, value
of the interest sacrificed, and local community customs may still
be applied to this stepped up analysis. Additionally, legislative
intent should factor into the analysis since gross negligence is a
legislatively limited liability per Section 27-1-724 of the
Montana Code Annotated.
Consider the following hypotheticals that apply a gross
negligence analysis to relationships between motorists and
livestock owners. For purposes of this illustration, assume that
none of the special highway classifications discussed above apply
to the following situations.

120.

See PROSSEI, supra note 114.

121.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-701 (2001).

122.
123.

Mang v. Eliasson, 153 Mont. 431,436-37, 458 P.2d 777, 781 (1969).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965).
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HYPOTHETICAL 1: A rancher in Petroleum County, Montana, grazes
livestock on several thousand acres of rangeland.
Seasonal
grazing patterns include rotating the cattle between several large
pastures divided according to water sources and rangeland
productivity.
The summer pasture, located far from any
development, consists of over 1500 acres of land fenced from
adjoining pastures. An unfenced road accessible to the public runs
through the middle of this pasture, but is controlled at the
perimeter fence line by a cattle guard. One summer evening, a
fisherman wanders off the main county road leading to Fort Peck.
While driving attentively at a reasonable speed, the driver crests a
hill and collides with a heard of cows crossing the road. The driver
is seriously injured and evacuated to a Billings hospital.

This hypothetical represents a classic open range issue that
may occur in rural Montana counties devoted primarily to
agriculture. The issue presented here is whether the rancher
acted with gross negligence or intentional misconduct by not
fencing the road through his pasture. Implementing the stepped
up negligence analysis requires assessing whether the rancher
created a grossly unreasonable risk of harm measured by the
likelihood of the harm occurring, the seriousness of the harm,
the value of the interest sacrificed, as well as community
customs. Legislative intent will also be a factor since the
Legislature contemplated a comparable situation before
imposing the gross negligence limited liability to the general
rule that livestock owners have no duty to "keep livestock from
1 24
wandering.
To implement a gross negligence analysis in this
hypothetical, significant facts may include the location of the
accident with respect to population density and residential
development, local community standards, and knowledge of
risks posed by livestock wandering the road. In this scenario,
Petroleum County has one of the lowest population totals in the
state, just over 510 people, 125 and is devoted primarily to open
range ranching activity. Although the accident occurred on a
road used by the public, traffic is infrequent and the road is
located far from any municipal or residential area. The outer
pasture is fenced, controlled by a cattle guard and, while the
road is not fenced, the fencing strategy conforms to common

124. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-724 (2001); see also Senate Hearing, supra note
108 at 4 (statement in response to a question by Senator Holden).
125.
1998 county statistical data, Regional Economic Information System,
<http://govinfo.library.orst.edu.>.
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community customs. Based on these facts, it is evident that the
risk of the harm is not high, and the rancher demonstrated
adherence to local community customs. Additionally, the value
of the interest sacrificed in such a situation is quite large.
Imposing liability would require every road used by the public in
Petroleum County to be fenced. The costs imposed upon local
ranchers and the county government in such a rural area
greatly outweigh the likelihood of an accident occurring.
Legislative intent also acts to exempt the livestock owner
from liability in the present situation.
Specifically, when
contemplating the gross negligence standard, Senator Holden
asked how the standard would impact county roads with cattle
guards. In response to this inquiry, Representative Bales noted
the specific language in the bill that the landowner has no duty
to keep stock off the road. Thus, gross negligence should not
apply in rural areas where people know cattle are likely to be in
the road. 126
This indicates that the legislature did not
contemplate liability in obviously rural open range unfenced
areas when they implemented the gross negligence standard.
In summary, although there remains some chance of harm,
and serious injuries did result in this hypothetical, the motorist
must overcome a heavy burden in order to establish a gross
negligence standard. In light of these facts, it is evident that the
rancher's conduct was not grossly unreasonable and no gross
negligence exists. The outcome here is reasonable because a
motorist in such an area should be expected to take greater
precaution, while landowners should not have to protect against
every hazard in remote open range areas throughout the state.
2: A rancher outside of Kalispell in Flathead
County, Montana, grazes a small herd of cattle on just under 1000
acres of rangeland. While the ranch used to be fairly isolated,
increased residential development is beginning to encroach as
neighboring land is subdivided and sold. Additionally, traffic on
the county road has increased steadily due to a popular
recreational site established on Flathead Lake. Despite increased
traffic and residential development, the rancher has refused to
maintain his fences. Neighbors continually call him to retrieve
livestock from their yards and the police have even herded
livestock off the road and issued reprimands to keep fences
properly maintained to avoid any further conflict. One Saturday
night a neighbor drives home from a day at the lake and, while
HYPOTHETICAL

126. See Senate Hearing,supra note 108 at 4 (statement in response to a question
by Senator Holden).
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driving attentively and lawfully, rounds a corner and sustains
serious injuries from impacting a cow on the road.

Hypothetical 2 presents the issue of whether a livestock
owner's conduct is grossly negligent when he fails to maintain
fences in an area of increased residential growth and
recreational traffic after repeated warnings that cattle were
escaping. By applying the same analysis as Hypothetical 1, this
activity seems to constitute gross negligence.
First, the
likelihood of harm is great since there is both increased
residential traffic on the road as well as recreational traffic to
Flathead Lake.
Second, serious injuries resulted from the
impact. Third, the interest sacrificed is low. Requiring ranchers
in urban-interface areas to maintain their fences is far less a
burden than requiring entire counties far from urban centers to
fence every road. Fourth, in such growing residential areas,
ranchers customarily maintain fences to avoid neighboring
conflict and animal nuisance.
Finally, legislative intent
indicates that when a livestock owner was aware of the hazard,
had been warned of the hazard, and failed to act, gross
negligence may be established. Here, the livestock owner was
aware of increased traffic, had been notified several times by
neighbors that cattle were escaping, and had been reprimanded
by the police. By failing to take any action to contain the
livestock, this conduct may be considered grossly unreasonable,
thus implying liability based on gross negligence.
HYPOTHETICAL 3: A livestock owner grazes 50 cows on 500 acres in
Chestnut Valley just outside of Cascade, Montana. Cascade is a
small town with a population of 600 people, but Chestnut Valley
remains rural in nature. There are no residential subdivisions,
but the land is unevenly apportioned between large cattle ranches,
irrigated farmsteads and ranchettes. Traffic on the road remains
mostly local. For the most part, fences on this particular 500 acres
are well kept, but cows have been known to escape from one corner
of the land. Thus, neighbors have occasionally had to notify the
rancher that cows were wandering the roadway. Although the
rancher shored up some fence posts and used baler twine to patch
the trouble spot, no major re-fencing was done. One night while
traveling to visit a family friend, a motorist driving lawfully on the
county road strikes a cow and is rushed to the Great Falls
emergency room for reconstructive surgery.
HYPOTHETICAL 4: A livestock owner grazes 50 cows on 400 acres in
Gallatin Valley just outside of Bozeman, Montana. Bozeman is a
mid-sized town and growing rapidly. While much of the Gallatin
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and ranchette
residential
remains agricultural,
Valley
development is beginning to encroach upon traditionally isolated
agricultural areas. Traffic on the county roads has increased
slightly due to local residential growth and some tourist flow
during the summer. While the livestock owner is attentive to his
cattle, and fences are mostly well kept, there is a gap in one corner
where the cattle repeatedly escape. Neighbors often notify the
rancher that his cows are on their land or in the road. One
summer evening a tourist is lawfully driving the county roads
looking for a nice ranchette and sustains serious injuries from
striking a cow in the road.

Hypothetical 3 and 4 present similar issues in different
locales and demonstrate the difficulty of distinguishing between
an ordinary negligence and gross negligence standard. In both
hypotheticals the harm caused is equally severe, and the value
of the interest sacrificed is similarly small. Requiring either
livestock owner to re-fence a small portion of land to contain
livestock is hardly a burdensome procedure when weighed
against the nuisance of wandering livestock and the possibility
of harm in either scenario. Additionally, the livestock owner in
each hypothetical resides in a community that customarily
keeps cattle fenced off the roads and out of neighboring land. A
final similarity is evident in the livestock owner's knowledge
that livestock escape and wander neighboring fields and
roadways.
The distinguishing facts between the two hypotheticals
revolve around the general locality of the landholding and the
Hypothetical 3
relative degree of negligence exhibited.
demonstrates a reduced likelihood of harm posed by livestock on
the roadway because of its more agricultural location. The
setting in a rural valley, intermixed with large ranches and
irrigated farmsteads outside a small town, poses less of a traffic
risk than a traditionally rural, but increasingly residential
valley outside a rapidly developing mid-size community.
Additionally, Hypothetical 4 demonstrates greater tourist traffic
adding to an increased likelihood of harm caused by a collision
with livestock on the road. Relating to the degree of negligence,
Hypothetical 3 indicates that cattle only occasionally escape and
the rancher at least attempted to repair the problematic sections
of fence. Hypothetical 4 indicates that cattle escaped more often
through a gap in the fence and, although known to the rancher,
no measures were taken to constrain the cattle from wandering.
Both Hypothetical 3 and 4 probably meet an ordinary
negligence standard, but distinguishing facts indicate that only
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Hypothetical 4 will likely rise to the level of gross negligence.
While both scenarios illustrate similar facts and circumstances,
determinative differences include the frequency of escaped
cattle, the locality of the land, the likelihood of the harm posed
by wandering cattle, and the existence of remedial measures.
Balancing these fundamental differences indicates that the
evidence is most likely sufficient to distinguish between differing
degrees of negligence. Thus, Hypothetical 4 is most likely an
example of gross negligence, while Hypothetical 3 fails to meet
such an increased standard of negligence.
In conclusion, liability for livestock wandering the highway
will be an extremely fact intensive analysis based on a nebulous
gross negligence standard. Since gross negligence varies from
ordinary negligence only by degree, a stepped-up negligence
analysis helps to conceptualize factors useful for determining
Instrumental to this
when gross negligence may apply.
determination will be the location of the accident, the
surrounding community customs, remedial measures, and prior
knowledge of wandering or hazard livestock. Consideration of
these factors creates good policy throughout a mostly
agricultural state like Montana. Careful application of the gross
negligence standard may impose some measure of liability in
more heavily trafficked developing urban and residential
centers, while maintaining an open range tradition in dominant
agricultural counties where stringent fencing standards are less
practicable.
D. Livestock Owner-Motorist RelationshipsAround the West
Montana is not the first state to struggle with judicial and
legislative application of the open range doctrine in a changing
western environment that mixes growing urban centers with
traditional rural lifestyles. Other western state courts have
arrived at conclusions similar to Larson-Murphy, while
legislatures have attempted to mitigate the impact on the
livestock community. A review of open range policies in some of
these states provides insight into the open range developments
spurred by both Larson-Murphy and House Bill 246. There are
generally three categories western states tend to fit under when
dealing with open range issues: (1) states that statutorily or
judicially apply the open range no duty rule to livestock-motorist
relationships and provide complete immunity for stock owners
in the open range; (2) states that apply ordinary negligence to
livestock-motorist relationships by judicial interpretation; (3)
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states that judicially interpreted an ordinary negligence
relationship to apply, but have legislatively increased the
standard from ordinary negligence.
Idaho and Nevada have both implemented legislation that
exempts livestock owners from liability for damages caused by
livestock wandering the highway in designated open range
areas. Section 25-2118 of the Idaho Code provides that no
livestock owner "shall have the duty to keep such animal off any
highway on such [open] range, and shall not be liable for
damage to any vehicle or for injury to any person riding therein,
caused by a collision between the vehicle and the animal." 2 7
Nevada has codified similar legislation exempting livestock
owners from liability for stock wandering public roads in the
open range; however, Nevada does impose liability on livestock
owners negligently allowing domestic animals to enter a fenced
highway right of way. 128 While these states have legislatively
imposed immunity for livestock wandering roadways in the open
range, the Oregon court has refused impose any duty upon
livestock owners to control stock in the open range. In Kendall
v. Curl, the Oregon Supreme Court held that "if cattle and
horses have a right to be on the road, their owner is not
negligent in allowing them on the road."129 Not unlike Montana
open range development, the Idaho and Nevada statutes are
similar to House Bill 246 before revision, while the holding of
the Oregon court parallels the Bartsch holding prior to Larson130
Murphy.
While Nevada, Idaho and Oregon provide complete
immunity for livestock on the roadway in open range, Colorado
and Arizona apply general negligence standards to livestock
owner-motorist relationships. In Millard v. Smith, the Colorado
court held that the open range doctrine does not limit a
motorist's claim for liability. Specifically, the court stated that
the statute does not bar a negligence action and "should not be
enlarged by construction... to operate as such a bar.' 3' The
Colorado court continued by clarifying that cattle on the
roadway do not raise a presumption of negligence; instead, the
plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that the livestock owner
committed a specific act of negligence to breach a duty of
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

IDAHO CODE § 25-2118 (Michie 2000).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 568.360(2) (Michie 2001).
353 P.2d 227, 231 (Or. 1960).
Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 409, 427 P.2d 302, 305 (1967).
495 P.2d 234, 235 (Colo. 1972).
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reasonable care. 132
Similarly, in Carrow v. Lusby, the Arizona court held that
the open range statute was developed to govern relationships
between "owners and occupiers of land... the statute does not
govern the liability of a livestock owner to a motorist injured by
cattle crossing a highway. ' 133 Upon this conclusion, the court
turned to common law traditions to determine whether a
livestock owner owes a duty of care to motorists traveling public
roadways. Finding that common law does not impose a duty on
livestock owners to keep livestock off the highway, the court
interpreted this in light of the "natural and physical conditions
of our state." The court concluded that this did not preclude
livestock owners from owing a subsequent duty of care to
motorists in a "modern Arizona." 134 While implementing a
negligence standard, the court further stated that in open range
country, the mere failure to fence cattle off the roadway did not
establish breach of a duty of reasonable care. Instead, the
plaintiff motorist must prove specific acts or omissions of the
livestock owner. 135 In this way, while similar to Montana's
Larson-Murphy holding, the Arizona court provided direction
defining the standard of proof required by a plaintiff motorist
before liability may be imposed upon a livestock owner.
Finally, New Mexico and Montana occupy a similar category
of open range development created by legislatively
implementing an increased standard of negligence after a
judicial decision applying ordinary negligence. In Grubb v.
Wolfe, a New Mexico livestock owner sued a motorist for killing
a cow on the road in open range country. 36 The motorist
claimed the owner was contributorily negligent, while the owner
claimed he had no duty to act reasonably to keep cattle off the
roadway in open range. 137 In reaching its holding that the
132. Id. at 235-36.
133. 804 P.2d 747, 750 (Ariz. 1990).
134. Id. at 751-53. In their conclusion, the Arizona court found a Ninth Circuit case
implementing California law persuasive: see Galeppi Bros. v. Bartlett, 120 F.2d 208, 210
(9th Cir. 1941) (holding that the common law rule was made before the extensive
highway and motor vehicle traffic and "changed conditions compel adoption of a different
rule. There is no reason for exempting cattle owners from the same duty applicable to
other people to use 'ordinary care or skill in the management of [their] property'"). The
California Legislature has also reacted to urbanization by restricting open range
designation only to the few counties "devoted chiefly to grazing." See Shivley v. Dye
Creek Cattle Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238, 243 n.3 (Ct. App. 1994).
135. Carrow, 804 P.2d at 754.
136. 408 P.2d 756 (N.M. 1965).
137. Id. at 758
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livestock owner owed a duty of reasonable care, the court
concluded that even in open range a livestock owner has a duty
to act as a reasonable person, and failing to do so may impose
liability on a motorist. 138 Shortly after this decision, the New
Mexico Legislature enacted Section 64-18-62(c) 139 of the New
Mexico Code pursuant to an emergency clause provision. 40 This
legislation altered the standard of care required of a livestock
owner from ordinary negligence to "specific negligence other
than allowing his animals to range in said pasture.' 41 In Dean
v. Biesecker, the New Mexico court had an opportunity to apply
this "specific negligence" legislation. 42 In this case, a cattle
owner grazed livestock on either side of a state highway, there
was water on both sides of the road, and increased traffic on the
roadway caused repeated damage to both livestock and
motorists. 43 In light of these facts, the court maintained that
Section 64-18-62(c) did not require the livestock owner to fence
the highway or abandon his pastures. Although the livestock
owner knew accidents occurred on the highway due to
wandering stock, there was no specific act outside of lawful
grazing for which the livestock owner could be liable. The court
thus ruled in favor of the livestock owner and dismissed the
complaint. 144
Although similar to the recent developments of the Montana
open range law, it is not clear whether Montana's "gross
negligence" standard is comparable to New Mexico's "specific
negligence" standard. Like New Mexico's Grubb opinion, the
Montana court in Larson-Murphy established an ordinary
negligence standard for livestock owners with cattle wandering
the roadway on the open range. Also similar to New Mexico, the
Montana Legislature almost immediately altered the standard
of care. The Montana Legislature seemed to indicate that "gross
negligence" would apply if a livestock owner knew cattle were
continually on the roadway, causing accidents, and nothing was
done to prevent it. 14 5 Dean, however, indicated that specific
negligence required something more than just allowing cattle to
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 759.
Now codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-363(C) (Michie 2001).
Dean v. Biesecker, 534 P.2d 481, 482 (N.M. 1975).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-363(C) (Michie 2001).
534 P.2d 481.
Id. at 482-483.
Id.
See Senate Hearing,supra note 108.
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wander the roadway even if the owner knew there was a good
chance of collisions with motor vehicles. While similar in theory,
the two tests will likely differ in application, and Montana's
precise standard of care will only become apparent as it develops
on a case by case basis.
When looking at western open range development as a
whole, it is perhaps unfair to categorize developments that are
more accurately envisioned as a continuum of change.
Montana's Larson-Murphy decision and subsequent legislation
moved Montana open range development from the first category,
through the second and into the third. Other states have
various applications around these central themes, 14 6 and can
provide helpful information as Montana strives to define what
exactly constitutes "gross negligence" and liability in the
livestock owner-motorist relationship.
CONCLUSION

The law of the open range is unique to the American West
- it is a law bred for open country. 147 As western society began
to change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
the law of the open range kept pace with limitations exhibited in
Lazarus v. Phelps,148 statutory herd districts and ultimately the
exclusion of statutorily designated state and federal
highways. 149 Although the Montana Legislature enacted further
limitations on the open range, it failed to crystallize its intent by
direct modifications to the open range doctrine statutes.15 0 The
result established an open range doctrine constructed on judicial
initiative and speculative legislative intent - a confusing rule of
law wiped clean by Larson-Murphy and returned to its original
purity.
This constituted a heavy blow to the ranching
community that relied on 33 years of judicial protection from
liability to motorists, and the bright line rule first established in

146. See, e.g., Estate of Shuck, 577 N.W.2d 584, 587 (S.D. 1998) (holding that
livestock owners are not liable for damages sustained by motorists unless the owner
should have reasonably anticipated injury would result).
147. See Scott, supra note 36, at 181.
148. 152 U.S. 81, 85 (1894).
149. See supra note 57; see also supranote 60.
150. Did the Legislature rely on Bartsch when it developed Section 60-7-101 of the
Montana Code Annotated, and did it intend this as the only provision creating a legal
duty between motorists and livestock owners? Because this question is unclear, the
court has refused to extend the open range doctrine to such relationships in LarsonMurphy.
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Bartsch. Thus, the Legislature acted to form a limited liability
for livestock owners and cattle on the roadway.
Potentially problematic, however, is that House Bill 246 is
codified as a limited liability statute, not an open range
amendment. Presumably, this means the statute will limit the
liability of livestock owners with cattle on the roads in
municipal, urban-interface, herd district and rural open range
areas. While this explicitly sets forth the livestock ownermotorist relationship that Larson-Murphy found legislatively
non-existent, it codifies the relationship wholly separate from
the open range doctrine and Containment of Livestock statutes.
While patching the issue at hand, just as with Section 60-7101,151 the Legislature addressed an open range problem
without changing the open range statutes and expressing their
true objective. Perhaps it is time to address the open range in
light of a changing twenty-first century Montana, and create a
flexible open range doctrine that has the ability to adapt to
Montana's growing urban centers as well as traditional rural
communities.152

151. See supra note 91.
152. As stated earlier, a majority of Montana counties remain in "frontier status,"
as well as being heavily devoted to grazing. Due to a changing regional landscape,
however, there is no longer a need for a "blanket" open range doctrine. Through
population and traffic surveys, most of which are readily available, it would not be
difficult to create standards for expansive grazing districts that maintain open range
doctrine customs in established areas. Conversely, growing urban centers could be
designated according to herding district standards that enforce more rigorous fencing
requirements to control wandering livestock. Such a standard would promote good
urban-interface ranching techniques, while maintaining the open range tradition where
it is still a necessary way of life.

NOTE

RESCUING YOUR ATTACKER: STATE OF
MONTANA EX REL. KUNTZ V. MONTANA
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Penny Lee Merreot

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are in a tumultuous and abusive relationship.
You have finally gathered enough strength and resources to get
out. Right before you make your move, however, a violent
altercation ensues. Your almost-ex repeatedly slams your head
into the stove while he threatens to kill you. You are out of your
mind with fear and pain. In the midst of the assault, you catch
a glimpse of a knife nearby. Instinctively, you reach for it.
Because of your partner's rage and fixation on hurting you, he
fails to immediately realize what you are doing. Seconds later,
he is on the floor bleeding to death from a stab wound to the
chest.
You are in a state of shock and unable to comprehend or
accept what has happened. Your only thought is to get out and
distance yourself from the situation. You take his car keys and
start driving. After traveling several miles, you reach a friend's
house. You call your mom on the telephone and, in disbelief and
She arranges for
bewilderment, tell her what happened.
medical and law enforcement personnel to go to the residence
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where your former lover lies dying.
After you have some time to absorb what happened and talk
through it, you realize that what you did was justified. If you
hadn't noticed the knife at the moment you did, it would
probably be you lying on the floor bleeding to death. Since
leaving the house, you have been aware of this fact deep inside
yourself, and your family is now reassuring you of this.
However, you have a difficult time accepting that you had to kill
your partner in order to save yourself. Nevertheless, you tell the
officers who arrive what happened the best way you can,
including the fact that you used the knife because you were in
overwhelming fear for your own life.
Can an individual in this situation legitimately argue
justifiable use of force? Of course. However, the adoption of
State ex. rel. Kuntz v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court'
stands for the proposition that a person who justifiably uses
force to fend off an attacker may be found criminally culpable for
failing to summon aid for that attacker. 2 This note addresses
the issue of duty and its relationship to the justifiable use of
force defense in Montana. Part II of this note describes the facts
of Kuntz and the holding of the Montana Supreme Court. Part
III sets forth the history of the two relevant duties in the case:
the duty based on personal relationship and the duty based on
creation of the peril. Part IV analyzes the imposition of a legal
duty to aid one's attacker and examines the Montana Supreme
Court's reasoning behind the controversial decision. Part IV
also examines another recent case where the court imposed a
legal duty and which the Kuntz decision expanded upon.
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the court's analysis and
comments on the possible impact the decision may have on
future cases involving the affirmative defense of justifiable use
of force in Montana.

1. 2000 MT 22, 298 Mont. 146, 995 P.2d 951. This note will not address the
underlying and important issue of domestic violence that is present in the case.
2. Id. at 38.
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II. STATE OF MONTANA, EX REL. KUNTZ V. MONTANA
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

A. Summary of Facts
Bonnie Kuntz (Kuntz) and Warren Becker (Becker) were
involved in a tempestuous relationship and lived together for
approximately six years. 3 They were never married. 4 Verbal
and physical altercations transpired between them consistently
throughout their relationship. 5 Kuntz sought medical attention
at least twice for injuries caused by Becker. 6 There is also
7
evidence that Kuntz injured Becker during a squabble.
At the time of the events at issue, Kuntz and Becker were in
the process of ending their relationship.8 On the morning of
April 18, 1998, Kuntz and Becker had an argument, 9 but then
parted and did not see each other again that day until Kuntz
arrived home shortly before midnight. 10 Upon entering the
residence, Kuntz immediately noticed Becker had trashed it: the
phone was pulled from the wall and disabled," pictures had
been ripped off the wall, and a chair and mementos belonging to
Kuntz were placed in the wood burning stove.' 2 Kuntz began
preparing a pot of coffee prior to cleaning up the mess. 3
4
While Kuntz was making the coffee, Becker attacked her.
Becker's appearance and the power of the attack made Kuntz
fear for her life. 15 Becker shook her, grabbed her by the hair,
and slammed her into the stove.' 6 While Kuntz does not clearly
remember what happened next, she apparently grabbed a knife
nearby and stabbed Becker once in the chest.' 7
Kuntz
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Supplemental Brief of Relator at 2, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supplemental Brief of Relator at 3, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supplemental Brief of Relator at 3, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
Id.
Id.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 5, 298 Mont. 146, 5, 995 P.2d 951,
Supplemental Brief of Relator at 3, Kuntz (No. 99-055).

5.
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18
remembers going outside through the back door to "cool off."
Becker walked through the living room and out to the front
porch. 19 A short time later, Kuntz entered the house and saw
blood on the floor that trailed out onto the front porch, where
Becker was lying face down. 20 Kuntz rolled him over, but he was
unresponsive. 21 Kuntz took Becker's car keys from his pocket
and drove to a friend's house several miles away where she
called her mother. 22
Kuntz's mother arranged for law
enforcement and medical personnel to be notified and advised
23
her to go back to the residence to wait for them, which she did.
On June 23, 1998, Kuntz was charged with negligently
causing the death of Warren Becker by stabbing him in the
chest. 24 Kuntz entered a plea of not guilty. 25 On November 6,
1998, the State amended the Information to charge Kuntz with
the same offense, but added the charge of criminal culpability
for failing to call for medical assistance. 26 Again, Kuntz entered
a plea of not guilty. 27 On December 18, 1998, Kuntz moved to
dismiss the Amended Information, or in the alternative, to
strike the allegation that her failure to seek medical assistance
28
constituted negligent homicide.
Kuntz asserted she would rely upon the affirmative defense
of justifiable use of force. 29 Because justified use of force is a

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 1 6, 298 Mont. 146, 6, 995 P.2d 951, 6.
22. Id. at 7.
23.
Supplemental Brief of Relator at 4, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
24. Application for Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities in
Support at 1, Kuntz (99-055). A person commits the offense of negligent homicide if the
person negligently causes the death of another human being. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5104 (1999). A person acts negligently with respect to a result or to a circumstance
described by a statute defining an offense when the person consciously disregards a risk
that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists or when the person disregards a
risk of which the person should be aware that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists. The risk must be of a nature and degree that to disregard it
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation. "Gross deviation" means a deviation that is considerably
greater than lack of ordinary care. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-104 (1999).
25. Application for Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities in
Support at 1, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. A person is justified in the use of force or threat to use force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to
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complete defense, Kuntz argued it would confuse the issues to
allow the jury to consider what happened after the stabbing in
terms of criminal negligence, as well as subject her to the
unconstitutional risk of conviction for behavior that is not
criminal. 30 By attempting to prove criminal negligence, the
prosecution would be able to appeal to the passions, sympathies,
and prejudices of the jurors by not only circumventing Kuntz's
justifiable use of force argument as a complete defense, but also,
by directing the jury's focus on Kuntz's failure to save Becker,
asserting Kuntz is criminally liable for her inaction. 31 The State
filed a brief in response, arguing that Becker's death was caused
by Kuntz's actions as a whole, that is, both the stabbing and the
failure to seek aid. 32 The State further argued that even if
Kuntz was justified in stabbing Becker, "the right to use force in
self-defense is extinguished when the threat is ended; a person
33
has no right to sit and watch the assailant die."
On January 8, 1999, the district court denied Kuntz's
motion to dismiss the Amended Information. 34 The district court
concluded that although justifiable use of force is a complete
defense, Kuntz had a duty to act as a reasonable person
following her use of the defense. 35 Kuntz then applied to the
Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. 36 On
March 23, 1999, the Montana Supreme Court accepted original
37
jurisdiction at the request of both parties.

defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force.
However, he is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm
only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or
serious bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible
felony. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (2000).

30. Application for Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities in
Support at 1, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
31. Id. at 16.
32. Response to Application for Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Kuntz (No. 99055).
33. Id.
34. Application For Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities
in Support at 1-2, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
35. Order and Memorandum at 6, Kuntz (No. 98-531).
36. Application For Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities
in Support at 2, Kuntz No. (99-055). A writ of supervisory control is issued only to
correct erroneous rulings made by the lower court within its jurisdiction, where there is
no appeal, or the remedy by appeal cannot afford adequate relief, and gross injustice is
threatened as the result of such rulings. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1605 (7t h ed. 1999).
37. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, I 11, 298 Mont. 146, 11, 995 P.2d 951, 11.
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B. Holding
The two primary holdings by the Montana Supreme Court
are: (1) One who justifiably uses deadly force nevertheless has a
38
legal duty to summon aid for the mortally wounded attacker;
and (2) One who justifiably uses deadly force and fails to
summon aid for her attacker may be criminally culpable for that
failure .39
The court stressed the duty to aid one's attacker is only
"revived" after the victim "has fully exercised her right to seek
and secure safety from personal harm."40 Kuntz argued such a
duty should not exist if justifiable use of force is established by
the jury because it is a complete defense. 4 1 As a complete
defense, Kuntz argued a finding of justifiable use of force would
entail the conclusion that she was warranted to act as she did
without peril. 42 However, the court agreed with the State that a
duty to aid an attacker should be imposed on a victim after the
43
victim has secured safety.
The court also ruled that a victim who fails to summon aid
for her attacker may be found criminally negligent "only where
the failure to summon aid is the cause-in-fact of death, rather
than the use of force itself (emphasis added)."44 The dissent
states this concept is unworkable and makes poor public policy,
for how can a victim be justified in taking an attacker's life at
one point in time, then later be held criminally liable for the
attacker's death for failing to aid him?4 5 It will undoubtedly be
interesting to see how this rule unfolds in future justifiable use
of force cases in Montana, especially when considering that past
case law sheds little light on the matter.
III. DISCUSSION OF PRIOR LAW
To find a person liable for a failure to act, there must be a
duty to act imposed by the law, and the person must be

38. Id. at T 33.
39. Id. at T 38.
40. Id. at 133.
41. Application For Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities
in Support at 11, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
42. Id. at 14.
43. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 33, 298 Mont. 146, 33, 995 P.2d 951, T 33.
44. Id. at 1 38.
45. Id. at 50 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
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physically capable of performing the act. 46 The "American
bystander rule" imposes no legal duty on a person to rescue or
47
summon aid for another person who is at risk or in danger.
This is true regardless of moral obligations in society or "when
that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to"
the potential rescuer. 48 However, there are exceptions to the
American bystander rule, two of which are primarily relevant to
the facts of Kuntz: (1) the duty based on a personal relationship;
and (2) the duty based on creation of the peril. 49 Criminal
liability may be imposed when one fails to take action and one of
these duties is present.5 0 This part of the note discusses past
case law regarding these two duties. It is important to point
out, however, that there is virtually no authority that addresses
whether or not a legal duty arises following an act of selfdefense. This issue is one of first impression in Montana.51
A. Duty Based on PersonalRelationship
Social policy may justify a duty to rescue when some type of
special relationship exists between individuals. 52 The foremost
authority on the personal relationship duty in Montana stems
from the case of State v. Mally. 53 In Mally, the Montana
Supreme Court held that a husband has a duty to summon
medical aid for his wife, and a failure to render such aid could
make the husband criminally liable if the "failure to act was the
proximate cause of the death."54 Kay Mally suffered from
several physical conditions, including hepatitis, cirrhosis,
osteoarthritis, and diseases of the liver and kidney. 55 One
evening, she fractured both bones in her upper arms. 56 Instead
of immediately providing medical attention for his wife, Mally
placed her in the bedroom for a few days.5 7 When Mally finally
46.
47.
48.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-202 (1999).
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 14, 298 Mont. 146, 14, 995 P.2d 951, 14.
Id. [quoting Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1064 (Md. 1979) quoting WAYNE R.

LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, at 183 (1972)].

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 113.
57A AM. JUR. 2DNegligence § 99 (1989 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961).
Id. at 610, 366 P.2d at 874.
Id. at 600, 366 P.2d at 869.
Id.
Id.

236

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 63

summoned an ambulance for Kay, medical personnel found her
unconscious and her head, face, and arms badly bruised and
swollen. 58 Kay Mally never regained consciousness and died a
few days later from degeneration of the kidneys, brought on by
59
the severe shock she suffered after fracturing both arms.
Mally's conviction of involuntary manslaughter was
compatible with the court's previous holding in Territory v.
Manton.60 In Manton, the court ruled a husband's drunkenness
was no excuse for his failure to summon medical aid on behalf of
his ill-clad wife, who perished outside in the cold. 61 Manton's
manslaughter conviction was also upheld by the Montana
Supreme Court because he, like Mally, let his wife languish
speechlessly while making no effort to summon medical
assistance .62
In the more recent case of State v. Decker,63 however, the
court concluded a husband was not liable for failing to summon
aid for his wife who was passed out on the floor of a bar after
being intoxicated and complaining of a headache the previous
night. 64 Decker's wife, Hyacinth, like Kay Mally, was generally
in poor health and suffered from high blood pressure and
cirrhosis of the liver. 65 In this instance, the court determined
the defendant husband did not depart "from the conduct of an
ordinary and prudent man" 66 by (1) putting his wife to bed after
she complained of a headache and fell; (2) putting her to bed a
second time after finding her in a bar passed out the next day;
and (3) finally, contacting a nurse and ambulance the following
67
morning because of concern for his wife's condition.
Significantly, the personal relationship duty does not only
apply to married persons as the above cases have illustrated. In
the 1910 case of State v. Rees, 68 which involved a couple who was
living together, but not married, the Montana Supreme Court
declared that, "even if the deceased was not defendant's wife, if
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Mally, 139 Mont. at 601, 366 P.2d at 869.
Id.
8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387 (1888).
Id. at 109, 19 P. at 394.
Id.
157 Mont. 361, 485 P.2d 695 (1971).
Id. at 365, 485 P.2d at 697-698.
Id. at 363, 485 P.2d at 697.
Id.
Id.
40 Mont. 571, 107 P. 893 (1910).
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he was guilty of the assault, the legal duty rested upon him to
protect, care for, and shelter her after that act to the same
extent as though she had been his wife." 69 This rule is
applicable under the personal relationship exception to the
American bystander rule, as well as the next exception I will
address, the duty based on creation of the peril.
The notion that unmarried couples in a relationship may
still fall under the personal relationship exception was disputed
in People v. Beardsley.70 The Supreme Court of Michigan
determined the married defendant did not have a legal duty to
assist his "experienced" 71 mistress who had voluntarily ingested
morphine and later died. 72 The rule from Beardsley, however, is
now generally viewed as outdated,7 3 probably because of the
increasing number of unmarried couples involved in intimate
relationships. Accordingly, in Kuntz, the Montana Supreme
Court disregarded the rule from Beardsley and asserted that
Kuntz and Becker "owed each other the same personal
relationship duty as found between spouses under our holding in
Mally."7 4
B. Duty Based on Creation of the Peril
Courts have consistently held that a defendant who
positively acts to carelessly cause physical damage to the
plaintiff (or his property) is always held to owe a duty of care to
the plaintiff.75 In other words, when a person puts another in a
position of danger, he creates for himself a duty to rescue the
person from that danger.7 6 The Montana Supreme Court
recognized this duty to be more significant to the facts of Kuntz
77
than the duty derived from a personal relationship.
In United States v. Hatatley, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals found the defendant criminally liable for failing to
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 575, 107 P. at 894.
113 N.W. 1128 (Mich. 1907).
Id. at 1131.
Id. at 1129.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 18, 298 Mont. 146, I 18, 995 P.2d 951, 18.
Id. at 19.
Jane Stapleton, Duty of CareFactors:A Selection From the Judicial Menus, in

THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF JANE STAPLETON 61, 72 (Peter

Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998).
76. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.12 n.84 (2d. ed.
1986).
77. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 20, 298 Mont. 146, 20, 995 P.2d 951, 20.
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rescue the victim after beating him and leaving him injured and
shirtless in the freezing desert.78
Moreover, a recent
Washington court held a husband criminally liable for recklessly
causing the death of his wife by injecting her with a lethal dose
of cocaine, then failing to summon aid until 10-15 minutes after
she suffered a second seizure. 79 The court in the latter case held
the defendant "had a statutory duty to provide medical care, a
natural duty to provide medical help to his wife, and a duty to
80
summon aid for someone he helped place in danger."
While no pronouncement of the legal duty to summon or
render medical aid after using justifiable use of force has been
established in Montana or elsewhere in the United States, a few
jurisdictions have applied the duty based on creation of the peril
in cases where self-defense is an issue.81 For example, in People
v. Fowler,8 2 the defendant argued he struck decedent in selfdefense, then left him "lying helpless and unconscious in a
public road, exposed to that danger."8 3 The court stated "[tihis
conduct of the defendant would then be criminal or not,
according to the character of the blow he gave [the victim]. If it
was done in self-defense, it would be justifiable. If it was
felonious, it would be murder or manslaughter... ,84 While the

court did not expand any further on the defendant's duty or nonduty to rescue his victim from the public street following an act
of self-defense, from the court's statement, it appears that if the
defendant was justified in using deadly force against the victim,
he did not have a duty to rescue him from the busy street.
In King v. Commonwealth,85 the defendant was deemed
justified in shooting another individual, but the jury found him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter by unlawfully neglecting to
provide or refusing to permit others to provide medical attention
for the victim when the defendant should have known the
seriousness of the victim's wounds.8 6 However, the court
declared the particular jury instruction improper on which the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

130 F. 3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997).
State v. Morgan, 936 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 1997).
Id.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 22, 298 Mont. 146, I22, 995 P.2d 951,
174 P. 892 (Cal. 1918).
Id. at 896.
Id.
148 S.W.2d 1044 (Ky. 1941).
Id. at 1045.

22.

2002

KUNTZ V. DISTRICT COURT

239

conviction was based.8 7 The instruction required the shooting be
"unlawful,"88 in order to find the defendant had hastened the
victim's death by "willful neglect or willful failure to provide
medical attention."8 9
Accordingly, the court reversed the
defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and stated
that the condition precedent to defendant's guilt was not met as
required in the instruction because defendant did not unlawfully
shoot the victim. 90
Significantly, exceptions to the American bystander rule are
not absolute. 9 1 For example, a person is not required by law to
risk her own life to save another-whether she has a legal duty to
rescue another because of a personal relationship or whether she
placed another in a position of peril. 92 This point was made
decades ago in Yockel v. Gerstadt,93 where the Maryland Court
of Appeals stated, "[ulnder any and all circumstances, the law
places upon a man the duty of exercising reasonable care for his
own protection."94 The Montana Supreme Court supports this
rule of self-preservation, asserting that "the law does not require
that he or she risk serious bodily injury or death in order to
perform a legal duty,"95 even though such person may still be
96
held accountable for the peril bestowed on the other.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Legal Duty to Aid One's Attacker
The Montana Supreme Court limited its analysis of whether
a victim must aid her attacker following an act of self-defense to
circumstances when the exception of either a personal
relationship or creation of the peril exists. 97 The court relied on
Flippo v. State98 to declare that "whether inflicted in self-defense
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
King, 148 S.W.2d at 1046-47.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 25, 298 Mont. 146,
Id. at
25-26.
140 A. 40 (Md. 1928).
Id. at 42.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 27, 298 Mont. 146,
Id.
Id. at 29.
523 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1975).

25, 995 P.2d 951,

25.

27, 995 P.2d 951, T 27.
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or accidentally, a wound that causes a loss of blood undoubtedly
places a person in some degree of peril, and therefore gives rise
to a legal duty to either: (1) personally provide assistance; or (2)
summon medical assistance (emphasis added). 99 However, upon
a thorough reading of Flippo, there is no mention whatsoever of
self-defense by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, nor does the
court enunciate or seemingly imply that such a duty would be
applicable following the use of self-defense. In Flippo, the court
merely found sufficient evidence existed to hold the defendants
criminally negligent after unintentionally shooting and killing a
man while hunting, then failing to render timely aid after
promising the victim's father they would do so. 100
The Montana Supreme Court made it clear that when a
person justifiably uses self-defense, she does not have to aid her
attacker if doing so would place her in harm's way. 10 1 This rule
logically flows from the basic theory underlying the notion of
self-defense, that is, the right to protect oneself. The court
compared the person that justifiably uses force to the American
bystander rule's innocent bystander. 10 2 Both the person that
justifiably uses force and the innocent bystander have no legal
03
duty to render aid; each simply has the duty to protect herself.
Somehow, from this scant analysis that some may argue
tends to call for the opposite conclusion, the Montana Supreme
Court determined that a duty to summon aid may be "revived"
as the State contends, but only after the victim has fully
exercised her right to seek and secure safety. 10 4 The court
stressed that imposition of this duty requires: (1) the victim is
physically capable of such action; and (2) the victim has
knowledge of the facts indicating a duty to act. 0 5 Accordingly,
the court ruled a legal duty may be "revived" after a victim uses
self-defense, but the two requirements of knowledge and
physical capability must be met first. 0 6 Moreover, when the
legal duty to aid is "revived," the victim may still not be liable
for negligent homicide, the charge at issue in Kuntz, because it

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 1 30, 298 Mont. 146,
Flippo, 523 S.W. 2d at 394.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 31, 298 Mont. 146,
Id. at 9132.
Id.
Id. at 9 33.
Id.
Id.

'

30, 995 P.2d 951,

9 31,

995 P.2d 951,

30.

9131.
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requires a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care-a
standard that may not be met by failing to render aid-especially
under the circumstances generally present in a situation calling
10 7
for self-defense.
The Montana Supreme Court wrongly determined that a
victim may have a "revived" duty to aid her attacker following
her justifiable use of force against him. The dissenting opinion
is correct by stating "[tihis result is simply unworkable as a
practical matter and makes poor public policy."'0 8 How can
justified use of force against an attacker reconcile with a later
obligation to assist him? There is no rationale behind this duty.
It makes little sense to permit a victim to justifiably use deadly
force against another when in a life or death situation, then
place a legal duty on that victim to aid the other, who just
previously threatened the victim with serious bodily injury or
death.
Certainly, one could argue that a moral duty may arise
when and if the victim feels safe and is physically and
emotionally able to call for help if her attacker is in need.
However, a moral duty is not the same as a legal duty, as the
Restatement makes clear. 10 9 A moral duty generally cannot be
imposed on one individual to aid another, even if assistance
could easily be invoked. 110 Thus, it follows that such a duty
should not be placed on a victim to aid her attacker after the use
of self-defense.
Furthermore, the majority's stipulation that the duty to aid
shall be revived only after the victim is "safe""' is, at best,
vague. How does a person who is completely removed from such
a violent and extreme situation (such as a judge) decide when
the victim felt safe enough to elicit the duty to render aid to her
aggressor? It would be impossible, as far as I can tell, for
someone unrelated to the incident to later determine when (and
if) a victim felt safe from her attacker to, at some particular
point in time, give rise to a legal duty to rescue her attacker.
Justifiable use of force is authorized only in very limited

107. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 34, 298 Mont. 146, 22, 995 P.2d 951, 22.
108. Id. at 50 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
110. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 14, 298 Mont. 146, 14, 995 P.2d 951 14 [quoting Pope
v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1064 (Md. 1979) quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, at 183 (1972)].
111. Id. at T 33.
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circumstances. 11 2 It is applicable only when necessary to
prevent imminent death, serious bodily harm to oneself or
another, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 113
However, in these limited instances, the use of deadly force is
acceptable. 1 4 "It is inherently contradictory to provide by
statute that under certain circumstances deadly force may be
justified, but that having so acted, a victim has a common law
duty to prevent the death of her assailant."1 5 Furthermore, it
should not be forgotten that justifiable use of force is a complete
16
defense, which must result in an acquittal if proven.
B. CriminalLiability for Failingto Aid One's Attacker
Since the Montana Supreme Court ruled a victim that has
justifiably used force may have a "revived" duty of care to her
attacker, it follows that the court held a failure to perform this
duty can give rise to criminal liability. 1 7 A victim under these
circumstances, however, may be criminally liable for failing to
render aid only if the failure was the "cause in fact" of the
aggressor's death, rather than the justified use of force." 8
Therefore, if the justified use of force directly led to the
aggressor's death, the victim cannot be criminally liable for
failing to render aid. To make the rule even more complicated,
the court notes that "a breach of the legal duty to summon aid
may be the cause-in-fact of death, but is still not necessarily a
crime" 119 under Montana's negligent homicide statute because a
gross deviation from an ordinary standard of care must be
shown. 20 Once again, the court has set forth a hazy rule that is
difficult to apply.
This rule is impractical for two reasons. First of all, it could
be extremely arduous to determine whether or not the failure to
summon aid was the cause-in-fact of the aggressor's death,
rather than merely the injuries received from the victim's
112.

Id. at J 51.

113.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (1999).

114. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 51, 298 Mont. 146, 51, 995 P.2d 951, 51.
115. Id. (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
116. Park v. Montana Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 1998 MT 164, 42, 289 Mont. 367,
42, 961 P.2d 1267, 42.
117. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 36, 298 Mont. 146, 36, 995 P.2d 951, 36.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 39.
120. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
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justified use of force. In the cases where this information is not
easily ascertainable, one could convincingly argue either way.
For instance, one may assert the aggressor died simply as a
result of the force necessarily used by the victim, and he would
have died even if medical aid had been quickly administered.
On the other hand, one could argue the aggressor died as a
cause-in-fact of the victim's failure to summon medical aid soon
enough (after feeling safe, of course), rather than dying from the
injuries received from the victim through the use of self-defense.
The former argument has merit because "where a person is
placed in peril by another's justified use of force it can never be
said that the failure to summon aid, rather than the original act
of force, is the cause in fact of death, because presumably death
would never have occurred but for the original act of selfdefense." 121 The latter argument also appears worthwhile,
because is it not true that virtually anytime a person is seriously
injured, the lack of immediate medical attention directly
contributes to the quicker expiration of that person's life than if
such aid had been readily administered?
The second reason the court's rule that imposes criminal
liability is impractical results from its contradictory nature as it
relates to the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force.
When self-defense is proven, the victim is justified in taking the
attacker's life. How can the same victim be held criminally
liable for failing to render aid to the attacker later, and for the
injuries inflicted justifiably by the victim while defending
herself? Clearly, the court's rule in Kuntz and Montana's self122
defense statute are at odds.
The dissent was correct by asserting that a legal duty under
the circumstances in the present case should not be capable of
being revived, nor should the victim be held criminally liable for
failing to render aid to her attacker if such revival has taken
place.' 23 Kuntz is an unusual case in which imposing liability is
troublesome for public policy reasons. In cases such as this, it is
recommended that judges screen the plaintiffs claim under the
direction of duty. 24 To illustrate, the Restatement presents a
situation where there is an obvious problem in allowing suit
121. Id. at ]52.
122. Id. at 1 51; see also supra text accompanying note 29.
123. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 54, 298 Mont. 146, 54, 995 P.2d 951,
J., dissenting).
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (2001).

54 (Trieweiler,
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against a property owner who is clearly negligent, but a plaintiff
who is injured while deliberately trespassing on the owner's
property. 125 The difficulty with this lawsuit is similar to the
problem faced in Kuntz. In both cases, the defendant should
generally not be held liable for the plaintiffs harm because of
By
the plaintiffs role and the surrounding circumstances.
recognizing liability in such instances, courts take on a bold task
126
that is potentially problematic.
C. Another Recent Montana Supreme Court Decision and Future
Implications of Kuntz
The Montana Supreme Court is clearly expanding the
circumstances of when one person owes a legal duty to rescue
another. Prior to Kuntz, the court broadened the concept of a
legal duty in Nelson v. Driscoll.127 In Nelson, the court held a
police officer had a legal duty of care to a female driver following
a traffic stop. 28 The officer was aware the female and her male
passenger had been drinking alcohol, but the driver did not
appear intoxicated. 129 However, because the officer knew both
the driver and passenger consumed alcohol earlier that night, he
30
prohibited them from driving home and offered them a ride.
The couple did not accept the ride and stated they would call a
The officer then left the area, but
friend for help. 13'
subsequently drove by the couple several times to make sure
they did not attempt to get back into their vehicle.1 32 A short
while later, the female was killed after being struck by a car,
and the Montana Supreme Court held the police officer had a
duty to protect her from harm because he affirmatively took
33
steps to voluntarily provide a service to her.
While there is authority that a special relationship exists
between an officer and a prisoner in custody, 134 which imposes a
duty on the officer to protect the prisoner, this was not the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
1999 MT 193, 295 Mont. 363, 983 P.2d 972.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Nelson, 1999 MT193, 38, 295 Mont. 363, T 38, 983 P.2d 972,
Id.
57A AM. JUR. 2DNegligence § 99 (1989 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
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situation in Nelson. In Nelson, the officer did not place the
female driver under arrest. The general rule is that a police
officer "has no duty to protect a particular individual absent a
special relationship."1 35 However, the court found the officer
assumed a duty to protect the driver merely because the officer
took affirmative and voluntary steps to prevent the couple from
driving home. 136 The court also concluded the officer's actions
constituted a foreseeable risk of harm to the female because of
icy conditions, darkness, and the fact the female had been
137
drinking alcohol.
The outcome of Nelson is off the mark. An officer that
simply takes away one's driving privileges because of alcohol use
should not then be burdened with a duty to protect that person.
In this case, the officer offered the couple a ride home and was
refused. The couple told him they would call a friend for a ride
home, and a pay phone was only a little more than a block
away. 138 The officer drove around in the vicinity where the
couple was located in order to check on them and make sure
they were not driving. 39 How would it be foreseeable to the
officer that the female would be struck by a car and killed? She
did not display enough characteristics to be charged with a DUI,
though she and the passenger admitted drinking. 140 Therefore,
regardless of the weather conditions, the officer did what he
could to assist the couple and should not be held responsible for
any harm to them. After all, the driver and passenger were both
adults who were accountable for their own actions.
In both Kuntz and Nelson, the court found a legal duty
where there should be none. Certainly, the court has expanded
the circumstances in which a legal duty exists. By finding that a
police officer owes a duty to rescue a possibly-impaired driver
and a victim owes a duty to rescue her attacker, it is hard to say
where the court will draw the line in the future. The court is
clearly leaning towards applying a legal duty wherever possible
instead of enforcing the American bystander rule, an arguably
more appropriate precept for cases concerning self-defense and
officer discretion.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Nelson,
Id. at
Id. at
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V. CONCLUSION

The legal duty the Montana Supreme Court applied in
Kuntz is not supported by existing case law. For the most part,
this is because of the lack of any case law on point. However,
the court's decision does not logically flow from the few cases the
majority did cite in its analysis. The rule that after a person
justifiably uses force to fend off an attacker she must then
render aid to that attacker, is truly unfeasible. The revival of a
duty to rescue under such circumstances cannot legitimately be
imposed. If it is determined that an individual justifiably used
force to fend off an attacker, the inquiry should stop there. It is
simply incomprehensible to imagine a scenario unfolding as the
court suggests-that a person would defend herself by wounding
an attacker during a vicious struggle, regain composure and feel
safe, then personally aid her attacker or call for help in order to
save him. One can only hope the current trend by the Montana
Supreme Court of imposing a legal duty where there should be
none soon will be reexamined, and thus, short-lived.

